[MD] The 4th. level's two interpretations. Part 1

[Ham Priday]

On 10/28/09 at 3:48 PM, "markhsmit" wrote to Ham:



> I have no problem with your stipulation. We cannot feel or
> understand the consciousness of level three, just as the cells
> of our body cannot intuit the consciousness of the whole body
> (brain included). However, we can perhaps discern purposeful
> behavior. That is, behavior that has choice. I know the linguistic
> pitfalls this includes. But glossing over that, a cell in the body
> has choices in its expression. The human body has choices in its
> expression, and so by analogy, the societal consciousness has
> choices as well. We cannot comprehend the active process or
> consciousness awareness of either of these two levels, but must
> assume that it exists, just as we assume our own consciousness exists.

A tossed coin has the "choice" of landing heads or tails, but it isn't 
conscious of this choice.  Living cells ingest and exude foreign matter to 
survive and undergo mitosis according to the laws of genetics, not by 
choice.  One cannot assume consciousness in single-cell organisms or plants 
simply from the manifestation of change, even if such changes serve a useful 
purpose.  This is not to say that the processes of nature are not purposeful 
or intelligently designed, but only that their "purpose" and "design" is a 
valuistic precept of our intellect.  This has to be the case if, as I 
maintain, experience creates the universe.

> I am beginning to understand your ontology, but still have a hard time
> understanding that sensibility is only confined to the biological 
> individual.
> That is, a proprietary sensibility or consciousness that only humans can
> have. Or, for example, only a human with all his faculties. These 
> faculties
> can be divided and reduced until nothing is left, there is no core.
> There is no reason not to extend the analogy to any system or system of
> systems and allow the same negation to be in place.

I'm not sure what you mean by "confined to the biological individual."  What 
other individual is there?
I do not disallow the fact that an ant or an earthworm is an individual, 
although I have no way of knowing what its consciousness amounts to.  It 
would appear that its behavior is directed by the survival instinct innate 
to all living organisms.  I suppose the response mechanisms of brainless 
creatures could be considered "conscious" behavior, although biological 
instinct does not support freedom of choice, value realization, and 
reasoning which are necessary for cognitively-directed behavior.

> While behavior is not consciousness just as a river is not gravity,
> I would say that it is a manifestation of consciousness.

You present a good argument, Mark.  However, I would say that 
"manifestation" is another word for "appearance", and there is no empirical 
means by which we can confirm the presence of consciousness from an 
organism's behavior.  Frankly, I'm more inclined to regard the appearance of 
an organism as a manifestation of OUR consciousness.

Cheers,
Ham

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On Oct 28, 2009, at 10:06:32 AM, "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
From:   "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net>
Subject:    Re: [MD] The 4th. level's two interpretations. Part 1
Date:   October 28, 2009 10:06:32 AM PDT
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org

On Wednesday, 10/28/09 2:34 AM, "markhsmit" wrote to All:.

> Social consciousness is unfelt by us, but we can tell that it does
> form a consciousness by observing that it does have behavior.
> What it is actually thinking can only be roughly deduced.

One of the mistakes we make in categorizing our world is to equate
consciousness with "behavior." This is an intellectual form of animism. A
computer, an automobile, a bouncing ball, and the climate exhibit behavior,
but they do not have consciousness. Consciousness is not measured
objectively and can only be affirmed (subjectively) by the "knower".

The collective behavior of mankind is social history. Collective knowledge
is defined as intelligence, not "intellect". It is important that we
distinguish euphemisms (i.e, reifications) like "the collective
consciousness" and "social intellect" from cognizant awareness which is
proprietary to the individual. Philosophers who fail to make this
distinction are deluded by a flawed epistemology which, I regret to say, is
the basis for the MoQ levels hierarchy.

Essentially speaking,
Ham