[MD] ego vs self

[Ham Priday]

Greetings Platt (Bodvar and Arlo quoted) --


> Hey Ham,
>
> Maybe the problem between we Pirsigians and you is in our
> understanding of "experience."  You say "experience is the
> objective content of the conscious self" whereas Pirsig says
> experience occurs "prior to intellectual abstractions."
> In other words, take it one step before thoughts like
> "conscious self" and "objective content." Even take it one
> step before the thought, "experience."  As Huang Po said,
> "Start thinking about it and you miss it." Or as one of my
> favorites, Kafka, wrote:
>
> "You do not need to leave your room. Remain sitting at your
> table and listen.  Do not even listen, simply wait.
> Do not even wait, be quite still and solitary. The world will
> freely offer itself to you to be unmasked. It has no choice.
> It will roll in ecstasy at your feet."

It's true that my understanding of "experience" is awareness of objective 
reality, whereas the Pirsigians  include awareness of Quality (Value) as 
"pre-intellectual.experience."  There's a logical reason for distinguishing 
sensibility from experience (objectification).

As Bo has just stipulated:
> Again Pirsig inadvertently confirms the SOL (intellect as the S/O
> distinction). From inside intellect the fundamental split is between
> a self and its world.

If intellect is what divides the self from "its world", then experience of 
objective reality requires intellection.  But, as you point out, "Pirsig 
says experience [the "Quality event"] occurs 'prior to intellectual 
abstractions'."  Therefore, awareness of Value is not an intellectual 
construct, not "objective", but some other kind of awareness.  I believe 
Pirsig also refers to value perception as "direct experience", which is 
somewhat confusing, considering that we commonly describe non-objective 
(proprietary) sensibility as "feeling" rather than "experience".  That's 
only a semantic distinction, however, which doesn't impugn the subjective 
"self".

But you suggest that I "take it one step before thoughts like 'conscious 
self' and 'objective content'."  This I cannot do.  My "conscious self" is 
not a "thought" to me: it IS me.  I suggest that you and your fellow 
Pirsigians want to deny this.  And defining the 'I' (ego?) of existence as 
"interactive patterns" is your way of dismissing the subjective self.   My 
self may not "exist" as rocks and trees do, but it is my reality 
nonetheless.  If I were to dismiss it (as Descartes tried to do), I could 
not vouch for the existence of anything.  And if I had no self, there would 
be no Ham Priday to exist, experience, think, or value.  The world that 
Kafka says "will freely offer itself to you" would have no identity to 
receive its offer.  In fact, if Pirsig is correct that "experience is the 
cutting edge of reality", no objective world would be  objectivized.

I noted with interest your recent exchange with Arlo:

[Platt]:
> I take it then that your believe existence depends on human perception.

[Arlo]:
> What we perceive to be "existence" depends on our "perception".

On this point I have to agree with Arlo (your cat UTOE notwithstanding). 
But I'm not sure that Pirsigians in general believe this -- especially when 
they talk of 'things-in-themselves'.  As an Essentialist, I'm convinced that 
all "beingness" depends on "awareness", and vice-versa.  Existence is an 
Awareness/Beingness dichotomy (otherwise expressed as 
"Sensibility/Otherness").

As to your question, "What is 'it' -- this elemental reality?", Pirsig's 
'Quality' is, indeed, a novel answer nicely supported by a moral principle. 
I cannot accept it because the epistemology is wrong.  Quality is not an 
'essent'; it exists only for the subject (value-sensibility) in relation to 
its object (otherness).  Eliminate that dichotomy and value perception 
disappears, along with the "Quality" which John Carl suggests "is the 
Appreciation of Value".

You are thinking like a philosopher, Platt, and your belief in the MoQ is 
resolute.  I'm happy that it works for you, and I don't mean to be critical 
of your views.  It's just that I'm equally convinced that the Quality thesis 
is epistemologically and metaphysically unsound.

Kindest regards,
Ham