[MD] a view

[John Carl]

> [Arlo]
> And my point, and Pirsig's, is that this process occurs only embedded in a
> socio-historical dialogue; only after a biological organism has
> appropriated
> the shared culture of her/his social world, and only in the context of
> response/anticipation to others in this dialogue.
>
>
Well you can't say that and expect to continue this argument with me.
 You're completely correct and I agree completely.  What fun is that?




>
> [Arlo]
>
> For what its worth, I find symbolic mediation underscores both the social
> and
> intellectual level, for me I separate the levels as occurring when the
> shared
> symbols of a culture become objects to inquire about themselves.



In other words, "intellectualized".  In other words, "objectified".  In
other words "thought".

And yes, I agree completely there too.  I also see this process of
objectifying social patterns and analyzing them objectively as that supreme
4th level activity which human societies have always engaged in, as long as
there have been human societies.

Primitive societies were no more "social" as opposed to intellectual than
our own, that we have any evidence of.  In fact, I'd hazard a guess as to
the opposite.  The technological powers that are now in the service of
reinforcing and manipulating social patterns have created a society more
social and less intellectual than any time in human history.



> One sees the
> intellectual level then as a sort of "literary criticism" atop a strata of
> "storytelling". I've mentioned this before, but one analogy would be to
> consider that on the social level we see evidence of using number-symbols
> to
> represent cows (or chickens, or wheat bushels, etc.), and we see a symbolic
> mapping of something like "II then II gives us IIII cows". But it is not
> until
> the "concept" of "twoness" is freed from its very particular social usage
> do we
> see "theoretical mathematics" take hold. That is, "two" as a symbolic
> marker is
> used and manipulated on the social level, but "twoness" as an abstract
> concept
> gives rise to the intellectual level.
>


In its microcosmic form, which takes place in the development of every child
ever born, is where you can study and observe it most clearly.  Many social
behaviors seem built in or automatic, but this intellectualism only seems to
be transmitted if taught explicitly.



>
> For the mythos, we have very illustrative and remarkable story-weaving, we
> see
> elaborate and intricate sagas developed over many generations to explain
> and
> transmit the moral code of the social group. But with the logos we see
> people
> starting to ask "what is a 'god'?, what evidence do we see of this? does it
> make sense that we are saying this, but seeing this other thing?" etc.
> Social
> level = religion, intellectual level = religious criticism. Or, concretely,
> social level = norse sagas, intellectual level = Joseph Campbell's work on
> mythology.
>
> [Jon]
> But yeah, you do have to have a society in order for intellect to evolve.
>  As
> well as inorganic material and biological continuance.  Duh?
>
> [Arlo]
> Well, it should be "duh", but it still confounds people, witness Platt's
> perennial confusion. Intellect does not emerge from biology, it emerges
> from
> the social world. Without that very clear aspect of the MOQ, you have a
> hierarchy that goes something like "inorganic-biological-intellectual (with
> social around screwing things up)".
>
>
My girl Jackie was just talking about this:

"Jessica Benjamin presents what she labels as an intersubjective view of
human development, the view that individuals grow in and through
relationships to other subjects, subjects that are different and yet alike.
 Royce speaks of the interaction of similarity and difference, assimilation,
and differentiation in developing the human self.  Benjamin argues that for
proper self-development there must be a balance of tension between
self-assertion and self-recognition.

Benjamin and Royce also agree that contrast between self and other is the
foundation for individualism.



> [Jon]
> Intellectuality arises with the big brain that some poor woman had to pop
> out
> of her womb.
>
> [Arlo]
> Here even you seem to propose that intellectual thinking is simply a direct
> function of a neural mass. Intellect from biology.



Well Arlo, not in a simplistic, straightline, mechanistic way, no.   Whales
have more massive brains than humans and porpoises come close or exceed.
 Yet they haven't built any libraries (probably, but who knows?  Their world
is probably the most mysterious we know of)   But yeah, there is a
correlation that is meaningful, when viewing the evolutionary story as a
whole, it does suggest a resonance between brain size and intellect.


Arlo:


> I'd say that the human brain
> has evolved to enable the organism to readily appropriate a shared
> consciousness, but that without that social appropriation all that big
> brain
> will do is enable the organism to function biologically. Like a big empty
> building that could function as a library.
>
>
Speaking of big brains, it's "John" with an "h".  I wouldn't care about
getting all pedantic on ya, but another Jon joined recently and I'd hate to
be the source of confusion.





> [Jon]
> Intellectualism arises with societies devoted to intellectuality as the
> center
> of their existence like in academia where too many big-brained apes have
> too
> much time on their hands and think up overly complicated explanations of
> the
> simple and obvious.
>
> [Arlo]
> Alright, so you're using the Bo Fallacy here, and tossing in some
> gratuitous
> academic bashing for good measure.
>
>
A two-fer!

Woo-hoo!



> I'd say that the big brain (biology) enables the organism to appropriate
> the
> shared consciousness of her/his society and then partake in the
> socio-historical dialogue (social), and THAT participation prepares the
> social
> organism for the meta-analysis of those social symbols as
> objects-in-themselves
> which sets the social organism on the path of theoretical mathematics,
> metaphysics, and critical inquiry (intellectual).
>
>
Yeah, you would.  But then you'd just be showing off, wouldn't you.  I'd
just quote more Jackie at ya, doing the same thing, but in my own way.

(showing off, that is.)

"If I see the world from a particular point of view, as is strongly
suggested by the intentionality of human consciousness, the only way I can
transcend my narrowness and subjectivity is by checking things out with my
fellows and with nature.  Indeed, as we have seen, as as we shall now
discuss, for Royce, knowledge both of self and of external world is grounded
in social interaction.  This means that the human self is, then, essentially
a relational and social being."

"I" think, therefore a contextual process has led to my being.

And if you think about it, even the most rigorous science is dependent upon
intersubjective agreement before it's discoveries are deemed "real".


[Jon]
> Is it absolutely impossible for animals?  Maybe not.  But it's such a
> degree of
> difference between coyote's howling in the night and people typing out
> ideas on
> keyboards, that we should keep the useful distinctions in mind.
>
> [Arlo]
> Well, duh. Right?
>
> By the way I don't know if I'd consider the coyote's howl "intellectual" at
> all. Maybe a very crude social pattern (if its mediating the activity of
> other
> coyotes). Probably mostly biological.



Yeah the point I was trying to make was this obvious social communication
(coyote's howling) contrasted with using words with people.  It's been a
while, but as I remember it you posited intellectual patterns amongst
non-human animals.  With which I disagree, which was the point of most my
points.

That and agreement with you on the need for socially created individualism.

That's what I meant by "useful distinction".  We intellectualize, animals
don't.  It's the main difference between us.

Now Pirsig had a hard time seeing that both we and animals socialize.  It's
what we have in common with them.  Royce does a good job of including the
realization of man's true self through social interaction with animals as
well as people.

But it's weird to have this discussion with you Arlo, because I remember
starting up with you over whether we share emotions with animals.  Which I
say we do.  Mammals at least.  Mammals share social patterning and emotional
reasoning with humans.



> As I said, I would posit very few species
> that MAY be considered to involve very crude intellectual activity, and
> certainly none as robust and sophisticated as humans. Even on the social
> level,
> we see maybe more animal species evidencing social patterns, but still very
> crude compared to those of humans.
>
>

Agreed then.  So crude it hardly bears comparison, but yet enough to be
intriguing.

I met one character in my reading who was trying to teach his dog to be
human, and since he'd named his dog "Descartes" you know he was serious
about the project.

John with the 'h", home from work