[MD] A Science of Morals

[Ham Priday]

Hey, Steve -- 


> Harris complains that your "no ought can be derived from is"
> is wielded as a dogma. This may have never been done,
> but is it true that it simply cannot be done?
>
> I think Harris's nine facts reduce to this:
>
> (1) Suppose X is a practice that produces the worst possible
> misery for everyone.
> (2) X ought to be avoided.

Even if some philosopher had "attempted this argument before", it is so 
juvenile that I'm surprised any MD participant would fall for it.

To begin with, moral judgments encompass far more than avoiding misery.
The way you have structured the argument dismisses ethics, aesthetics, 
justice, personal integrity and compassion, all of which are moral concerns. 
There is nothing "scientific" about setting Harris's notion of morality as a 
worst-case scenario built around the word "ought", unless it's an appeal to 
the science of logic.

"Ought" implies a moral obligation to behave in some way, which presupposes 
a choice.  If there is no choice, one cannot make a moral decision.  Harris 
has reduced morality to psycho-physical "well-being" , which effectively 
eliminates both valuistic and intellectual judgments, while limiting the 
"choices" to what is harmful or beneficial to human life.  As a scientist, 
he should know that Nature has provided instinctual responses that ensure 
the survival of even brainless creatures.

Thus, we don't sit on a hot stove because it hurts; we avoid poisoning 
ourselves by not eating vile-tasting substances; we are protected from 
falling to our death by fear of precipitous heights or unstable footings, 
etc.  Harris may consider such situations "scientific morality" in practice; 
however, they don't involve the kind of valuistic or intellectual decisions 
philosophers and sociologists usually associate with morality.

Of course we avoid pain and injury, and seek pleasure and contentment, in 
the life-experience.  But that is a given.  So, what new knowledge or 
insight does your "worst possible misery" index offer by way of moral 
guidance?  Having witnessed the suffering of Rabies victims in the final 
stages of life, I can imagine nothing more "miserable".  Fortunately, there 
is a vaccine that will prevent this misery if it is administered in time. 
As a moral principle, however, all I can say is that if one knows he is 
going to have contact with a rabid creature, he had better have ready access 
to a veterinarian or physician.

But the moral issue is more than praxis or "what comes naturally".  Suppose 
I get pleasure from smoking, even though I know it is injurious to my 
"well-being", to use Harris's term.  Do I have a moral duty to avoid 
smoking?

I was interested in this reader's comment at the end of the Harris essay:

"Sam Harris' position that appears to arbitrarily and automatically take 
altruism as a moral good is just one example.  It certainly may be such but 
it can't be taken a priori to be so.  And, if the decision is taken out of 
the hands of the individual it is no longer altruism.  A forced morality is 
no morality at all.  In addition, the idea that measuring neurophysiology to 
determine well being is flawed in itself.  It is clear that a feeling or 
perception of well being is not necessarily proof of well being.  One's 
individual values and long term goals must be considered to determine what 
the moral choice is.  If one's goal is to be physically fit one could likely 
have a positive feeling from eating nothing but ice cream and cake but fail 
to meet that goal."

So you see, Steve, there's a big difference between the "morality" of 
leaping from a hot stove and the value decisions that mankind continually 
faces in
dealing with the laws of society and the threats of foreign nations.  I see 
little evidence that logical principles and the order of the universe can 
provide moral guidance as to how we "ought" to behave.  Indeed, I believe 
there are no "oughts" in this existence other than what man himself invents. 
Morality is derived from value, the sensibility of which is that of a free 
agent.

But it's nice to know that Sam Harris at least acknowledges the importance 
of value to human civilization.

Best regards,
Ham

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

> Harris's argument is basically that anyone who does not follow this
> logic doesn't understand what "ought" means. In other words, if (2)
> did not follow from (1), then "ought" would be completely meaningless.
> I suppose for the positivists, "ought" was indeed "meaningless" or
> "non-cognitive babble" or "preferences without foundation," but it was
> demonstarted that the positivist's criteria for meaningfulness by
> their own standards were meaningless. Certainly none of us would try
> to take the positivist's out for Harris's claim. So for us MOQers who
> do think that "ought" has meaning, what meaning can this word have if
> it can be intelligible to say that the worst possile misery for
> everyone ought not be avoided?
>
> Has this argument been attempted by philosophers of the past?
>
> Best,
> Steve