[MD] A Science of Morals
Steven Peterson
peterson.steve at gmail.com
Wed Apr 7 06:41:18 PDT 2010
Hi Ham,
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 2:02 AM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
> Hey, Steve --
>
>> Harris complains that your "no ought can be derived from is"
>> is wielded as a dogma. This may have never been done,
>> but is it true that it simply cannot be done?
>>
>> I think Harris's nine facts reduce to this:
>>
>> (1) Suppose X is a practice that produces the worst possible
>> misery for everyone.
>> (2) X ought to be avoided.
>
Ham said:
> Even if some philosopher had "attempted this argument before", it is so
> juvenile that I'm surprised any MD participant would fall for it.
>
> To begin with, moral judgments encompass far more than avoiding misery...
Steve:
The point here is not to encompass all of morality in one argument.
The question I was hoping you would address is whether or not Harris
has successfully made one particular argument that derives an ought
from an is.
Does (2) follow from (1) above? If not, why not?
If you don't understand that a practice that produces the worst
possible misery for everyone ought to be avoided, then it seems to
Harris that you simply don't know what the word "ought" means. How
could the word "ought" have any meaning at all if the worst possible
misery for everyone ought not be avoided? Could any other sentence
that uses the word "ought" have its usual meaning if the sentence "the
worst possible misery for everyone ought to be avoided" is not a true
sentence? Anyone who doubts that this sentence is true can be obliged
to provide another ought-sentence that could hold true while this
sentence is false.
Best,
Steve
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