[MD] A Science of Morals

[Ian Glendinning]

Nice idea Ron,

But what if two cultures value science differently ... who claims the
moral high ground / how is the difference "resolved".

Ian

On Fri, Apr 9, 2010 at 2:27 PM, X Acto <xacto at rocketmail.com> wrote:
> science is a moral value. Once that is realized cultural relativism
> is a non issue.
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: Ian Glendinning <ian.glendinning at gmail.com>
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Sent: Wed, April 7, 2010 7:55:53 AM
> Subject: Re: [MD] A Science of Morals
>
> A thought occurred to me.
>
> In order for there to be a comprehensive "science of morals" both
> science and moral philosophy need to evolve (which is a good thing).
> Science is more than biology and neuroscience, and morals will not be
> "explained" fully by such sciences.
>
> The thought that occurred was that is the same "cultural relativism"
> problem - both cultures need to co-evolve - enlightened science and
> morality will discover that they are both value-based.
>
> Regards
> Ian
>
> On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
>> Hey, Steve --
>>
>>> Harris complains that your "no ought can be derived from is"
>>> is wielded as a dogma. This may have never been done,
>>> but is it true that it simply cannot be done?
>>>
>>> I think Harris's nine facts reduce to this:
>>>
>>> (1) Suppose X is a practice that produces the worst possible
>>> misery for everyone.
>>> (2) X ought to be avoided.
>>
>> Even if some philosopher had "attempted this argument before", it is so
>> juvenile that I'm surprised any MD participant would fall for it.
>>
>> To begin with, moral judgments encompass far more than avoiding misery.
>> The way you have structured the argument dismisses ethics, aesthetics,
>> justice, personal integrity and compassion, all of which are moral concerns.
>> There is nothing "scientific" about setting Harris's notion of morality as a
>> worst-case scenario built around the word "ought", unless it's an appeal to
>> the science of logic.
>>
>> "Ought" implies a moral obligation to behave in some way, which presupposes
>> a choice.  If there is no choice, one cannot make a moral decision.  Harris
>> has reduced morality to psycho-physical "well-being" , which effectively
>> eliminates both valuistic and intellectual judgments, while limiting the
>> "choices" to what is harmful or beneficial to human life.  As a scientist,
>> he should know that Nature has provided instinctual responses that ensure
>> the survival of even brainless creatures.
>>
>> Thus, we don't sit on a hot stove because it hurts; we avoid poisoning
>> ourselves by not eating vile-tasting substances; we are protected from
>> falling to our death by fear of precipitous heights or unstable footings,
>> etc.  Harris may consider such situations "scientific morality" in practice;
>> however, they don't involve the kind of valuistic or intellectual decisions
>> philosophers and sociologists usually associate with morality.
>>
>> Of course we avoid pain and injury, and seek pleasure and contentment, in
>> the life-experience.  But that is a given.  So, what new knowledge or
>> insight does your "worst possible misery" index offer by way of moral
>> guidance?  Having witnessed the suffering of Rabies victims in the final
>> stages of life, I can imagine nothing more "miserable".  Fortunately, there
>> is a vaccine that will prevent this misery if it is administered in time. As
>> a moral principle, however, all I can say is that if one knows he is going
>> to have contact with a rabid creature, he had better have ready access to a
>> veterinarian or physician.
>>
>> But the moral issue is more than praxis or "what comes naturally".  Suppose
>> I get pleasure from smoking, even though I know it is injurious to my
>> "well-being", to use Harris's term.  Do I have a moral duty to avoid
>> smoking?
>>
>> I was interested in this reader's comment at the end of the Harris essay:
>>
>> "Sam Harris' position that appears to arbitrarily and automatically take
>> altruism as a moral good is just one example.  It certainly may be such but
>> it can't be taken a priori to be so.  And, if the decision is taken out of
>> the hands of the individual it is no longer altruism.  A forced morality is
>> no morality at all.  In addition, the idea that measuring neurophysiology to
>> determine well being is flawed in itself.  It is clear that a feeling or
>> perception of well being is not necessarily proof of well being.  One's
>> individual values and long term goals must be considered to determine what
>> the moral choice is.  If one's goal is to be physically fit one could likely
>> have a positive feeling from eating nothing but ice cream and cake but fail
>> to meet that goal."
>>
>> So you see, Steve, there's a big difference between the "morality" of
>> leaping from a hot stove and the value decisions that mankind continually
>> faces in
>> dealing with the laws of society and the threats of foreign nations.  I see
>> little evidence that logical principles and the order of the universe can
>> provide moral guidance as to how we "ought" to behave.  Indeed, I believe
>> there are no "oughts" in this existence other than what man himself invents.
>> Morality is derived from value, the sensibility of which is that of a free
>> agent.
>>
>> But it's nice to know that Sam Harris at least acknowledges the importance
>> of value to human civilization.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Ham
>>
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>
>>> Harris's argument is basically that anyone who does not follow this
>>> logic doesn't understand what "ought" means. In other words, if (2)
>>> did not follow from (1), then "ought" would be completely meaningless.
>>> I suppose for the positivists, "ought" was indeed "meaningless" or
>>> "non-cognitive babble" or "preferences without foundation," but it was
>>> demonstarted that the positivist's criteria for meaningfulness by
>>> their own standards were meaningless. Certainly none of us would try
>>> to take the positivist's out for Harris's claim. So for us MOQers who
>>> do think that "ought" has meaning, what meaning can this word have if
>>> it can be intelligible to say that the worst possile misery for
>>> everyone ought not be avoided?
>>>
>>> Has this argument been attempted by philosophers of the past?
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Steve
>>
>> Moq_Discuss mailing list
>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
>> Archives:
>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html
>>
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org/md/archives.html
>
>
>
>
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org/md/archives.html
>