[MD] A Science of Morals

Fri Apr 9 06:40:36 PDT 2010

It's proclaimed by xacto's factos and other such xacto high-minded gibberish!

On Apr 9, 2010, at 8:32 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:

> Nice idea Ron,
> 
> But what if two cultures value science differently ... who claims the
> moral high ground / how is the difference "resolved".
> 
> Ian
> 
> On Fri, Apr 9, 2010 at 2:27 PM, X Acto <xacto at rocketmail.com> wrote:
>> science is a moral value. Once that is realized cultural relativism
>> is a non issue.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> ----- Original Message ----
>> From: Ian Glendinning <ian.glendinning at gmail.com>
>> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>> Sent: Wed, April 7, 2010 7:55:53 AM
>> Subject: Re: [MD] A Science of Morals
>> 
>> A thought occurred to me.
>> 
>> In order for there to be a comprehensive "science of morals" both
>> science and moral philosophy need to evolve (which is a good thing).
>> Science is more than biology and neuroscience, and morals will not be
>> "explained" fully by such sciences.
>> 
>> The thought that occurred was that is the same "cultural relativism"
>> problem - both cultures need to co-evolve - enlightened science and
>> morality will discover that they are both value-based.
>> 
>> Regards
>> Ian
>> 
>> On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
>>> Hey, Steve --
>>> 
>>>> Harris complains that your "no ought can be derived from is"
>>>> is wielded as a dogma. This may have never been done,
>>>> but is it true that it simply cannot be done?
>>>> 
>>>> I think Harris's nine facts reduce to this:
>>>> 
>>>> (1) Suppose X is a practice that produces the worst possible
>>>> misery for everyone.
>>>> (2) X ought to be avoided.
>>> 
>>> Even if some philosopher had "attempted this argument before", it is so
>>> juvenile that I'm surprised any MD participant would fall for it.
>>> 
>>> To begin with, moral judgments encompass far more than avoiding misery.
>>> The way you have structured the argument dismisses ethics, aesthetics,
>>> justice, personal integrity and compassion, all of which are moral concerns.
>>> There is nothing "scientific" about setting Harris's notion of morality as a
>>> worst-case scenario built around the word "ought", unless it's an appeal to
>>> the science of logic.
>>> 
>>> "Ought" implies a moral obligation to behave in some way, which presupposes
>>> a choice.  If there is no choice, one cannot make a moral decision.  Harris
>>> has reduced morality to psycho-physical "well-being" , which effectively
>>> eliminates both valuistic and intellectual judgments, while limiting the
>>> "choices" to what is harmful or beneficial to human life.  As a scientist,
>>> he should know that Nature has provided instinctual responses that ensure
>>> the survival of even brainless creatures.
>>> 
>>> Thus, we don't sit on a hot stove because it hurts; we avoid poisoning
>>> ourselves by not eating vile-tasting substances; we are protected from
>>> falling to our death by fear of precipitous heights or unstable footings,
>>> etc.  Harris may consider such situations "scientific morality" in practice;
>>> however, they don't involve the kind of valuistic or intellectual decisions
>>> philosophers and sociologists usually associate with morality.
>>> 
>>> Of course we avoid pain and injury, and seek pleasure and contentment, in
>>> the life-experience.  But that is a given.  So, what new knowledge or
>>> insight does your "worst possible misery" index offer by way of moral
>>> guidance?  Having witnessed the suffering of Rabies victims in the final
>>> stages of life, I can imagine nothing more "miserable".  Fortunately, there
>>> is a vaccine that will prevent this misery if it is administered in time. As
>>> a moral principle, however, all I can say is that if one knows he is going
>>> to have contact with a rabid creature, he had better have ready access to a
>>> veterinarian or physician.
>>> 
>>> But the moral issue is more than praxis or "what comes naturally".  Suppose
>>> I get pleasure from smoking, even though I know it is injurious to my
>>> "well-being", to use Harris's term.  Do I have a moral duty to avoid
>>> smoking?
>>> 
>>> I was interested in this reader's comment at the end of the Harris essay:
>>> 
>>> "Sam Harris' position that appears to arbitrarily and automatically take
>>> altruism as a moral good is just one example.  It certainly may be such but
>>> it can't be taken a priori to be so.  And, if the decision is taken out of
>>> the hands of the individual it is no longer altruism.  A forced morality is
>>> no morality at all.  In addition, the idea that measuring neurophysiology to
>>> determine well being is flawed in itself.  It is clear that a feeling or
>>> perception of well being is not necessarily proof of well being.  One's
>>> individual values and long term goals must be considered to determine what
>>> the moral choice is.  If one's goal is to be physically fit one could likely
>>> have a positive feeling from eating nothing but ice cream and cake but fail
>>> to meet that goal."
>>> 
>>> So you see, Steve, there's a big difference between the "morality" of
>>> leaping from a hot stove and the value decisions that mankind continually
>>> faces in
>>> dealing with the laws of society and the threats of foreign nations.  I see
>>> little evidence that logical principles and the order of the universe can
>>> provide moral guidance as to how we "ought" to behave.  Indeed, I believe
>>> there are no "oughts" in this existence other than what man himself invents.
>>> Morality is derived from value, the sensibility of which is that of a free
>>> agent.
>>> 
>>> But it's nice to know that Sam Harris at least acknowledges the importance
>>> of value to human civilization.
>>> 
>>> Best regards,
>>> Ham
>>> 
>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>> 
>>>> Harris's argument is basically that anyone who does not follow this
>>>> logic doesn't understand what "ought" means. In other words, if (2)
>>>> did not follow from (1), then "ought" would be completely meaningless.
>>>> I suppose for the positivists, "ought" was indeed "meaningless" or
>>>> "non-cognitive babble" or "preferences without foundation," but it was
>>>> demonstarted that the positivist's criteria for meaningfulness by
>>>> their own standards were meaningless. Certainly none of us would try
>>>> to take the positivist's out for Harris's claim. So for us MOQers who
>>>> do think that "ought" has meaning, what meaning can this word have if
>>>> it can be intelligible to say that the worst possile misery for
>>>> everyone ought not be avoided?
>>>> 
>>>> Has this argument been attempted by philosophers of the past?
>>>> 
>>>> Best,
>>>> Steve
>>> 
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