[MD] DMB and Rorty

david buchanan dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Mon Apr 12 20:13:27 PDT 2010


Matt said to dmb:
Now you don't get to say I or Rorty (since Rorty would subscribe to both of the above) abandon truth theories or epistemologies.  Because I just gave you both. ...If you feel cheated, it would be unclear to me why, since Rorty's never denied semantics as a discipline nor knowledge-production as a human process.  It pays to pay attention to other people's definitions of terms--your notion of "epistemology" is clearly wider than Rorty's--which you bitch about in Rorty, which means you're aware of your own terminological sleight-of-hand on some level, I would imagine.



dmb says:

I don't get to say that Rorty has abandoned epistemology? I guess I'll never understand what you mean because I thought that's what Rorty himself says about Rorty. Bet you've said it dozens of times yourself. That's what the Stanford encyclopedia article says too, the one that you recommended to me, was written by a sympathizer and which I've quoted several times recently. And now you're saying it ain't so?

You'll find it in the section called "AGAINST EPISTEMOLOGY"

Epistemological behaviorism leaves no room for the kind of practice-transcending legitimation that Rorty identifies as the defining aspiration of modern epistemology. Assuming that epistemic practices do, or at least can, diverge, it is not surprising that Rorty's commitment to epistemological behaviorism should lead to charges of relativism or subjectivism. Indeed, many who share Rorty's historicist scepticism toward the transcending ambitions of epistemology—friendly critics like Hilary Putnam, John McDowell and Daniel Dennett—balk at the idea that there are no constraints on knowledge save conversational ones. Yet this is a central part of Rorty's position, repeated and elaborated as recently as in TP and PCP. Indeed, in TP he invokes it precisely in order to deflect this sort of criticism. In "Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace," Rorty says:In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which "the Relativist" keeps getting himself is to move everything over from epistemology and metaphysics into cultural politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions about what we should try. (TP 57)

dmb continues:

Yes, my notion of epistemology is wider than Rorty's. Since I have been trying to explain the difference between their notions of things like "truth" and "empiricism", it seems pretty unfair to characterize this as a "sleight-of-hand". I've been trying to explain that Rorty defines epistemological questions in terms of the failed answers and it seems to me that you are finally starting to see what I mean. But this is not a trick. In fact, it's hard work. 


Maybe now you'll explain it to Steve, who still appears to be unaware.


Oh, and please tell me you don't really have such an apathetic attitude toward relativism. Doesn't the case of Sam Harris show you how relativism can be a problem? Don't you see how it would negatively effect our ability to deal with international in intercultural conflicts? Don't you see how Rorty's ethno-centrism could be a problem as the world continues to shrink? C'mon, it's obvious isn't it?



 		 	   		  
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