[MD] Intellect? Never.

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Platt --


Your clear and concise explanation of the major MoQ principles is a 
significant accomplishment.  Although the finer points of your 
interpretation undoubtedly will be challenged by the academicians here, from 
what I've read of Pirsig's thesis your description of the fundamentals is 
consistent with the spirit and ontology of the author's philosophy.

Not to criticize this synopsis, but by way of alerting you to some 
weaknesses in the thesis that are reflected in your outline, I'd like to 
comment briefly on what I see as problematic assertions.  These will come as 
no surprise to you, knowing the differences in my ontological perspective. 
But I think they underscore points of controversy that may confound 
newcomers like Jon and are almost certain to elicit critical responses from 
the elders of this forum.

> Principles of the Metaphysics of Quality
>
> The Quality Principle. Quality is simultaneously an immanent and
> transcendent moral force. It created and gave purpose to our world,
> motivated by the ethical principle of the "Good" which is its essence.
> Quality is synonymous with "morality" and "value." Thus, the world
> is primarily a moral order, consisting not of subjects (mental things)
> and objects (material things) but patterns of value.

Because it is posited as Reality itself, Quality defined as a "principle" is 
a form of casuistry.  It forces you to accept Quality as both the Creator 
and the "created", as the essence of goodness and the "moral order" that 
ensues.  This leads to two questions: If the "Good" is the essence, what is 
the need for a principle to "motivate" it?  Also, your phrase "primarily a 
moral order" seems equivocal.  If moral goodness is primary, why is the 
world (of value patterns) not ABSOLUTELY good?

> The Awareness Principle. The essence of quality is known to us as
> awareness without content - pure, unpatterned experience. As such,
> it's impossible to describe. Whenever we try, we end up describing
> what we are aware of, not awareness itself.

Epistemologically we cannot "know" something without content, and experience 
(the world of appearances) is the content of awareness.  Thus, not only is 
the essence of quality "impossible to describe", it is impossible to be 
aware of.

> The Dynamic/Static Principle. To explain the inexplicable, the Metaphysics
> of Quality divides quality into two parts, Dynamic and Static.  Dynamic
> Quality is the moral imperative to create; Static Quality is the moral 
> imperative
> to survive.

This distinction, and the conclusions you have drawn, appear to be 
arbitrary.  The need to survive is instinctual, rather than a "moral 
imperative", as is the need to procreate.  I don't see any substantiation 
for an "imperative to create", nor (except for Pirsig's special concept of 
"morality") is either survival or creation generally regarded as a moral 
issue.  Also, since the act or exercise of creation and doing what is 
necessary to survive are both processes in time, I don't know how Pirsig 
justifies the premise that survival is a static principle.

> The Levels Principle.  Quality became manifest in our world by an
> evolutionary sequence of Dynamic Quality Events. Left in the wake of
> these events were four static levels of evolution - inorganic, biological,
> social and intellectual.  Each level is a static pattern of Quality, 
> organized
> and governed by its own unique moral laws - the laws of physics, biology,
> culture and reason respectively.

This, of course, assumes that the creation of existence ("our world") is a 
series of historical events in time, and that the categories cited were 
differentiated or defined prior to the arrival of a conscious agent to 
distinguish them.  Inasmuch as the four levels are processes (i.e., 
"actions") of evolution -- how could they not be?  -- what is it that makes 
them "static" as opposed to evolution which only names the overall process?

I'll skip the Hierarchy and Dominance Principles because they are unique to 
the MoQ and require a doctrinal acceptance of Pirsig's theories as 
"authoritative.  As a personal note, I believe in the dependency of all life 
forms on Nature and "being" (otherness), but I don't view it as a struggle 
for dominance by superior or inferior levels.  Likewise, while Truth may be 
an "intellectual pattern", there is no basis for calling it "a species of 
Good."  Pragmatists, for example, would regard "what works" as a principle 
of Truth; the only "goodness" about it being that it solves a problem for 
which a solution was wanted.

For Quality to "strive for freedom from static patterns" strikes me as 
contradictory, since Quality is described as creating those patterns, and 
would therefore have primary control over them.  Regarding the Individual 
Principle, you say, "responses to and evaluations of Quality vary by 
individual because each has a different static pattern of life history." 
True, but isn't this another way of saying that existence (i.e., the 
life-experience) is unique for each individual?

I especially like the way you developed the Proof Principle.  It establishes 
two concepts which are not apparent in the other principles.  "People" are 
the "deniers" and "affirmers" of morality and value.  (For me this bears out 
Protagoras' axiom, 'Man is the measure of all things'.)  And, life's purpose 
is ultimately derived from the values we choose.

> The Proof Principle. That reality is morality strikes most people as 
> loony.
> But in denying that the world is a moral order they have to employ moral
> judgment. They cannot refute that Quality is reality without asserting a 
> value.
> And they will have to concede that it´s impossible to live without 
> assumptions
> of what is Good. For life requires action, action presupposes choice, 
> choice
> presupposes purpose and purpose presupposes values.

Fine work, as always, Platt.  It will be interesting to see which principles 
are contested by the other participants.

Best regards,
Ham