[MD] Putnam on Is-Ought and Truth

[david buchanan]

DMB said to Steve:
 ...Rorty dismisses epistemology because he defines the question in terms of the failed answer. Matt finally saw what I meant. Ask him.


Steve:


I never read Matt agreeing with you that Rorty dismisses epistemology. In fact, everything I have read him to say on this topic has been to disagree with you. Did this agreement supposedly happen off-list? Are you just trying to bait him back into conversation by claiming some sort of victory?



dmb says:

No, it did not happen off-list and in fact I mentioned your name at the time, suggesting he ought to explain it to you. What Matt saw, finally, was that Rorty defines epistemology more narrowly than I do. As Matt puts it below, "your notion of epistemology is clearly wider than Rorty's". This one was posted on the 12th....
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Matt said to dmb:
Now you don't get to say I or Rorty (since Rorty would subscribe to both of the above) abandon truth theories or epistemologies. Because I just gave you both. ...If you feel cheated, it would be unclear to me why, since Rorty's never denied semantics as a discipline nor knowledge-production as a human process. It pays to pay attention to other people's definitions of terms--your notion of "epistemology" is clearly wider than Rorty's--which you bitch about in Rorty, which means you're aware of your own terminological sleight-of-hand on some level, I would imagine.


dmb says:

I don't get to say that Rorty has abandoned epistemology? I guess I'll never understand what you mean because I thought that's what Rorty himself says about Rorty. Bet you've said it dozens of times yourself. That's what the Stanford encyclopedia article says too, the one that you recommended to me, was written by a sympathizer and which I've quoted several times recently. And now you're saying it ain't so?

You'll find it in the section called "AGAINST EPISTEMOLOGY"

Epistemological behaviorism leaves no room for the kind of practice-transcending legitimation that Rorty identifies as the defining aspiration of modern epistemology. Assuming that epistemic practices do, or at least can, diverge, it is not surprising that Rorty's commitment to epistemological behaviorism should lead to charges of relativism or subjectivism. Indeed, many who share Rorty's historicist scepticism toward the transcending ambitions of epistemology—friendly critics like Hilary Putnam, John McDowell and Daniel Dennett—balk at the idea that there are no constraints on knowledge save conversational ones. Yet this is a central part of Rorty's position, repeated and elaborated as recently as in TP and PCP. Indeed, in TP he invokes it precisely in order to deflect this sort of criticism. In "Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace," Rorty says:In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which "the Relativist" keeps getting himself is to move everything over from epistemology and metaphysics into cultural politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions about what we should try. (TP 57)

dmb continues:

Yes, my notion of epistemology is wider than Rorty's. Since I have been trying to explain the difference between their notions of things like "truth" and "empiricism", it seems pretty unfair to characterize this as a "sleight-of-hand". I've been trying to explain that Rorty defines epistemological questions in terms of the failed answers and it seems to me that you are finally starting to see what I mean. But this is not a trick. In fact, it's hard work. 


Maybe now you'll explain it to Steve, who still appears to be unaware.

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