[MD] The MoQ agency problem

[MarshaV]

Hahahaha...  You ask Ham to think, but what you are really saying is that you cannot think or explain for yourself so accept your second had source from Wikipedia.  Intellectual competency?  




On Aug 3, 2010, at 7:31 PM, david buchanan wrote:

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> dmb said:
> ...Nietzsche had said the same thing in his own pithy way. He said statements like "I think" are misleading insofar as the "I" is conceived as the thing that does the thinking. Compare that statement to statements like "it is raining". Do we imagine there actually is an "it" that does the raining?  No. The rain is all there is to raining.
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> Ham replied:
> Maybe so, David.  But only the observing subject KNOWS it is raining and is aware that he is experiencing the storm.  Without that experience "thunder and rain" would never be known, either as a concept or as a reality.  So which do you believe to be primary in this example: the phenomenon "raining" or the subjective experience of it?
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> dmb says:
> 
> With all due respect, Ham, you have asked this same question many times. Do you really want an answer? Let me simply re-quote the same Wiki article I posted for Krimel, who also appears to be stuck within subject-object dualism every bit as much as you. Read it. Think about it. Try to see that the assertion you keep pressing is merely the "common sense" view that "everyone assumes". And yet this is exactly the view James and Pirsig reject. You keep responding to this rejection by simply re-asserting the very thing that's been rejected. You're free to dispute what they're saying but trying to dispute it that way only shows a lack of comprehension. Like I said to Krimel, you're trying to fight chemotherapy with cancer. This only shows that you don't see what the problem is. 
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> "Sciousness, a term coined by William James in The Principles of Psychology, refers to consciousness separate from consciousness of self. James wrote:Instead of the stream of thought being one of con-sciousness, 'thinking its own existence along with whatever else it thinks'...it might better be called a stream of Sciousness pure and simple, thinking objects of some of which it makes what it calls a 'Me,' and only aware of its 'pure' Self in an abstract, hypothetic or conceptual way. Each 'section' of the stream would then be a bit of sciousness or knowledge of this sort, including and contemplating its 'me' and its 'not-me' as objects which work out their drama together, but not yet including or contemplating its own subjective being.[1]When James first introduced "sciousness" he held back from proposing it as a possible prime reality in The Principles of Psychology, warning that it "traverse[s] common sense."[2]. He allowed that he might return to a consideration of sciousness at the conclusion of the book, where he would "indulge in some metaphysical reflections," but it was not until two years later in his conclusion to the abridged edition of The Principles that he added:Neither common-sense, nor psychology so far as it has yet been written, has ever doubted that the states of consciousness which that science studies are immediate data of experience. "Things" have been doubted, but thoughts and feelings have never been doubted. The outer world, but never the inner world, has been denied. Everyone assumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking activity as such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with the outer objects which it knows. Yet I must confess that for my part I cannot feel sure of this conclusion. Whenever I try to become sensible of thinking activity as such, what I catch is come bodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or nose. It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity were rather a postulate than a sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, of a knower as correlative to all this known; and as if "sciousness" might be a better word by which to describe it. But "sciousness postulated as a hypothesis" is a practically a very different thing from "states of consciousness apprehended with infallible certainty by an inner sense." For one thing, it throws the question of who the knower really is wide open….[3]Then thirteen years later, writing solely as a philosopher, James returned to his "parenthetical digression" of sciousness that "contradict[ed] the fundamental assumption of every philosophic school."[4] James had founded a new school of philosophy, called "radical empiricism," and nondual sciousness was its starting-point. He even wrote a note to himself to "apologize for my dualistic language, in the Principles."[5] James did not continue to use the word "sciousness" in later essays on radical empiricism, but the concept is clearly there as the "plain, unqualified …existence" he comes to call "pure experience," in which there is "no self-splitting…into consciousness and what the consciousness is of."[6]
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