[MD] Subjective self

[Ham Priday]

On Thursday, 8/5 at 2:47 PM, DMB replies to Ham --



> Okay, I understand that your concern is with the agency of individuals.
> I can also see that you believe the rejection of the subjective self
> undermines the agency of individuals. Addressing your concerns
> would be several steps down the road. If we ever got that far down
> the road you'd see that the rejection of the subjective self has almost
> nothing to do with your concerns. If you are ever going to see that,
> the first thing to do is gain an understanding of what the subjective self
> actually is and the reasons for its rejection by James, Pirsig, Dewey
> and other radical empiricists. To that end, I offered you a passage
> from a Wiki article. I can tell by your response that you did not
> comprehend that passage, not even a little bit. (This is very frustrating
> for me.)  Here's the line that really killed me....
>
> Ham said:
> Does "nondual 'sciousness'" add anything meaningful to ontology or
> metaphysics? It seems to me that any quality ending in 'cious' --  
> "precious",
> "delicious", "malicious", "fallacious", etc. -- may be categorized as a 
> type
> of "ciousness", if one wishes to hide the meaning of the prefix.
>
> dmb says:
> Yes, this non-dual awareness adds something meaningful to metaphysics.
> In the MOQ, this non-dual awareness is called Dynamic Quality.
> It is the central topic of both books. If you don't understand this part
> of the MOQ, then you understand nothing about the MOQ. This non-dual
> awareness is also the starting point of James's radical empiricism, which
> is explicitly adopted by Pirsig.  In that context, James refers to this
> non-dual awareness as "pure experience".  As the Wiki article put it,
> Sciousness "refers to consciousness separate from consciousness of self"
> and this notion "throws the question of who the knower really is wide 
> open".

David, it's not that I don't understand what the "radical empiricist" is 
trying to do, it's that I don't accept the premise.  Throwing "the question 
of who the knower is wide open" is not my idea of making metaphysics more 
comprehensible or meaningful.  Why do you suppose "this notion contradicts 
the fundamental assumption of every philosophical school"?  You admit that 
the point of radical empiricism is precisely "to contradict that fundamental 
assumption."  But what justifies the dismissal of sound philosophical, 
psychological, and sociological research, except the need to postulate a 
monistic reality?

There simply IS no "consciousness separate from the conciousness of self," 
and I challenge you to provide evidence to the contrary.  To insist on 
positing consciousness as a collective entity or pattern apart from the 
subject is begging the question of "non-dual awareness" with no epistemology 
to support it.

> The dualism they are rejecting with this non-dual awareness is
> called subject-object metaphysics or, as we refer to it around here,
> simply SOM.  Rejecting SOM doesn't make people disappear.
> It doesn't mean we're mere pawns controlled by the physical universe.
> The MOQ says that Man is the measure of all things, is a participant
> in the creation of all things. You're unlikely to ever find a philosophy
> that is more centered on human agency than these guys are offering.
> It is human centered and freedom is the highest good but in a way
> that's more profound than even Jefferson could have imagined,
> but it's not about individualism or egotism either. I mean, your
> concerns that the MOQ would undermine such ideals is unfounded
> and only reveals a lack of understanding on your part.

"Rejecting SOM" is just a cop-out for rejecting subjectivity.  Being aware 
of objective phenomena is not a "metaphysics"; it's common, universal 
experience.

And where does the MOQ say that "man is the measure of all things"?  (That 
was Protagoras's maxim from the 4th century BC, and I am rebuffed by 
Pirsigians every time I quote it.)  Frankly, your assertion that James and 
Pirsig offer a philosophy that is "centered on human  agency" strikes me as 
disingenuous.  The agency of MOQ is Quality and its levels, and the human 
individual is just a set of patterns under its control.  Needless to say, 
neither Quality nor a pattern has conscious awareness--even if it is equated 
with Reality in a philosopher's thesis.  I've seen few, if any, references 
to individual freedom in either of Pirsig's books, and the capacity of free 
choice and value creation are conspicuous by their absence.

I'm sorry if my personal worldview clashes with that of Mr. Pirsig. 
Understand that I have put a lot of time and thought into developing a 
philosophy of Essence, which also acknowledges Value as the ground of 
experience.  Like other philosophies, it has its weaknesses and 
shortcomings, the order of "universal forms" being one of them.  On the 
whole, however, Essentialism answers the fundamental questions in a 
meaningful way, without rejecting empirical knowledge or man's quest for 
spirituality.

Your efforts to "help" me are appreciated, David.  But, as you can see, I 
follow my own convictions, which makes it extremely difficult to adapt to 
someone else's notion of metaphysical reality.

Thanks for your interest, and sincere best wishes,
Ham