[MD] MOQ Recursion

[John Carl]

On Thu, Aug 5, 2010 at 2:00 PM, ARLO J BENSINGER JR <ajb102 at psu.edu> wrote:

>
> [Arlo]
> Hey John. I see what you're saying, but I am now convinced the problem is
> the
> acronym. The "MOQ" is not a verb, it is a "metaphysics of Quality", it is
> the
> result of the "defining process", one undertaken infinitely and creatively,
> but
> IT is an artifact not a process.
>
>
John:

Well, we'll just have to differ then Arlo.  I can't see something that is
"undertaken infinitely and creatively" as a mere "artifact" to be pinned to
your board and dissected, (you evil akerdemic you :)

It is a process, not an artifact.

Arlo:


> I do agree, of course, that Pirsig's central thesis in ZMM was to showcase
> the
> artful nature of the "figure sorting sand into piles". Or, in Carse's terms
> (which I think you are referring to) to show how playful- an infinite game-
> the
> discrimination process is, that it is NOT fixed- a finite game.
>

John:

Well, I like Carse, but I was more thinking about the
sorting-the-sand-into-piles.  I can point to any sandcastle and say, there
is a well-done structure.  The  process of building sand castles itself,
however,  is not a sand castle.  And I think of the MoQ as a teaching or a
tool of building sandcastles rather than simply another sand castle.  It
explicitly does not absolutize its own framework of how to conceive the
absolute.  Sorta like Zen, then.

While  I hadn't explicitly considered Carse, I can see his thinking at the
roots of my own conceptualization of the MoQ.  Mea culpa.


Arlo:


> So I am not disagreeing that the act of defining- infinitely and
> creatively- is
> where our "sorting sand into piles" should be, only that the "Metaphysics
> of
> Quality" is a particular pile of sand as sorted by Robert Pirsig; a
> high-quality one to be sure, but again its an artifact of the process which
> points TO the process, not the process itself.
>
> Make sense?
>
>
John:

Well I understand what you mean, but still disagree.  Which  I feel I
covered adequately.  I believe Pirsig's work to explicitly contain the
elements of "sand castle building" that I describe.  Just like Pragmatism is
more a way of doing philosophy rather than a  particularly rigorous
philosophy, so is the MoQ how to DO metaphysics, rather than a completed and
thoroughly fleshed out metaphysics.

 In novel format.  What more could you want?


 Arlo:


> In any event, we're drifting from my original question here, and I'll
> restate
> it.
>
> Is the "inorganic level" itself a pattern of value, and if so what kind
> (inorganic, biological, social, intellectual), and if not then what it is?
>

John:

The label "inorganic level" is itself a label, of course, for a pattern of
phenomena we observe, as part of the rudimentary aspects of the MoQ.

As far as I can see, "pattern" is just another word for "values".  It is
recognizable values which make us see patterns, and match them using the
tools of time perception and spatial intelligence.

I don't really understand the question, I guess.


Arlo:


> Bo's answer to this also posits a third metaphysical type, "levels", which
> is
> neither DQ nor SQ (exactly how Marsha added "labels", which are neither DQ
> nor
> SQ).
>
>
John:

Well, I don't really understand Bo, either.

 Arlo:

I asked this because, of course, you can also ask "is the intellectual level
> itself an intellectual pattern of values?", or "is the set of all
> intellectual
> patterns itself also an intellectual pattern?" If not, what is it?
>
>
John:

The conception of all intellectual patterns is itself an intellectual
pattern.  This is the point I make about the intellectual level being
unbounded.  It's also the point Royce made with his map of England,  in his
refutation of Bradley's assertion of the impossibility of conceiving the
absolute.


> [John]
> Instead, Bob went a different way.  Lila's child is explicitly, part of an
> MoQ
> that includes the reader, the interpreter as part of the dialogic process
> and
> that's... unique.
>
> [Arlo]
> I'd argue the uniqueness is the recognition, but not in the form. ALL
> metaphysics are evolving dialogues, everything that has ever been said is
> said
> in response to, and in anticipation of, the historical dialogue (Bahktin).
>


John:

Well I'm not gonna argue "uniqueness".  Pirsig's work seemed pretty original
to me, but I haven't surveyed the ENTIRE field.  And I'm even arguing that
he's unconsciously a part of a key philosophical movement (absolute
idealism) that's been explicitly ignored and thrust into the background.

As far as your point about all metaphysics being dialog, I agree.  But I
don't see this as something ordinarily "owned" by metaphysicians.  In fact,
I believe Kierkegaard made the exact opposite point with his criticism of
the constant constructions of systems, where nobody really listens.  At
least since Socrates.  And meaning must be constantly adjusted and
fine-tuned.

A couple of other philosophers who make this all-important point: Josiah
Royce, Richard Rorty and I'd add Robert M. Pirsig.

And probably Peirce and James too.  Ok, quite a few then.

Arlo:


> The difference then is on focus, one privileges the artifact another the
> process, but both are a process dialogue that creates artifacts along the
> way.
>
>
John:

Processes and artifacts, waves and particles.  I guess it depends on how you
want to look at it. I see the normal thing to do tho, is value the artifact
and YOU keyed me onto this Arlo, when you offered up the idea that in a
Capitalistic system, intellectual evolution tends to produce attachment to
artifacts more than process.

Thanks!

John