[MD] Consciousness & Moq.

[Krimel]

Note to Dave T.: Sorry for butting in here but this was just too much. I
actually wrote it last night and saved it until you got a chance to respond.



[dmb]
His dualism says that consciousness is a separate ontological category and
cannot be reduced to physical processes. Because his anti-reductionism is
being asserted against physicalist positions in the philosophy of mind, this
criticism is very helpful to the MOQ. 

[Krimel]
Seriously?
A separate ontological category for mind?
And another category for physical processes?
You mean like matter?

Mind and matter as separate ontological categories?

This helps the MoQ?
How?

[dmb]
Pirsig is also opposed to that kind of reductionism because of the way it
excludes values and Chalmers "hard problem" raises that same issue to the
front and center of the debate. As I understand it, this is the central
thesis of his book, the one you think I should NOT read. 

[Krimel]
So the bugbear of reductionism trumps the bugbear of SOM?

[dmb to Dave T.]
I think it's pretty clear that you barely know what you're talking about. 

[Krimel]
Again, sorry for butting in Dave T. but this was just too funny.
I think the guy should get his own show.

You?