[MD] Consciousness & Moq.

[John Carl]

Sorry, but what a load of ...

The Pirsigian insight is there is no such thing as a "hard problem of
consciousness"  We know what it is because we're using it.  Consciousness =
duh.

This metaphysical position is elegant, simple and irrefutable.  The "hard
problem of consciousness" that Chalmers defines is nothing more than the age
ole S/O split.

dmb continues:
> Let me repeat the central question, just in case you missed it. "Why should
> physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?" Chalmers is
> saying we don't have any good explanations for that.



Chalmers never perused the archives of MD, obviously.

How does consciousness arise from objectified matter?  Hmmm... that is a
hard problem... from the perspective of SOM.


Let's snip to some meat:

Again, let me repeat the salient lines. "There is an explanatory gap between
> the functions and experience" and "a mere account of the functions stays on
> one side of the gap".
>
> When I think about this gap between functions and experience I can't help
> but think of the gap between Krimel's version of James and my version. As I
> see it, your emphasis on "perception" has turned James's pure experience
> into a mere function.


Ok, you're talking to Krimel, I know, but I sorta see it that way too.
Experience is just what happens to you. What does it mean different than
that?



> See, I've never denied the existence of these processes and functions as
> you seem to think. But I have repeatedly objected to that kind of
> explanation as reductive and irrelevant.


Right.  You have dave.  I've been paying attention.  You probably don't
realize it, (because you haven't been paying attention to things beneath
you) but I agree completely.  As an explanation of consciousness, mechanism
is inadequate.  As a function of consciousness, it's natural.



> I sincerely hope that Chalmer's framing of the hard problem will help you
> see what I mean. Chalmers is saying these functional explanations can't
> explain the felt experiences that arise from them. Likewise, pure experience
> can't be explained in terms of perceptual processes, let alone equated with
> them. That would be like trying to explain the quality of a road trip in
> terms of gas mileage or oil temperature. They are certainly involved in the
> road trip but that's just not what we're asking about.
>

"What we're asking about" is the arising of consciousness in a meaningful,
MoQish way.  Right?

I think that Quality is impossible to extricate from Choice- value is not
relevant without a chooser AS WELL as a choice.  I think that's pretty close
to Ham's position.

I miss Ham.

And choice is impossible to extricate from consciousness.  That which can
choose, is deemed by us as conscious.  That which just lays there like a
rock, is  not.  More choice means more consciousness.  Thus consciousness is
itself along a continuum of  Quality.

There.  Say it like this.  Since DQ is defined in pure experience, Quality
can be said to be "real" (in the pragmatic, human perceptive definition of
real) only in experience.  Or some people just say Quality=Experience.  Well
Consciousness also equals experience, so Quality equals consciousness.

Any problems?

John the interloper