[MD] Consciousness & Moq.

[David Thomas]

On 8/27/10 1:42 PM, "David Buchanan" <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:

> When I think about this gap between functions and experience I can't help but
> think of the gap between Krimel's version of James and my version. As I see
> it, your emphasis on "perception" has turned James's pure experience into a
> mere function. See, I've never denied the existence of these processes and
> functions as you seem to think. But I have repeatedly objected to that kind of
> explanation as reductive and irrelevant. I sincerely hope that Chalmer's
> framing of the hard problem will help you see what I mean. Chalmers is saying
> these functional explanations can't explain the felt experiences that arise
> from them. Likewise, pure experience can't be explained in terms of perceptual
> processes, let alone equated with them. That would be like trying to explain
> the quality of a road trip in terms of gas mileage or oil temperature. They
> are certainly involved in the road trip but that's just not what we're asking
> about. 

Well its James who "reduced" it to one half of the process and went on to
treat it as a whole.

James on his speech titled "The Notion of Consciousness" at the end outlines
his take in six points.

1. Consciousness as it is ordinarily understood does not exist, any more
than does that Matter to which Berkeley gave the coup de grace;
2. What does and exist and constitutes the portion of truth covered over by
the word " Consciousness" is the susceptibility possessed by the parts of of
experience to be reported and known;
3. This susceptibility is explain by the fact that certain experiences can
lead some to others by means of distinctly characterized intermediary
experiences, in such a fashion that some play the role of known things, the
others of knowing subjects;
4. These two roles can be defined perfectly without departing from the flow
of experience itself and without invoking anything transcendental;
5. The attributes "subject" and "object," "represented" and
"representative," "thing" and "thought" mean then a practical distinction of
the utmost importance, but a distinction which is of a FUNCTIONAL order
only, and not at all ontological as understood by classic dualism;
6. Finally, things and thought are not fundamentally heterogeneous; they
made of the same stuff, which as such cannot be defined but only
experienced; and which if one wishes, one can call the stuff of experience.

My take is that Chalmers would reject 1, accept 2,3,4, accept 5 to
"FUNCTIONAL order only," changing the ending describing his natural dualism
position. And accept 6 as long as it was made clear that James was talking
about experience not some metaphysical claim about reality out there in the
world around us.

Chalmers goes on to claims that this is only one half, the awareness half,
the cognizant half, of the experience and that the phenomenal half can not
be described by psychological functioning.

Dave