[MD] atomic preferences and panexperientialism (panpyschism)

[Krimel]

Dmb,
Whatever...
Your Friend,
Krimel

-------------------------------

Krimel said to dmb:
In bed with a metaphysical SOMer you now seek a three way with a Christian
bio-theologian IDer, who says, "In so far as any line is drawn it is
completely arbitrary. The logical alternative is to propose that there is no
line of demarcation any more than there is a line between living and non
living in evolution."  That squares with Pirsig's discrete and feuding
inorganic and biological levels how?   BTW, does he know who you're are
sleeping with these days?



dmb says:

As shocking as it may seem, I actually agree with Platt about at least one
thing; you are using personal insults to dismiss the messenger INSTEAD of
dealing with the message. Everyone knows that ad hominem attacks are not a
valid. Even non-philosophers know this. This is especially bogus in the case
with panpsychism. This view has been a respectable and valid philosophical
option since the very beginning. It stretches from Heraclitus to Chalmers.
It's simply ignorant to dismiss the idea as flakey new-age nonsense. One
certainly doesn't have to be an advocate of Christianity or intelligent
design either. If you dismiss every thinker who ever thought panpsychism was
plausible, you'd have to dismiss about half of the philosophers who ever
lived. And you don't have to take my word for it. Look it up and see for
yourself. Here is an excerpt from a peer-reviewed encyclopedia article. This
part just covers the last century or so but it goes all the way back to the
pre-Socratic philo
 sophers.This section stretches from William James to David Chalmers and
you'll see that panpsychism, "offers a naturalistic escape from Cartesian
dualism and Christian theology".
Twentieth Century to the PresentWilliam James first addressed the subject of
panpsychism in his Principles of Psychology. He devoted a full chapter to
Clifford’s mind-stuff theory, and displayed notable sympathy to the view.
James’ first personal endorsement of panpsychism came in his Harvard
lecture notes of 1902-3, in which he noted, “pragmatism would be [my]
method and ‘pluralistic panpsychism’ [my] doctrine” (Perry, 1935: 373).
In his 1905-6 lecture notes he observed: “Our only intelligible notion of
an object in itself is that it should be an object for itself, and this
lands us in panpsychism and a belief that our physical perceptions are
effects on us of ‘psychical’ realities…” (ibid: 446).
James arrived at a clear and unambiguous position in his 1909 book, A
Pluralistic Universe. He explained that his theory of radical empiricism is
a form of pluralist monism in which all things are both pure experience and
“for themselves,” that is, are objects with their own independent
psychical perspectives. In the end he endorsed “a general view of the world
almost identical with Fechner’s” (ibid: 309-10). He saw in this new
worldview “a great empirical movement towards a pluralistic panpsychic view
of the universe” (ibid: 313).
In the early part of the twentieth century, panpsychist philosophy continued
to develop rapidly in England and the USA. The dominant philosophical
system, the one most connected with panpsychism, was Process Philosophy. Its
earliest advocates were Bergson and Whitehead.
Bergson wrote Creative Evolution in 1907. His thesis-that matter is “the
lowest degree of mind”-echoes Peirce. He added, following Schopenhauer,
that “pure willing [is the] current that runs through matter, communicating
life to it” (1907/1911: 206). But Bergson’s clearest elaboration came in
Duration and Simultaneity (1922). Here he achieved a true process philosophy
wherein all physical events contain a memory of the past. Given his earlier
insistence that memory is essential to mind, one can see the conclusion that
mind, or consciousness, is in all things:
What we wish to establish is that we cannot speak of a reality that endures
without inserting consciousness into it. … [I]t is impossible to imagine or
conceive a connecting link between the before and after without an element
of memory and, consequently, of consciousness. … We may perhaps feel averse
to the use of the word “consciousness” if an anthropomorphic sense is
attached to it. [But] there is no need to take one’s own memory and
transport it, even attenuated, into the interior of the thing. … It is the
opposite course we must follow. … [D]uration is essentially a continuation
of what no longer exists into what does exist. This is real time, perceived
and lived. … Duration therefore implies consciousness; and we place
consciousness at the heart of things for the very reason that we credit them
with a time that endures (1922/1965: 48-49).Whitehead’s panpsychism is
relatively well known. It is based in his view of an “occasion of
experience” as the ultimate pa
 rticle of reality, and as possessing both a physical pole and a mental
pole. If things are nothing but occasions, and occasions are in part mental,
then all things have a mental dimension. In Modes of Thought (1938), in the
chapter titled “Nature Alive,” he observed, “this [traditional] sharp
division between mentality and nature has no ground in our fundamental
observation. [...] I conclude that we should conceive mental operations as
among the factors which make up the constitution of nature” (p. 156).
Bertrand Russell ultimately came to a neutral monist view in which events
were the primary reality, and mind and matter were both constructed from
them. After some early, suggestive comments, he became increasingly
supportive of panpsychism in the late 1920′s. Russell’s book An Outline of
Philosophy(1927) directly addressed this. He wrote: “My own feeling is that
there is not a sharp line, but a difference of degree [between mind and
matter]; an oyster is less mental than a man, but not wholly un-mental” (p.
209). Part of the reason why we cannot draw a line, he says, is that an
essential aspect of mind is memory, and a memory of sorts is displayed even
by inanimate objects: “we cannot, on this ground [of memory], erect an
absolute barrier between mind and matter. … [I]nanimate matter, to some
slight extent, shows analogous behavior” (p. 306). In the summary he adds,
The events that happen in our minds are part of the course of nature, and we
do not know that the events which happen elsewhere are of a totally
different kind. The physical world…is perhaps less rigidly determined by
causal laws than it was thought to be; one might, more or less fancifully,
attribute even to the atom a kind of limited free will (p. 311).Perhaps
Russell’s clearest statement came in his Portraits from Memory (1956).
Memory is “the most essential characteristic of mind, … using this word
[memory] in its broadest sense to include every influence of past experience
on present reactions” (pp. 153-4). As before, memory applies to all
physical objects and systems:
This [memory] also can be illustrated in a lesser degree by the behavior of
inorganic matter. A watercourse which at most times is dry gradually wears a
channel down a gully at the times when it flows, and subsequent rains follow
[a similar] course… You may say, if you like, that the river bed
‘remembers’ previous occasions when it experienced cooling streams. … You
would say [this] was a flight of fancy because you are of the opinion that
rivers and river beds do not ‘think’. But if thinking consists of certain
modifications of behavior owing to former occurrences, then we shall have to
say that the river bed thinks, though its thinking is somewhat rudimentary
(p. 155).In contrast to Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne articulated a clear
and explicit form of process panpsychism. Beginning with his Beyond Humanism
(1937), he laid out the unambiguous position that all true individuals
possess a kind of psyche: “Molecules, atoms, and electrons all show more
analogy of behavio
 r to animals than do sticks and stones. The constitutions of inorganic
masses may then after all belong on the scale of organic being…” (pp.
111-112). Elaborating on this notion over four decades, through such
articles as “Panpsychism” (1950), “Physics and Psychics” (1977), and
“The Rights of the Subhuman World” (1979), his panpsychism (or,
“psychicalism”) is a clear and consistent theme. He combined the insights
of Leibniz with Whitehead’s process view into a system which, he claimed,
resolved many long-standing philosophical problems: most notably that it
serves as a third way between dualism and materialism. Ultimately,
panpsychism/psychicalism is, he says, the most viable ontology available to
us-certainly preferable to an utterly unintelligible materialism: “the
concept of ‘mere dead insentient matter’ is an appeal to invincible
ignorance. At no time will this expression ever constitute knowledge”
(1977: 95).
Many other great thinkers of the twentieth century promoted panpsychist
ideas, including:
F. S. C. Schiller: “A stone, no doubt, does not apprehend us as spiritual
beings… But does this amount to saying that it does not apprehend us at
all, and takes no note whatever of our existence? Not at all; it is aware of
us and affected by us on the plane on which its own existence is passed… It
faithfully exercises all the physical functions, and influences us by so
doing. It gravitates and resists pressure, and obstructs…vibrations, and so
forth, and makes itself respected as such a body. And it treats us as if of
a like nature with itself, on the level of its understanding…” (1907:
442).Samuel Alexander: “there is nothing dead, or senseless in the
universe, [even] Space-Time itself being animated”(1920: 69).John Dewey :
“[T]here is nothing which marks off the plant from the physico-chemical
activity of inanimate bodies. The latter also are subject to conditions of
disturbed inner equilibrium, which lead to activity in relation to
surrounding things, and which te
 rminate after a cycle of changes…” (1925: 253).Sir Arthur Eddington:
“The stuff of the world is mind-stuff” (1928: 276).J. B. S. Haldane: “We
do not find obvious evidence of life or mind in so-called inert matter…;
but if the scientific point of view is correct, we shall ultimately find
them, at least in rudimentary form, all through the universe” (1932: 13).J.
Huxley: “[M]ind or something of the nature as mind must exist throughout
the entire universe. This is, I believe, the truth” (1942: 141).Teilhard de
Chardin: “there is necessarily a double aspect to [matter’s] structure…
[C]o-extensive with their Without, there is a Within to things.” “[W]e are
logically forced to assume the existence in rudimentary form…of some sort
of psyche in every corpuscle, even in those (the mega-molecules and below)
whose complexity is of such a low or modest order as to render it (the
psyche) imperceptible…” (1959: 56, 301).C. H. Waddington: “[S]omething
must go on in the si
 mplest inanimate things which can be described in the same language as
would be used to describe our self-awareness” (1961: 121).Gregory Bateson:
“The elementary cybernetic system with its messages in circuit is, in fact,
the simplest unit of mind; … More complicated systems are perhaps more
worthy to be called mental systems, but essentially this is what we are
talking about. … We get a picture, then, of mind as synonymous with
cybernetic system… [W]e know that within Mind in the widest sense there
will be a hierarchy of subsystems, any one of which we can call an
individual mind” (1972: 459-60).Freeman Dyson: “The laws [of physics]
leave a place for mind in the description of every molecule… In other
words, mind is already inherent in every electron, and the processes of
human consciousness differ only in degree and not in kind…” (1979:
249).David Bohm: “That which we experience as mind…will in a natural way
ultimately reach the level of the wavefunction and of
  the ‘dance’ of the particles. There is no unbridgeable gap or barrier
between any of these levels. … It is implied that, in some sense, a
rudimentary consciousness is present even at the level of particle physics”
(1986: 131).Panpsychism enters the 21st century with vigor and diversity of
thought. A number of recent works have focused attention on it. If we look
back to the year 1996 we find two books that contributed to a resurrection
of sorts. First, Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind lays out a naturalistic
dualism theory of mind in which he suggests (with an apparent diffidence)
that mind can be associated with ubiquitous information states-following
Bateson and Bohm, though without citing their panpsychist views. His
relatively detailed discussion of panpsychism sparked a resurgence of
discussion on the matter, and contributed to a wider interest. Also, Abram’
s Spell of the Sensuous argued from a phenomenological basis for a return to
an animistic worldview, though hi
 s work was more poetic essay than detailed philosophical inquiry. In 1998
process philosopher David Ray Griffin published Unsnarling the World-Knot, a
major milestone in panpsychist philosophy. Griffin supplies a detailed and
scholarly assessment of the subject, though with a strong focus on the
process view, and with only a cursory historical study.
Into the present century, Christian DeQuincey’s Radical Nature (2002)
offers another process perspective, and a more satisfying review of the
historical aspect. In 2003 there were two more books dedicated to
panpsychism: David Clarke’s Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude, and
Freya Mathews’ For Love of Matter. Clarke again takes the process view,
underscoring the dominance of this philosophical perspective on the
discussion. Mathews moves into new territory; drawing inspiration from
Schopenhauer, she crafts a truly metaphysical philosophy in which humans are
sensitive participants in an animate cosmos. Gregg Rosenberg released a
nominally panpsychist approach to mind in 2004, with his book A Place for
Consciousness. In 2005, Skrbina published the first-ever comprehensive study
of the subject, Panpsychism in the West. Most recently, Galen Strawson has
presented a forceful argument for panpsychism based on the inexplicability
of emergence of mind (see Section 4).
Thus, at present we can discern at least six active lines of inquiry into
panpsychism:
the Process Philosophy view, as conceived by Bergson and Whitehead, and
developed by Hartshorne, Griffin, DeQuincey, and Clarke;the Quantum Physics
approach, as developed by Bohm, Hameroff, and others;the Information Theory
approach, arising from the work of Bateson, Wheeler (1994), Bohm, and
Chalmers;the Part-Whole Hierarchy, as envisioned by Cardano and elaborated
by Koestler (1967) and Wilber (1995);the Nonlinear Dynamics approach, as
inspired by Peirce (1892) and further articulated by Skrbina (1994, 2001);
andStrawson’s (2006) “real physicalism” (see Section 4).These areas all
offer significant opportunity for development and articulation. They hold
out the hope of resolving otherwise intractable problems of emergentism and
mechanism, especially when so many conventional approaches have reached a
dead end. As Nagel, Searle, and others have noted, the problems of mind and
consciousness are so difficult that “drastic actions” are
warranted-perhaps even as drastic as
 panpsychism.
Panpsychism, with its long list of advocates and sympathizers, is a robust
and respectable approach to mind. It offers a naturalistic escape from
Cartesian dualism and Christian theology. And, by undermining the
mechanistic worldview, it promises to resolve not only long-standing
philosophical problems but persistent social and ecological problems as
well. Many great thinkers, from Empedocles and Epicurus to Campanella and
LaMettrie, Fechner and James to Gregory Bateson, have recognized the
potential for the panpsychist view to fundamentally alter, for the better,
our outlook on the world. An animated worldview is not only philosophically
rigorous, but it can have far-reaching and unanticipated effects.