[MD] Philosophy and Abstraction

[david buchanan]

Matt said:
When I wrote that line ["returning us to the scene of life" ], I had in mind Pirsig's line in Lila: "societies and thoughts and principles themselves are no more than sets of static patterns.  These patterns can't by themselves perceive or adjust to Dynamic Quality.  Only a living being can do that." (Ch. 13, Bantam paperback 185) I've always had a hard time assimilating that line, because shouldn't it seem as if philosophies/ideas should adapt to their dynamic environment?  And, further,...

DMB says:
I think Pirsig just means that textbooks don't re-write themselves, ideas don't refine themselves. Evolution is a living thing and the static latching follows from that. To make philosophies evolve, you need philosophers. These patterns are not external in the sense that they grow out of our hands and heads and the books we make are made for eyeballs. They co-evolve as part of us, so much so that it is sometimes hard to tell what invented who.


Matt said:
Your specific claim is that my construal of Dewey in the above passage ["Philosophy is Dewey's indirect experience--returning to life is knowing, as Wittgenstein put it, when to put philosophy down"] suggests that philosophies need not figure DQ out.  "I'm fairly certain that putting DQ into our philosophies - or rather some working concepts about DQ - is the main mission of the MOQ."  I can't say I disagree with this point, nor do I think my construal of Dewey does so, particularly when you phrase it as "working concepts about DQ."  On the analogy of maps, one central concern of Pirsig has been to write into our maps a notion of change, of openness, of the element that will always escape Platonic encapsulation (what I've called the Quality as anti-essence thesis). I think this is perfectly consistent with my construal and general project and I'm not sure where you see the conflict.

dmb says:
I think our maps are seriously flawed if they don't include change and openness. Those are very fine things in general and especially in philosophy. But as a description of DQ, I think that's very weak tea. It's so watered down that it hardly distinguishable from a warm sentiment or a comfortable platitude. In any case, it's hardly the Copernican revolution he's shooting for. 
In your analogy, DQ is a feature of the map. In Pirsig's, the whole map is derived from DQ and DQ can be represented on the map only as a kind of paradox. (About ten key passages from his texts are behind this little analogy change). 

Matt said:
We are, in part, intellectual patterns and these patterns respond to DQ.  One particular activity of the conglomerate of static patterns known as "the person" is to create a small slice of intellectual patterns whose purpose is to consistently map the terrain of life and everything in it.  One thing map-makers have learned is that a good map should include the person changing the map to better negotiate the terrain.  And part of this means rejecting the closedness of Platonism.

dmb says:
That's right. Including the map-maker within the map also means dropping the pretense of disinterested observation and attitudes of objectivity in general. It's a way of saying the map-maker chooses what to notice and record and so he is always making value judgements whether he realizes or not. This is just one more way to knock the representational theories of knowledge. It says that perfect correspondence is neither possible nor even desirable. 


Matt said:
 So when you say, "The question is whether or not it's a good idea to exclude certain kinds of experience from our reflections," all I can say is, "yes, I agree: I, like you, do not think I'm excluding any kind of experience in a pernicious manner."

dmb says:
Hmmm? The terms in question are things like "pure experience" and "pre-intellectual experience". I don't know how perniciously you're excluding them but this conversation is mostly about why you and Steve want to avoid them. Isn't that the main topic here? 



Matt said:
I think you are running far too fast from the limited scope of my remarks to generalized impressions.  Moving too quickly obscures all the inferential connections that we must examine between text, the intentions of a text, the local consequences of the text, to the remote consequences you see ever on the horizon.  If we are ever to have a productive conversation, we have to move slower and more patiently than that.

dmb says:
I hear you saying "slow down" but other than that I really don't know what you're saying. Inferential connections? Intentions of a text? The local and remote consequences? It's not at all clear to me what these phrases mean.