[MD] Philosophy and Abstraction

[Matt Kundert]

One example of me not being the person who's causing confusion in 
articulating their position:

DMB said first:
I honestly don't see how either [James or Pirsig] make any sense 
unless they're taken as anti-metaphysical and as very, very empirical. 
Rorty is anti-metaphysical and very, very linguistic. That's the 
difference we should be talking about.

Matt then said:
I recognize no distinction between "empirical" and "linguistic" as you 
use it here to catch a difference between Rorty and Pirsig/James.  I 
don't understand how Rorty is not empirical in the same way as they, 
partly because I do not understand how language is not empirical.

DMB said:
Well, I never said language in not empirical and I don't thing any part 
of their difference would hinge on that anyway. The question centers 
around Rorty's rejection of epistemology and his linguistic reasons for 
doing so. The distinction is between an having an Empiricism and not 
having an Empiricism. It's not subtle.

Matt:
You technically did not say the words "language is not empirical," yet 
I would call attention to the implications of saying that Team Radical 
Empiricism is anti-metaphysical and empirical and Team Psychological 
Nominalism is anti-metaphysical and linguistic.  The implication is that 
their is a difference that makes a difference between "empirical" and 
"linguistic."  If you weren't so high and mighty in your conversational 
manner, perhaps I wouldn't feel the need to assert (against your 
contrary assertions and insinuations) that it is not I who railroads 
open and honest conversational inquiries.

Given your reformulation, I have to first point out that you once used 
to say that Rorty rejected metaphysics and that radical empiricism 
was a metaphysics, so that was the substantive difference (your line 
of argument I take it in your paper on moq.org).  Now you are 
perfectly comfortable in saying that both are anti-metaphysical.  I 
call attention to this because I believe the same terminological 
rapprochement is needed for "epistemology"--if James the 
anti-Platonist has an epistemology, then so does Rorty.  This means 
trying to understand what the difference is between pre-radical 
Empiricism and Radical Empiricism to see whether Rorty, in his work 
on epistemological arguments, does not also have a post-radical 
Empiricism (even if it is called by a different name).

Whenever you describe the differences between pre- and post-radical 
Empiricisms, I cannot help but think that those are the same 
anti-Platonic maneuvers that Rorty performs in Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature (connections I tried laying out in "Quine, Sellars, etc.").  
As such, I do not recognize your pithy demonstration of difference 
between Rorty and James/Pirsig as catching anything, subtle or 
otherwise.

Another less obvious example of not being the one:

Matt said:
If it were the case that we were all anti-Platonic buddies, then it is 
superficially the case that those terms should not be weapons against 
Rorty the anti-Platonist.  [*]  Granted that superficiality, you want to 
argue that underneath of that Rorty has a soft spot in his positive 
program (his descriptions of reality, what Pirsig calls "doing 
metaphysics") that these terms poke at.  Because I don't immediately 
see such a soft spot, I grow post facto re-suspicious of those terms in 
your hands, and so begin conversations wanting reassurance.  As a 
justification for my re-suspicion, I have offered descriptions of why 
there is no soft spot underneath his positive program by offering 
descriptions of the parallel between the 
radical-empiricism-positive-program and the 
"linguistic"-positive-program (what's offered, e.g., at the end of 
"Quine, Sellars, etc.").

DMB cut off at the "*":
No, it simply doesn't follow. They can both be anti-Platonists or 
post-Metaphysical while also having substantial differences on other 
matters. I mean, Platonism and anti-Platonism is not what separates 
them. The terms in question are epistemological or empirical. That's 
where Pirsig and Rorty differ.

Matt:
The trouble I have with this effort at reading and understanding 
what I'm saying is that you appear to have cut me off with your gut 
reaction and then not completed my train of thought because you 
didn't know what I was trying to say (you never in your post quoted 
or responded to what remained in my paragraph).  The trouble is 
that this was a single train of thought.  The key qualifier was 
"superficially"--I was attributing to you an ability to look below the 
surfaces of their similarities.  I was saying, "Okay, Dave sees their 
anti-Platonism, but is not fooled into thinking that there could be no 
differences.  He sees a soft spot."  I was saying exactly what you 
said, except that I didn't use the terms "epistemological" or 
"empirical" (partly because, as I implied above, I think they 
obfuscate the real issue).  What I said was to justify my angle of 
conversation, which is to first offer an understanding of how the 
non-Platonic radical empiricism parallels the non-Platonic 
psychological nominalism.  And what I don't understand is how 
"pure," "direct," and "pre-intellectual" cut into the soft underbelly of 
psychological nominalism while _remaining_ non-Platonic.  You 
jump up and down and scream, "no, no, no! They are non-Platonic!", 
but that's the articulation I'm looking for: how do they cut into Rorty 
while remaining non-Platonic.  It's not enough to say they don't at 
this stage of our conversation.  I'm not talking about how they look, 
at that point, I'm talking about how you use them to do the work 
you are saying they do.

Matt said:
Rorty has tried to offer an alternative manner in understanding how 
the nonlinguistic impacts knowledge-claims, the relationship between 
the linguistic and the non-.  One needn't follow him, but I don't see 
how, if one properly understands the model Rorty was offering (in 
say, "Inquiry as Recontextualization" and "Non-Reductive 
Physicalism"), Rorty wouldn't fall on the side of pragmatists who 
"argue for warranted assertions" rather than the "nihilism and 
relativism" side that Seigfried appears to place him.

DMB said:
I honestly have no idea what you mean. 
Seigfried's point is simply that Rorty's answer to the 
post-Metaphysical question of truth is "conversation" and she thinks 
that position amounts to relativism.

Matt:
Uh-hunh, yes, and as I tried to clearly articulate to you: given Rorty's 
arguments in those two essays, I do not see how Seigfried's account 
of his position as "nihilism and relativism" holds on the grounds I'm 
imagining (since, as I indicated, I have not read her specific 
arguments).  The "grounds I'm imagining" are based on what is 
usually argued in things I have read: cases made, partly, on how 
obvious it is that things Rorty says are nihilistic and relativistic (in, 
say, the introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism).  But, similiar 
to the "look deeper and properly" clause on interpretation you wish 
for those who read James and Pirsig, I wish a similiar circumspect 
attitude towards Rorty's more infamous remarks.  As an example:

DMB said:
I also take Rorty's statement as an articulation of the slogan that says 
it's language all the way down. If you think that's a straw man, please 
explain.

Matt:
I could hardly take the idea that Rorty articulates the slogan "it's 
language all the way down" to be a strawman, but that slogan, for 
example, is what I've been asking for a more circumspect attitude 
towards in unpacking its meaning in conversation with John.  You 
think it is obvious that to hold that slogan as true means you're a 
relativist, but part of the purpose of the rapprochement in "Quine, 
Sellars, etc." was to show that it is, at least, not obvious.  For 
instance, in contradistinction to the language slogan you dislike, you 
say, "James held to a kind of perspectivism wherein truth only has 
meaning in relation to particular situations and our purposes within 
them, but he also insisted on experience as the crucial factor in 
truth making."  However, if _everything_ is experience--given the 
understanding of radical empiricism as a collapse of the distinction 
between reality and experience that created the knower/known 
conundrums of typical modern epistemology--then I do not know 
how experience _couldn't_ be a crucial factor because everything is 
experience.  You statement doesn't say anything extra, about for 
example what Rorty is missing.  Because if my rapprochement is 
right, then Rorty makes the same maneuver, which means they are 
in the same epistemological position with respect to truth and truth 
making (and understanding Rorty on "truth making" would mean 
coming to terms with Davidsonian triangulation between 
self/community/world).

What I think is clear is that we are both trying to thrust the burden of 
proof on the other person in terms of laying out interpretive evidence.  
This is clear, I think, from the awkward balancing of your "it's not 
about what's popular in academia" and "a lot of scholars say that 
about [Rorty] and so do I."  You want their authority, but you don't: 
you just want to talk about me and you.  I think part of the problem 
might be that you perceive me as being dismissive.  I can't help that 
perception.  I try as honestly and sincerely as I might to articulate my 
provenance as a thinker, the kind of time, energy, and ability I have 
at my disposal that circumscribes the conversation from my end.  I 
cannot sincerely say that I don't take some people's arguments 
seriously (like Susan Haack), yet I also cannot produce 20,000 word, 
professional articulations of why--full-scale rebuttals of what I 
perceive as wrong with those understandings of Rorty.

I don't want to be dismissive of your arguments, but I am trying to 
thrust the burden of reading Rorty back onto you (pointing at the 
essays I believe a full command of to be necessary on issues you 
raise).  You recur to other scholars, and so I tell you what I think 
about them.  I think that if it is okay for you to refer to their 
articulated understanding in place of your unarticulated one, then 
it is okay for me to refer to my unarticulated understanding of 
Rorty in response.  Your impressions matched by my impressions.  
You think I'm insulting you when I say that I don't think you 
understand Rorty well enough to articulate the differences between 
Rorty and James, but it is just what you've been suggesting about 
me and James/Pirsig.  And I have to absorb those suggestions, 
because I do not have the expertise to back them up with long 
patterns of interpretation (other than gesturing to my favorite 
interpreters).  So what else am I supposed to say at a certain 
point to you other than, "that really doesn't sound right"?  I try to 
tell you why, you don't understand because I use Rorty's vocabulary,
 so what else am I supposed to say other than "maybe you should 
read more Rorty to work your way into his vocabulary so you know 
from his point of view what you're arguing against"?

Why you don't say this to me is beyond me.  It seems the sensible 
thing to do.  Just say that you don't think I'm getting Pirsig right.  
You say that, but it comes on the heels of an implied 
demonstration that's lying around somewhere that I haven't read 
and had the ability to come to terms with.  So instead of the 
demonstration, you say I'm being unreasonable and violating rules 
of argument and such.  You take this high and mighty approach as 
if your shit don't stink.  I'm just trying to be honest about the 
process of argumentative discourse, which means taking seriously 
_all_ of the things that happen in philosophical practice, including 
time, energy, and ability.  Because life is in flux due to the continual 
impact of new experience, the best thing to claim about one's 
claims is not that they are the All Time Best because they've won 
the day, but to compose yourself gracefully in preparation for the 
day when you don't, allowing others the same grace.  You think 
you've backed me into a corner and that, oh my, I'm so 
"squeamish," but I honestly do not feel the pressure of your claims 
and arguments because a large part of their force depends on your 
understanding of Rorty being right, and I just do not think that to be 
the case from what I understand of your understanding.  You're 
whole approach to talking to me requires me to acknowledge being 
backed into a corner, but how can I do that and remain sincere?  
Am I asking something similar of you?  I think all I'm asking for is 
the understanding of how the "pure," "direct," and "pre-intellectual" 
of radical empiricism attack psychological nominalism, something 
to parallel the understanding of how they don't that I offered in 
"Quine, Sellars, etc."

Can you state what you are asking of me?

Matt