[MD] Three Hot Stoves

[John Carl]

Hi Ham,


>
> No.  What can you conceptualize that you don't first realize?



John:

I believe conceptualization and realization are epistemologically synonymous
Ham, is my point.  The act of realization IS conceptualization at the most
basic level.  When I recognize that a certain pattern of light is red, I'm
realizing out of the whole matrix of sensation a particular pattern which
becomes instantly a conceptualization of that color.  If I don't realize any
differentiation, then I don't form any conceptualization.  This might seem
at first that I'm agreeing with you, that realization comes first, but any
realization is immediately and totally a conceptualization OF that
realization so the two terms refer to the exact same mental process.

Ham:

Value realization is primary to conceptualization.  (In Pirsig's vernacular,
> it's "pre-intellectual experience".)  The concept--i.e., what a thing or
> event appears to be--is an experiential construct of its realized value.
>  The process of constructing objective entities from value is sometimes
> called "actualization".  Nicholas of Cusa in the 15th century postulated the
> concept of "actualized possibility" [Latin, "posse"], reasoning that if
> actuality did not exist, nothing could actually be.  But things appear;
> therefore actuality exists.  Hegel theorized that "the inward negation of
> Essence is manifested in its outward appearance," and he called the
> completion of this inward/outward identity 'Actuality'.  Hegel's cosmology
> is based on "being", however, and is non-valuistic.  For the valuist, being
> is "actualized value".


John:

Well I've got enough on my mental plate at the moment to play with, I'll
have to hold off on "actualization" for a moment as I can only digest so
much at a time.  Actualization seems to me to imply intention, whereas
realization occurs more or less automatically - that is, our neural-sensory
apparatus is conducive to certain realizations out of our existential
matrix.  Those things that match up to our senses, become conceptualized
naturally.

Ham:

The experience of night turning into day, and vice-versa, is a construct of
value.  The difference between light and darkness is an intellectual
"precept" (knowledge) derived from the experience.


John:

Um, I'm going to quibble a bit here.  I believe only humans have intellect
at their disposal, but almost all living beings and even plants recognize
the difference between light and dark, or hot and cold for that matter and
respond accordingly.  I haven't thought much yet about the way I'm using
"concept" and what I've heard as a "percept" but that seems closer to what I
mean - a "perception" of the difference between night and day as opposed to
a "precept" which I agree IS a purely intellectual building block of
knowledge.  Thus, the difference between night and day is a percept, and
humans actualize this by precept.




> [Ham]:
>
>  We do, indeed, realize something called Value as primary to both
>> experience
>> and intellection.  What is this Value, and where does it come from?
>> Perhaps more important as regards the MoQ, does Value exist before
>> it is realized?
>>
>
> [John]:
>
>> In this case, I'd take a pragmatic stance that "it doesn't really matter".
>> That is, it doesn't make any difference if unrealized value exists or not,
>> because we can only deal with what we do realize.  My stubborn insistence
>> of focusing upon "language all the way down" is rooted in the same idea,
>> because talking about what lies outside of language seems pointless and
>> futile in the end.  It is upon that basis that I agree that "unrealized
>> value is an oxymoron."
>>
>
>
Ham:


> The premise does matter if you are building an ontology on it.  Language
> only expresses the concept.



John:

I like that last point you make, "language only expresses concepts", whereas
sometimes we have conceptualizations which don't have any words to express
them.   And it is for this reason that when I say I agree it's "language all
the way down", I have to add the caveat that "language" is something
different than mere words.

Ham:



>  Philosophical concepts are not developed from words or numbers; such
> symbols merely represent the concepts for communication purposes.  You can
> be a pragmatist and say "how you realize something doesn't matter", but
> you'll never make a philosopher with that attitude.  The philosopher has to
> deal with concepts that reach beyond empirical evidence.
>
>
John:

I agree!  Mostly.  I agree with the part about philosophical concepts being
more than words, in fact, I think I've been saying the same thing.  But what
I averred was that that which is unrealized doesn't exist.  As I say we can
have concepts for which we have no words, but I must insist that for which
we cannot conceptualize (realize) cannot be said to be real.  I take
"unrealized" in the sense you offer, to mean "unrealizable" as well.

 John prev:


>  However, there is a point to trying to always reach beyond our
>> conceptions.
>> That such an effort is driven by a quest that began with our birth whereby
>> we build continuing linguistic analogues for our experience in a process
>> that never ceases.  And that this process as a whole very definitely
>> points
>> at what is beyond language or definition.  Calling what we aim at
>> "Intellectual Quality" seems as good a term as any, and better than most.
>>
>
>
Ham:


> Again, the "conception" is what we DO reach for.  It's intellectual
> precepts that we depend on for pragmatic survival.  "Intellectual Quality"
> is a euphemism that doesn't translate into anything meaningful to me.
>
>
John:

I see your point about reaching for a conception.  In a sense, this obviates
my idea that what is not conceptualized is not real because if its not real,
then what are we reaching for?  Unreality?  So perhaps my understanding of
your "unrealized" as "unrealizable" is not correct.  You seem here, with
your "we DO reach for" to imply a a realizable conception that we have
realized *yet*. If so, then I see I'm going to have to bat this around a bit
more in my brain.



> [John]:
>
>> Now here is where it sounds to me as if you're dabbling in Absolute
>> Idealism. Your "ultimate source" seems very close to Royce's "Absolute
>> Knower".
>>
>
>
Ham:


> I don't use Royce as a reference for my thesis, nor do I consciously
> pattern my philosophy after any authority.
> If the label "Absolute Idealism" fits, then so be it.  (I've been called by
> worse names.)
>
>
John:

Well, I'm very interested at differing systems coming to the same
conclusions, using different terms.  I think such examples illustrate
"perennial" themes emerging and these congruencies are very important and
indicative of a far-reaching validity.  So whether you mind or not, it's of
significance to me!

[John]:

>
>  I've learned quite a bit since then Ham, and this seems very good to me.
>> I would definitely like to continue the process.
>>
>
>
Ham:



> Great!  You should know that I have an ulterior motive beyond winning you
> over to essentialism.  I value your logic, and hope our dialog leads to
> insights or analogies that will improve my exposition.
>
>
John:

Likewise, I'm sure.



>  Happy Eclipsed Solstice.
>>
>
> (I think the eclipse occurred while typing this message.)
>
> Merry Christmas to you and yours, John.
> --Ham
>
>
I was able to observe most of the eclipse, breaking through the wispy clouds
in a beguiling manner.  It was only when the moon got completely dark, that
I could no longer find it in the sky, due to the cloud cover.   It reminded
me greatly of that one in Jan of 2001, which I would like to talk more about
sometime soon.  If I can find the time during this hectic hoopla holiday
season.

And wishing you the joys thereof,

John