[MD] A larger system of understanding

[plattholden at gmail.com]

Hi Magnus,

Fine post. Thanks. About nature not being paradoxical, wouldn't quantum physics 
qualify nature as paradoxical? I'm no expert on the subject, but haven't they 
discovered that light can be both wave and particle at the same time? Or some 
similar weirdness? Secondly, about reality "becoming," that's an important 
point and a reminder of the metaphysical importance of DQ, "the Quality of 
freedom that creates this world." (Lila, 9) compared to science's magical 
"emergence," or "Oops".

Thanks again, Magnus
Platt 


On 9 Jul 2010 at 10:45, Magnus Berg wrote:

> Hi Platt
> 
> On 2010-07-08 22:22, Platt Holden wrote:
> 
> Magnus:
> >> Intellectual patterns can refer to any other pattern, including
> >> intellectual patterns and including itself.
> >>
> >
> > [Platt]
> > Yes they can. But in doing so often create paradox. Ex: "This is not an
> > intellectual pattern."
> 
> Sure, but that only shows that the system is too powerful, i.e. allows 
> too complex statements, about its domain. In this case, it's the 
> operator "not" that is too powerful. It exists only in the intellectual 
> domain. So, sure, you can make an intellectual statement that is always 
> false like that, but you can never make a correct intellectual statement 
> about nature that is paradoxal like that. Nature doesn't include 
> negations, no law of nature includes a paradox. If it did, the universe 
> would crash and reboot occasionally. (Ok ok, I can't prove that hasn't 
> happened. :) )
> 
> Anyway, the MoQ might of course contain such a paradox. And that would 
> be a bad thing since it aims to mirror our reality in a correct way. But 
> that's what we're doing here, to find such mistakes in the MoQ and fix 
> them. However, your original question about the MoQ referring to itself, 
> does not refer to nature in a direct way, so it's quite ok to use such 
> powerful statements like circular references.
> 
> For example, the statement:
> 
> "This is an intellectual pattern"
> 
> Is ok, right? It is circular, yet true and understandable and doesn't 
> make the universe crash or anything.
> 
> However, if you transpose it to a lower level:
> 
> "The egg contains an egg"
> 
> Is not ok! The universe doesn't crash just because I wrote it, but it 
> would crash if it were true. If each egg contained another egg inside 
> it, it would be smaller and smaller eggs inside until we reach molecular 
> and atomic sizes. And then it would be impossible to make smaller eggs.
> 
> >   Moreover, any intellectual proposition about reality must fall into the
> > following four categories:*
> >
> > 1. Reality is absolute Being
> > 2. Reality is Non-being
> > 3. Reality is both Being and Non-Being
> > 4. Reality is neither Being nor Non-Being
> >
> > Any one of these propositions that claims to embrace reality must exclude
> > another, thus limiting its embrace and falling into self-contradiction.
> >   *("The Spectrum of Consciousness" by Ken Wilber, p. 66)
> 
> That may be true for a static universe, but it isn't purely static, 
> there is DQ as well. To paraphrase Wilber in MoQeese:
> 
> Reality is both Being and Becoming.
> 
> 
> 
> > [Magnus]
> >>
> >> See it this way. A snake can't eat itself. It can start eating its own
> >> tail, and it might at most swallow some of itself but pretty soon it just
> >> can't swallow more. This is because the snake is not an intellectual
> >> pattern. The essence of a snake is biological and can't consist of itself.
> >>
> >> However, an intellectual pattern, like the text in a document, *can* refer
> >> to itself. For example the book that lays out the MoQ, Lila, mentions the
> >> MoQ lots and lots of times, and in doing so, the MoQ (the book Lila) refers
> >> to itself lots and lots of times. That is the power of the intellectual
> >> level, no other level can do it.
> >>
> >
> > [Platt}
> > Such references are a subject {Pirsig} referring to an object {the MOQ)
> > which is good old SOM. Pirsig cautions us in LC not to depend on SOM to tell
> > us about the central reality of the MOQ because "It is understood by direct
> > experience only and not by reasoning of any kind." (Note 132.)
> 
> It's not just "good old SOM", it's just as much the MoQ. Just because 
> something is equally easy to express in SOMeese as in MoQeese doesn't 
> mean you can just throw it in the bin and call it names.
> 
> About the quote, Pirsig used *quite* a lot of reasoning in Lila to 
> convey the MoQ, so he puts himself in a rather tight spot with that. And 
> I will continue to use very rational reasoning to explore the static 
> side of the MoQ.
> 
> >> [Platt]
> > As long as we can know something we can't define, like Quality, mystic
> > understanding is as good as, if not better than.logical positivism.
> 
> Ok, I can agree with you on Quality. But the MoQ's first division is 
> into DQ/SQ, and I guess we must still use that phrase "mystic 
> understanding" about DQ, but *not* about SQ!
> 
> > [Magnus]
> >
> >> I'm certain many of you are laughing by now about my ignorance. Rationality
> >> is the very ghost Pirsig tried to get rid of in both ZMM and Lila. And yes,
> >> that's true for many human endeavours, but not when it comes to discussing a
> >> metaphysics. Pirsig made quite a point out of Phaedrus' analytical knife
> >> when he carved up reality. In that process, DQ is only important when
> >> seeking the initial inspiration for a certain cut. But after that,
> >> transpiration takes over in the form of formal, rational and static
> >> thinking.
> >
> >
> > [Platt]
> > But to forget, or worse, ignore DQ's prominent role in the MOQ, we, to use
> > DMB's phrase, "rip out the heart."
> 
> DQ has a prominent role in the MoQ, yes. But SQ's role is just as 
> prominent! There can *be* nothing without SQ, and there can *become* 
> nothing without DQ. I know you're mostly a DQ guy, you've always been 
> that and I still admire you for your DQ side (it's only when you try to 
> use SQ reasoning to promote right-wing ideas that I get really itchy).
> 
> Nice talking to you again Platt.
> 
> 	Magnus