[MD] A larger system of understanding

[Ham Priday]

Magnus --


[Ham]:
> Why isn't 'Being and Becoming' a valid interpretation
> of experiential reality? It certainly represents the existentialist
> position of Heidegger and Sartre. Moreover, it also takes
> "nothingness" into account, as "becoming" infers coming into
>  existence (from nothing).

[Magnus]:
> This might be a first, but I agree with you on that Ham.
> The MoQ isn't alone on this, it's mostly common sense
> if you think about it. And I can imagine that this is the case
> for many other areas of the MoQ. And this is not a bad
> thing, it probably just makes it easier for outsiders to understand it.
>
> For example, in my essay "The levels undressed", I argue
> that the MoQ levels can be mapped to different scientific
> fields, like physics, chemistry, biology, etc. That's a strength! Then it 
> can use the level ladder to connect the dots *between*
> those, otherwise very separate, fields of research. I mean, is it really 
> feasible that mankind have separated those
> scientific fields of research for so long (ok, I guess it really
> isn't *that* long, but anyway), without good reason? Why would everybody 
> agree that physics, chemistry and
> biology are different, if they metaphysically aren't?

Because they ARE different fields of investigation, established for 
different objectives.  The physicist is looking for basic principles of 
dynamic interaction--the "mechanics" of the universe, so to speak.  The 
biologist studies life forms to learn the properties of organisms that lead 
to evolutionary change and complexity.  Since the time of the alchemists, 
the chemist has been interested in categorizing the elements and their 
behavior in reactiive processes such as compounding,  metallurgy, and 
polymerization.  Of course there are cross-overs, as in biophysics, 
genetics, geology, archeology, anthropology, etc., so that man's exploration 
of nature need never be segregated strictly by "kinds of substances" 
investigated .

I don't view these differences as "metaphysical", however.  Nor, in my 
opinion, are the four levels posited by Mr. Pirsig anything but an arbitrary 
classification of observed phenomena.  According to the paradigm, anything 
that involves knowledge, thought or feeling is assigned to the "social 
level", while inanimate and animate phenomena are attributed to the 
"inorganic" or "biological" level, respectively.  (The so-called 
"intellectual level" remains in limbo, depending on whether one regards 
reasoning as a "subjective" or a "social" function.

Just what is "metaphysical" about such a classification, and how is it a 
more "enlightened" worldview than the subject/object duality which it was 
designed to replace?

Essentially curious,
Ham