[MD] LC Comments

[Magnus Berg]

Mary

Sorry about the delay.

> [Mary replies]
> I don't think Pirsig is trying to be disrespectful.  I think he is
> expressing some underlying assumptions we might not agree with (or, as in my
> case, I tend to feel it's more like I don't understand him than that I do
> understand him but disagree).  I think it's common to perceive stuff we
> don't understand as disrespectful when it's not intended that way at all.

Yes, I know it's probably not disrespectful. He's probably honest and 
really believes what he's saying is correct. But since I have spotted so 
many flaws with the levels as described in Lila, and also fixed them, I 
assumed that he had as well.

> It seems like Pirsig is following the line of reasoning he put forth in the
> SODV paper where he divides the levels into something akin to the 'material
> or objective' (Inorganic and Biological) and the 'mental or subjective'
> (Social and Intellectual). But maybe not, because while you are puzzled
> about his statement, "The hand that taps the computer keys is biological",
> for myself, I can get comfortable by extrapolating that into, "the hand that
> built the computer is biological, shaped by social, and refined by
> intellectual" and be ok with it,

As I've written to Dan and DMB, I'm not ok with that. I require direct 
dependency, not circumstantial like that.

> but then start to have difficulty with his
> other statement, "Social patterns are subjective.  Robots are not."  I mean,
> I tend to agree with him that robots are not social patterns, but since he
> groups Social and Intellectual patterns into the subjective category, then
> he seems to be saying they aren't Intellectual patterns either - leaving
> what?  Inorganic?  It seems so.

Yes, when you start thinking in these lines, you get to a point where 
there's simply no way out, without adjusting the levels as described in 
Lila that is. Pirsig for example says that the border between the 
inorganic and biological is drawn by DNA. Stuff that has DNA is 
biological, stuff without it is not. Ok, simple enough, but way too 
simple. Because that would mean that only stuff with DNA can become 
intellectual, and would make any attempts at AI futile. But is that 
really so unthinkable, that we some day learn what makes the human brain 
so smart, and make ourselves a similar device? Then what? When that 
happens, we must rethink the biological border, but why not do that now? 
What's the harm? The DNA border is soo arbitrary, earth-centric. Should 
really a universal metaphysics contain such local processes. Isn't it 
very presumptuous to assume that all life in the entire universe is 
based on DNA?


> [Mary replies]
>
> The questions posed are the same ones any person viewing the situation from
> a S/O perspective would raise.  The computer 'has' attributes of operating
> temperature and such, so it must also 'have' Intellectual Value patterns
> too; and if it 'has' these intellectual values, then when it is broken it
> must no longer 'have' them.  For Pirsig (and us here) though, it is
> understood that this is not the case;  we see instead that the Intellectual
> Quality that created it 'has' the computer.  So if the computer breaks or
> fails to work beyond a given range of operating temperatures, that just
> indicates that an 'imperfect or incomplete' set of Intellectual Value
> patterns were used to create it.  These subjective intellectual patterns of
> value need to go back to the drawing board to refine the intellectual
> pattern of values otherwise known 'objectively' as a computer.

Hmm, I've never been a fan of those 180-degree turns of pattern 
ownership. It might sound good, but does it really work in practice?

I mean, when I leave my computer, it can still work itself hot 
manipulating formulas, text, numbers, all those things we normally 
consider intellectual pattern manipulation. A very large percentage of 
people do that every day for a living, pretty automated manipulation of 
formulas, text and numbers. We may not consider such work to be very 
dynamic, or intellectually challenging, but it's still very much a 
manipulation of static intellectual patterns of value.

I mean that such work, no matter if it's done by a computer or a person, 
is not possible without the ability to manipulate intellectual patterns 
by itself. No user is required, no builder is required once it's built. 
It just works by itself.

> [Mary replies]
>
> I don't like this formula either, but maybe I dislike it for different
> reasons than you?  In one way, he's right to divide the levels into
> objective vs subjective.  It's what everybody sees and understands
> intuitively, so when you start off explaining the MoQ to anyone new, that's
> probably where you have to start (and for most everyday people is probably
> also where it ends ;) ).  We object to it because we see the Universe as DQ
> expressed as SQ, so the subjectivity/objectivity thing rankles.  I wonder if
> Pirsig is taking it in a more forgiving bigger picture sense though?
>
> If all is SQ derived from DQ, then surely SOM is also SQ, so to see the
> Universe in terms of subjects and objects is a Quality perspective too -
> just not the 'best' or 'most fundamental' perspective.  If you explain the
> levels to anyone in everyday conversation, they will immediately jump to the
> conclusion that the lower levels are 'material' and the upper levels are
> 'mind'.  From a SOM perspective that will always be so and you can probably
> argue until you are exhausted with someone planted in a SOMish worldview and
> never convince them otherwise.

I guess that should be a common goal for us here, to come up with a good 
way to show how to explain the MoQ and the levels without having to 
revert to S/O.

Thanks Mary.

	Magnus