[MD] Essentials for target practice

[Ham Priday]

Hey, John --



> An old friend of mine, Grego, used to say humorously, "reality, what a
> concept".  And obviously, reality is a concept, but if you point out there
> is an objective reality outside of our conceptualization, I can't argue
> with you, but I can't really see much usefulness in saying anything about 
> it.
> For we are stuck with our concepts, always.

It's true that Reality is a concept.  But so is Existence, as you and others 
have pointed out.  Pirsig even turned it into a metaphysics!  In fact we 
hold empirical knowledge as so many concepts.  Physical principles, 
evolution, relativity, mathematics, geometry and calculus -- they're all 
concepts.  Marsha would argue that everything we know or experience is a 
"pattern".  Does that make it any less "real" for us than, say, a phenomenon 
or an object?

There comes a time, it seems to me, when a "concept" must stand for 
something beyond a mental image or dialectic symbol.  We inhabit and 
participate in a world that we all treat as "real", at least when we're not 
philosophizing.  Is it conceivable that this universe of concrete subjects 
and objects can exist on its own without an intrinsic essence to create and 
sustain it?  It doesn't matter that this essence is inaccessible to the 
senses and must be conceptualized as a metaphysical premise.  What matters 
is that it is real, and that we realize it as the true Reality.  Pirsig 
postulated that Quality (DQ) is the true reality.  I agree that Quality 
(better identified as Value) is the essential ground of existential reality. 
However, I maintain that "unrealized value" is an epistemological absurdity, 
which is to say, realization is contingent upon man's sensibility.

I promised to report on Professor Bill's reactions to my "essentials".   As 
our Saturday chats tend to be long-winded, we managed to discuss only four 
of the dozen tenets in the 90 minutes allotted.  Like you, Bill doesn't see 
the need for "nothingness", suggesting that the first tenet read: "Nothing 
comes from nothing."  I can live with that revision, except that it may be 
misconstrued by some as a "positive" statement, i.e., "Nothing creates 
itself", which of course is not my meaning, but which I made the second 
tenet (also as a "negative" assertion.).

As if to refute this tenet, Bill then proceeded to discuss a theory of 
abiogenesis by which life forms are believed to have been produced by 
inanimate matter.  He also criticized me for using "philosophical words" 
that support my thesis, such as "appearance", "otherness", and--yes--even 
"value".  He has always insisted that "importance" or "virtuosity" are more 
apt terms than value, especially as they pertain to utlilitarian ends. 
(Bill, an avid reader, repeatedly reminds me that he's spent a lifetime 
studying man's behavior through all of history, and that he considers his 
personal philosophy to be the acquisition of "virtuous knowledge".  On those 
rare occasions when he has indulged me in a discussion of a philosophical 
concept, his typical response has been: "But what can you DO with it?")

The professor refused to accept my premise that man is a "free agent" (No. 
10) on the ground that there is no historical precedent for this assertion. 
"The idea that man is free is greatly exaggerated," he said, dismissing my 
claim that man has the innate capacity to act in accordance with his values. 
Although he agreed that truth is relative (No. 11), he failed to understand 
why access to absolute truth would be inimical to individual freedom.  About 
the only tenet he accepted without qualification was No. 12, again stressing 
that "realizing the value of experience" was his life goal.   Altogether it 
was a rather disappointing discussion.

> I still have problems with nothingness.  I'd posit that we conceptualize
> nothingness from a pre-realized sense of being.  Nothingness is just too
> "not there" for any kind of perceptual distinguishing.
>
> How about absence?  I could go with absence.  For any thing to be 
> realized,
> it's a negate of its absence.  For some reason that makes more sense to 
> me.
> I think because deep down, I'm not sure that there is any true nothingness
> anywhere.  Even the vacuum of space is a "something" that flows with
> energies and forces beyond our normal perceptions.  The connotation of
> "nothingness" trips me up.

I don't think you are atypical, John, and I find your "anything realized is 
a negation of its absence" concept intriguing.  Let me say that I define 
"nothingness" in the Sartrean sense of "non-being".  Even though nothingness 
is not an 'existent', being cannot exist without non-being,  This is another 
of existence's dualities.  I doubt that anyone who has read "Being and 
Nothingness" can dismiss this proposition.  That we straddle a being/nothing 
universe in our life-experience explains why existence is negational -- a 
"reduction" of (as opposed to an "addition" to) Essence.  It also explains 
why the Ultimate Reality that transcends existence cannot logically be said 
to "exist".

> Reality does not exist?  We're back to my original refutation, that even 
> if
> reality is only a concept, it exists AS a concept and thus "exists".  We 
> use
> it pragmatically in staying at the top of cliffs and out of heavy traffic.
> Comes in handy, that way.

I know this conclusion sounds nonsensical.  Here's the way I explained it in 
my online thesis:
"If Essence is a priori, and existence is limited to phenomena that occur in 
time and space, then it is illogical to say that Essence exists.  Essence is 
the infinite Source of finite experience, not an existent.  (Aristotle 
rejected the "Infinite" as an existing reality on the premise that a whole 
number cannot be infinite because one can never actually count to 
infinity.)"

There is simply no way that the differentiated, evolutionary system we call 
"existence" can be equated to Ultimate Reality.  If you believe, as I do, 
that a transcendent source is prerequisite for existence, then "existence"' 
is no longer viewed as the predominant mode of reality

> Ok, I squinch up my eyes, and substitue "being and absence" and agree.
> Conception as existence, I also agree.  So far so good.
>
> I agree Lila is not a metaphysics.  Just like pragmatism is not a
> philosophy.  Pragmatism is a method of philosophizing and Lila is
> a how-to manual on building a metaphysics of undefinable Quality.
>
> And you're absolutely correct about value not being a precept, or percept
> or whatever you call that which our senses tell us.  "Pre-intellectual" 
> has
> been as hard for me to grasp as nothingness.  I'd say that we construct an
> idea of value from our experience, just as we do with reality.  Thus it's
> seems obvious to equate value with reality with experience.
>
> What if we turn back to Father Kant, and designate Quality as the
> ultimate a priori conceptualization upon which all else derives?
>
>... has this been tried?

I assume it was tried by Robert Pirsig.  How successfully is a question time 
will tell.  The problem, as I see it, is that Reality (whatever it is) must 
be more than a "conception".  In Pirsig's case, particularly, the Quality 
upon which all else derives is a conceptual 'straw man' inasmuch as it 
cannot be realized independently of a "real" man.

[Ham, skipping the bit on Ellul]:
> Again, that which exists represents existential reality.  Ultimate Reality
> is not an existent.  Until you acknowledge these two states of reality,
> you will not understand my ontology.
>
> I also said that when it comes to Truth, ideas don't count.

[John]:
> I think I can buy that first part, even tho I don't as a rule, ponder
> "Ultimate Reality" anymore than you ponder the anthropomorphic
> daddy-in-the-sky.  But I'm willing to allow you to do so and thus
> see where you're coming from and I can go along with it.
>
> But I don't agree that ideas don't count when it comes to Truth.
> What is Truth but a high Quality idea that drives all intellectual
> conceptualization?

You might as well say that Reality is a "high quality idea" and be done with 
it.  But I sense that this would not satisfy you.  Actually, we are in 
agreement on more than I would have expected, John.  Moreover, the 
problematic issues -- nothingness and the necessity of a primary source --  
seem to be problems for everyone I've talked to.  So, on the whole, I 
consider this a productive dialogue.  Perhaps the most satisfying one I've 
had in my six years on this forum.

I bow to your indulgence and understanding.

Essentially yours,
Ham