[MD] Natural Law

[Steven Peterson]

Hi John,

On Fri, Jul 30, 2010 at 2:21 PM, John Carl <ridgecoyote at gmail.com> wrote:
> Yay Steve,
>
> Steve:
>> I think we agree that for the MOQ values are real, but that doesn't
>> tell us that there is a right and wrong that is not relative.
>
>
>
> John:
>
> Well, I disagree.  And that's the crux of the matter, isn't it.  But I think
> plainly the reductio ad absurdem that Pirsig employs in ZAMM, proves the
> existence of a fundamental pull toward betterness.  The observable facts of
> evolution indisputably prove some anti-entropic pull
> An objective or absolute good, or we wouldn't be here.  Randomness is too
> unlikely an explanation and also, generates no hope.
>
> What is relative, is our individual perception and our individual position
> relative to the vector arrow of Quality.


Steve:
The Euthyphro Dilemma comes to mind. Should we go in the direction
evolution seems to be pulling because it is good, or do we call the
direction good because that is the way evolution is pulling?



> John:
> What you seem to be saying, Steve, is that Quality is valueless without
> intersubjective agreement.



Steve:
What I am saying is that "Both are moral arguments. Both [Arlo and
Platt] can claim the MOQ for support."



John:
> I see Pirsig offering exactly what I define.  A way of playing the game,
> with hope of a goal.  Rather than just randomly running around in a field
> without lines.  It takes people to play, and they have to be in opposition.
> It doesn't work when all are going "ommmm" in harmonic perfection all the
> time.

Steve:
But Pirsig says that the MOQ has no teleology. It doesn't say which
side of any moral conflict _ought_ to win. It just helps us better
understand the conflict in terms of different types of value patterns.



> John:
> Yes, I agree.  When the field of play is intellectual formulation, the
> goalposts are infinitely distant.  BUT there is a direction.  The field of
> play provides a context, a way of knowing whether you are relatively closer
> or more distant than an other.  Sometimes it's not real obvious, because you
> are both real close.  And the roaring of the crowd might confuse one or the
> other, because from the crowd's static position on the sidelines, your
> opponent has inched ahead of you.  But they could be wrong in this.  And
> even if right, keep racing, racing, racing and you'll catch up and surge
> ahead.
>
> Because you know which way to run.
>
> See how knowing which way to run, by defining a field of play, is
> pragmatically useful to actually getting somewhere?


Steve:
I don't think the MOQ tells us which way to run except for the
hypothetical "all things being equal" scenario where we ought to favor
the more dynamic. (When are all things equal????) As Pirsig pointed
out. Even in cases where a social pattern runs up against an
intellectual pattern, we can't always say that the intellectual
pattern ought to always win since we are on that boat I mentioned...

"We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship
but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is
taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest
of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams
and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by
gradual reconstruction."

Social patterns support intellectual patterns, so to undermine a
social pattern may be to lose support for intellectual patterns even
though the intellectual pattern in question is considered to be on a
higher moral level than the social pattern in question. Reconstruction
(evolution of static patterns of value toward undefined betterness)
has to be gradual enough so as not to sink the ship.

Best,
Steve