[MD] atheistic and content

[plattholden at gmail.com]

Hi Ham, 

On 15 Mar 2010 at 2:30, Ham Priday wrote:

> Hi Platt -- 

Platt (before) 
> > I listed the conditions (requirements) you cited for "being,
> > i.e., existence.  If you are saying "being" and "existence"
> > are different, please explain the difference. If you prefer
> > "reality" instead of either "being" or "existence," I'll go along
> > with that.

Ham 
> I'm having the same problem with you as I do with Marsha.  She is looking to 
> find her self.  You are trying to identify reality.  Pirsigians are a 
> strange lot; they have a mindset that resists common sense.
> 
> I'm saying that existence is the appearance of being.  It is fundamentally 
> comprised of two components: Sensibility (individualized as proprietary 
> awareness) and Otherness (differentiated as pluralistic beingness).  How can 
> such a simple duality
> confound your intellect?

Platt 
> > But, you have insisted all along that without cognizant experience
> > there is no being, existence, reality. Or am I mistaken?
> > (By "cognizant experience" I presume you mean "human experience,"
> > eliminating my cat, UTOE, from reality.) Incidentally, what is the
> > difference between a "requirement" and a "conditional aspect?"

Ham 
> I'll answer your second question first.  A "condition" is a given aspect 
> (attribute or state) of existence.  In some cases, one condition may be 
> contingent upon another.  A "requirement" is what is needed to create or 
> actualize that state.  I've defined existence (above) as consisting of 
> Sensibility and Otherness.  Neither contingency creates itself; they are 
> both actualized by negation of the Primary Source.  (I'll skip the dynamics 
> of "negation", as well as the special distinction Pirsig makes between 
> "dynamic" and "static", as these theories provoke controversy that only 
> complicates the issue.)

Platt
To me, a distinction without difference. The condition of pregnancy is a 
requirement for birth. 

Ham
> I maintain that experience creates the appearance of being that we call 
> existence.  I have never said that without experience there is no reality. 
> But that, of course, depends on how you define Reality.  Is it the 
> appearance of pluralistic being?  If so, you have no problem with the 
> so-called SOM worldview.  Pirsig defines it as Quality, so I assume that's 
> your Reality.

Platt
Again, to me experience, being, existence, reality are synonymous.  

 Ham
> My problem with the MoQ is that the existence of Quality has no ontology. 
> The author posits no progenitor or source for Quality.  It simply is (has 
> been) always there in the cosmos, and it's continually "moving toward 
> betterness".  The fact that creatures experience Quality is only incidental, 
> even though they are "patterns" of it..

Platt
Nor do you posit a progenitor or source for Essence. Another distinction 
without a difference in my book. 

Platt (before) 
> > What is the difference between "experiential existence" and
> > "existence?" And, who "actuated" the division of the One (Essence)
> > into Sensibility (Subject) and Otherness (Object). Is it Ham?
> > Descartes? the Greeks? All of the above?

Ham 
> Existence IS experiential, so these terms are synomous. (I sometimes use 
> "experiential existence" as a reminder that experience creates existence.) 

Platt
And is it not the case that in your metaphysics, experience creates being 
and reality?

Ham
> As I stated above, Essence is the "actuator" of the primary division (i.e., 
> the Sensibility/Otherness dichotomy).  As to who came up with this 
> hypothesis, I would have to say Ham with considerable help from the likes of 
> Plotinus, Cusanus, Eckhart, and Hegel, among others.

Platt
Since in your metaphysics the primary division is subject/object 
(disguised
as sensitive agent/otherness), I would say it's hardly an original division.  

Platt (before) 
> > What is outside a "metaphysical context?" In your view as I
> > understand it, nothing, including Essence, exists outside a
> > metaphysical context provided by "experiencing agents,"
> > "individuated selves" or "cognizant subjects." (It's confusing,
> > Ham, when you use different words to mean the same thing,
> > like a shovel in one place, a spade in another, and a
> > dirt-moving instrument in another.)

Ham 
> Sorry to have confused you.  I don't know where you got the idea that 
> "nothing exists outside a metaphysical context."  When I said "I have put 
> Value into a metaphysical context." I meant that I have gone a step further 
> than Pirsig by positing Value as derived from the primary source (Essence). 

Platt
In Pirsig's "metaphysical context," Value is the primary source with 
Dynamic/static values derived therefrom. 

Ham
> You can read "metaphysical context" to mean "in a metaphysical sense" or 
> "from a metaphyical standpoint".  From an existential standpoint "selves" 
> are individuated, "agents" are experiencing subjects, and subjects are 
> "cognizant".  Does that help?

Platt
It helps to confirm that you uphold the subject/object division. 

Platt (before) 
> > Look. Quality can stand alone as the One as well as your Essence
> > can.  Both can be divided into subjects and objects. As Pirsig
> > points out, there are many ways that undivided experience can be split.
> > The question is, "Which way is best?" You chose the tried and true
> > conservative subject/object split. Pirsig chose the innovative
> > Dynamic/static value split and explained in Lila why it is the better
> > choice. He has convinced a lot of us that his first division provides
> > a better account of "being" than other divisions. Personally,
> > Occam's razor goes a long way to convincing me his metaphysics
> > is on the right track.

Ham 
> Epistemologically, Quality (Value) cannot stand alone but must be realized. 
> Realization is what human sensibility does.  Maybe Pirsig can divide Quality 
> into subjects and objects; I can't.  The answer to "which is best?" is a 
> subjective judgment based on what sounds or feels good.  If you're searching 
> for Truth, "which is right or more logical" is the criterion you'll use. 
> Pirsig has won converts by perpetrating the notion of "betterness" as a 
> cosmic principle, which "feels good" but is unsubstantiated.  (I don't need 
> to remind you that Socialism also feels good to many people.)   Occam's 
> razor supports no particular division or hypothesis; it only argues for 
> simplicity over complexity.

Platt
Pirsig wrote an entire book to substantiate the logic and rightness of 
"betterness."  "Feel good" happens at different evolutionary levels. The 
feel good of a roll in the hay is different than the feel good of an 
enlightening theory. The "betterness" of capitalism compared to 
socialism is explicated simply and directly in the MOQ. Occam's razor 
prevails.   

Ham
> I no longer hold out hope for changing your mind, Platt.  Now I'm simply 
> trying to ensure that you understand my position correctly.

Platt
I appreciate your taking the time to answer my questions. As always, I 
enjoy our exchanges. Now if we can just convince enough democrats 
not to vote for that monstrous "health" bill that will inflict death panels on 
Americans.

Best regards,
Platt