[MD] atheistic and content

John Carl ridgecoyote at gmail.com
Mon Mar 15 18:35:49 PDT 2010


Thank goodness for Ham, even though I am kosher, he gives me meat to chew
on:

On Fri, Mar 12, 2010 at 3:35 PM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> Cynicism has never been the heart of philosophy, nor will it satisfy our
> quest for spiritual understanding.  Instead of excoriating theism and
> glorifying atheism, might it not be more productive to explore the reasons
> that mysticism and religion have for thousands of years provided the
> valuistic and moral basis for human civilization?  Indeed, the development
> of philosophy itself owes much to the inspiration of gnostics and monastic
> thinkers.
>

I have always pictured the MoQ as the best intellectual tool for the
analysis of intellectual and social tools.

Science is an intellectual tool.

Religion is a social tool.

Both are valid tools with many useful functions, that ought to be analyzed.
That ought to be talked about.  That ought to be discussed from the context
of "what is good?"

Claiming for instance, that "science is good and religion is bad" is as
stupid as saying "box wrenches are good and open-end wrenches are bad."
Some tools are good for doing some things, and some tools are bad at doing
those things.  The MoQ handles both tools with aplomb, it is a "meta-tool",
for it posits Good as fundamental, immanent AND Absolute.  And everything
else is relative.

Perhaps this is a bad formulation in some esoteric, philosophic sense, but
hey, it works for me.  Which means you can't attack it from a pragmatic
angle because I've got Pragmatism right here in my right hand holster,
baby.

Cynicism is bad philosophy.  Skepiticism is good philosophy.  Skeptics doubt
the answers provided while cynics believe there are none.  That's why
atheism is also a poor philosophical stance.  As is theism!  I agree with
dmb on that.  Philosophy should be analytic and open-minded, skeptical and
willing to wonder.





>
> Actually, Marsha may have unknowingly put her finger on the nature of man's
> discontent when she described her search for a "...place where I might be a
> religious person who doesn't believe in god, or better yet, a place without
> such divisions as I and god."  None of us want to be "religious persons",
> but we all seek to satisfy our spiritual needs.
>
> Why do you suppose we are spiritually unfulfilled?  Marsha has answered
> that, too.  Because we all feel the "division between I and god" as
> estrangement from the source of our existence.  We are, in fact, lacking the
> 'essence' of our being.



Well who's this "we" you talkin' 'bout white man.  I don't see how we can be
anything BUT in touch with our essential source.  Our essential source is
all around, we're swimming in it all the time - everything that is, IS our
source.

Sure, discontented feelings arise and unhappiness and suffering abound.  But
those are largely things with attributable causes of "wrong thinking".  I
don't think intellect is all bad, but when there is something bad, it's
because intellect made a wrong turn somewhere.



> Just what is that essential source?  Mr. Pirsig has contented some by
> proposing that it's Quality.  But we know Quality as our measure of value or
> goodness.
>

Well I usually let these little things slide, but who is this "we" you
talkin' 'bout, again, whiteman?

You can't make the subject the basis of values, Ham.  It doesn't fly
epistemologically, or something.  It's that recursion thing.  You have to
have an "other" for realization of self and it is in the differentiation and
valuation of this relationship with other that creates the "self" you depend
upon for value.

tsk tsk.

I mean, that's the way it's always seemed to me.



> To evaluate something as good or bad requires a cognitive subject,



And what else?  It requires a valuation for a cognitive agent to be aware
of.  Even "cognitive" is a value, for there is a continuum of Animal Being
(this the point Royce made in his grasping of Evolution as a Narrative
purpose to existence) where we plainly see at one end, cognition and at the
other end, nada.  With lots of shades of gray between, I might add.


yet Pirsig denies a subjective agent as anything but a "pattern of Quality".
>  Obviously, this is an epistemological paradox, for we can't appreciate
> (have an affinity for) value if it is the very nature of our being.
>
>

Sure we can!  We'll just ask the waiter for some.

I can't see your point at all.  It makes more sense to me to wonder why we
DON'T have an affinity for value, since it's the very nature of our being
and all...

John



> I'll stop here, because I've already made my point, and it's unfortunately
> not a concept of the MoQ.  But just maybe it will inspire others to come out
> of their nihilistic fog long enough to consider the implications of my
> argument.
>
> Essentially yours,
> Ham


Well, nihilist, I'm not.  So that was projected elsewhere, I'm sure.  But
it's always a pleasure Ham, to dialogue with you.

Idealistically,

John



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