[MD] Royce's Absolute, conclusion

[John Carl]

dave,

On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 11:37 AM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> dmb replies:
>
> The stuff you quoted from John McDermott seemed quite compelling and
> challenging to me and so you're more likely to convince me with more thought
> along those lines.
>
>

ok.  But is my task to "convince you"?  Or could it be something similar but
different?    For instance, if you typed the words "I'm convinced",  but
deep down were not so convinced, I wouldn't know the difference.  My
experience would be identical whether you were convinced or not.  Thus, I am
not aiming at convincing you, I'm aiming at convincing some idealized
"other".  In this case, an idealization of myself - myself in the future who
would like to be convinced of the rightness of my own position, and I'm
seeking your assistance in my conviction by persuading you.

Does that make sense?

good.




> But here, you've only provided reasons NOT to equate Royce's Absolute with
> DQ. I think you were quoting Royce when you wrote, "this supposed universal
> knowing consciousness, this "not ourselves" has, under the conditions
> stated, all the essential characteristics of a real world.  It is beyond us;
> it is independent of us; its facts have a certain correspondence to our
> sensations."
>

Sorry.  I'll try to be more clear, if you're actually going to take this
dialogue seriously, but that was Kuklick explaining Royce's position.  But
small difference, as I accept Kuklick's understanding of Royce as
authoritative.  And yeah, some of those quotes were Kuklick's direct quotes
of Royce, so...

I think what he's describing is our "experience" of the world, as this
knowing consciousness.  It knows in the way that effect "knows" cause.  It's
a relation.  Our direct experience is of a "not ourselves" that has all the
essential characteristics of a real world.  etc.  That's sure the way it
seems to me.  What's the problem?




> Now compare this idea of a universal knowing consciousness that is beyond
> us and independent of us to the idea of direct everyday experience.




Why?  Why would I compare two things that intrinsically the same?  Direct
everyday experience is of a nature of a universal knowing consciousness.
Zen calls this enlightenment, but the MoQ just calls it "duh".




> This notion of a universal consciousness is what Pirsig is talking at the
> end of chapter 29, when he says that Quality "is not some intellectualized
> Hegelian Absolute. It is direct everyday experience."



I think Pirsig was arguing against the way intellect tries to capture
knowing in a hubristic and control-freak way.  In other words, from personal
experience.  Royce spat out Hegel as well.

I agree.  Experience = Quality.  But that IS an absolute.  It is THE
Absolute of Pirsig and Royce, and since THAT is my position, your positing
of Pirsig's refutation of Hegelian Absolutes does nothing to help me in my
process of self-conviction.

I think you need to read the Coppleston Annotations again, this time paying
more attention to the process of thinking by Pirsig, rather than nit-picking
certain thoughts that appeal to your preconceived lines of argument.

Royce improves upon his position with time.  Interpretation is the best
explanation I've heard.  I think a perfected metaphysic would use DQ/sq in a
Roycean logic of interpretation and we could call it a day and hoist a brew.




> Those two things are very different and what you're offering here as
> equivalent to direct everyday experience is just such an Absolute.


There's all kinds of Absolutes dave.  Just like there's all kinds of
metaphysical systems which define them.  These things take a bit more
interpretative powers than simply reading the cliff notes in SEP or wiki or
whatever.




> It doesn't have to be Hegel's version or come out of Hegel's mouth for it
> to be objectionable. We can see this in the description you've provided.
> Look at that Royce quote and ask yourself some questions.
>

Or rather, I'll answer yours.



> In what sense can direct experience be equated with a universal knowing
> consciousness? (The former is an empirical fact while the latter is a
> metaphysical entity created by logic but is not known in experience as
> such.)



In what sense does that question make any sense?

Geez dave, you really gotta clean up your structuring a bit...  I'll
construe the best I can, but man...

In what sense?  In an intellectual one.  It is a process of thinking which
leads to the conclusion that the only Abolute possible is  direct
experience.  Thus experience is an absolute.

Why do you have to have an Absolute at all?  I can hear you asking down my
neck,

Because you just do.  This is where the Metaphysical primacy of Value as
argued by Pirsig's argument of the good, and Royce's argument from the
existence of error, both concur and point to the same results.



I actually think Ham is saying something similar to this, but since he uses
such carefully obfuscatory verbiage, its hard for me to tell.  I'd say ask
him




> In what sense is direct everyday experience "not ourselves"?



Huh?  If I was just "you", I'd probably be a lot more complimentary instead
of  so scornful.  ipso facto, quip pro quo.



> In what sense is direct experience independent of us or beyond us?


Sat on any hot stoves lately?

No?  Too bad.  you should.

You really should.





> Pirsig's Quality is called the primary empirical reality and the cutting
> edge of experience. I don't see how this kind of immediate experience can
> reasonably be characterized as transcendent or independent of us in any way.



I know you don't dave.  I know you don't.  And it's a shame.  Such a waste,
really.  A mind locked in on itself is a sad thing to see.  If I really did
care much for convincing you, it would be here on this point mainly.

You poor lonely, lonely man.



> Pirsig is talking about the experience of actual people. Royce is talking
> about something "not ourselves". The incompatibility of these two ideas is
> obvious, don't you think?
>


Pirsig is only talking about the experience of lonely people then, if he's
not also talking about the experience of not ourselves.

"Ah the lonely people,  where do they all come from?  Where do they all
belong?"

The beatles.