[MD] DMB and Me

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Steve,

Steve said:
So, among other things, you are taking Putnam's pragmatic 
attempt to blur dichotomies into useful distinctions one step 
further by blurring the difference between a distinction and 
a dichotomy?

Matt:
Well, maybe trying to articulate what kind of "useful 
distinction" a dichotomy is.  I don't mean to blur the 
difference between a distinction and a dichotomy such 
much as say, "okay, so we have a bunch of 
distinctions--what's this bunch over here doing that's so 
special that some philosophers think are of an entirely 
different brand of distinction?"  So, Kant thought that the 
tripartite distinction between cognitive, ethical, and 
aesthetic wasn't just useful, it was a special kind of useful 
known as "the way things are."  The step I want to 
awkwardly take is to say--"okay, we know Kant's gloss on 
the distinction between cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic 
doesn't help--saying they are dichotomies that reflect the 
way things are adds nothing to their utility (because you 
can't explain the reflection process): however, is there a 
utility _other_ than the Platonic urge Kant wanted to satisfy?"  
It is likely that most dichotomies aren't still fought over if 
they don't in some way satisfy an urge we still have, and that 
is still useful to have (maybe).  For instance, a distinction 
between physics and painting--the bad dichotomy between 
cognitive and aesthetic is ostensibly aimed at what is still a 
useful thing to distinguish between.  How might we do it 
better?

Steve said:
With regard to (2) ["How heavy-handed was Pirsig trying to 
be in enforcing/suggesting this distinction/dichotomy?"], the 
paintings in a gallery bit supports a suggestion for a better 
distinction/dichotomy over an enforced distinction/dichotomy 
about the way things really are.

Matt:
This is where I lose hold of how you are dividing up your 
terms for use.  When you dissolve "enforcing/suggesting" 
into a continuum of heavy-handedness, the fuzzy 
continuum disappears when we get to "suggestion for a 
better..." vs. "enforced ... about the way things really 
are."  The idea, I take it, in creating fuzzy continuums is 
not to repeat the term you want to get clear on.  In this 
case, "the way things really are"--Platonism hasn't been 
clear to us on how to tell what that is, so pitting that at 
the end of a continuum does suggest we know how to 
get from one end of the continuum to the other.  But that 
makes being a heavy-handed writer a criterion for getting 
at the way things really are.

Steve said:
DMB seems to be on the heavy-handed side of the issue, 
enforcing a dichotomy between those who correctly 
subscribe to radical empiricism and those who just don't 
get it and reject it.

Matt:
I'm still not sold on how useful this distinction between 
"suggesting" and "enforcing" is in getting at the difference 
between distinctions and dichotomies, pragmatism and 
Platonism.  DMB is enforcing his understanding of radical 
empiricism to the same degree that I, say, enforce the 
Davidsonian understanding of metaphor.  For particular 
purposes, I am completely unbending.  Enforcement is a 
degree of systematization, and there's nothing _inherently_ 
wrong with system (i.e. Rorty was slightly misleading in 
the closing section of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature).  
I've come to appreciate this point by reading "system" as 
just "really internally coherent."

When you are trying to get clear on something, on very 
specific points (like where a disagreement lies between two 
people), you have to be heavy-handed and enforce the 
things you think are at issue--because if you don't, it won't 
look like you have a point at all.

Matt
 		 	   		  
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