[MD] DMB and Me

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,


> Steve said:
> The difference between Matt (and I) and you and Pirsig is that Pirsig claims that the fundamental nature of reality is outside of language, and Matt and I have stopped trying to nail down any fundamental nature of reality.
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> Hmmm. No, actually, there is no difference. ...
> Pirsig's claim that the fundamental nature of reality is outside language MEANS that you can NOT nail it down. This fundamental reality is outside of language and language is what we use to nail things down. But when I use the terms that refer to this fundamental reality, Matt (and now you too, apparently) takes that to mean I'm trying to nail it down.


Steve:
I agree that the point of saying "the fundamental nature of reality is
outside of language" is to insist that we give up on trying to nail it
down with words. So does Matt. I should have been more clear about
that in my pithy description of the the difference which, like you, I
think is not much of a difference. Matt was actually the first to say
that there may be "no difference" which is when you got all upset with
him. Your original denial of "no difference" is what got this whole
thing rolling.

My understanding is that your "radical empiricism approach" and Matt's
"philosophy of language approach" are both forms of anti-Platonism.

You keep taking Matt's lack of interest in talking about radical
empiricism as an attack on radical empiricism. It's not. And since you
think he is attacking radical empiricism, you think he must be
supporting Platonism. He's not.

Matt is just saying that he is doing the anti-Platonist thing in a
different way from you. You seem to be insisting that there is just
one way to do anti-Platonism: radical empiricism.

In your view, if Matt wants to be an anti-Platonist but doesn't want
to do radical empiricism, then he must not understand radical
empiricism. Matt is willing to grant that he may not understand
radical empiricism, but he thinks that even if he understood it, he
still wouldn't necesarily want to use it since he already has ways of
doing anti-Platonism. But you keep insisting that either he does
radical empiricism or he is a Platonist in your book. Then Matt just
shrugs and walks away. He knows that he is not a Platonist, but he
also knows that you are no more interested in understanding his sort
of anti-Platonism as he is in better understanding your radical
empiricism.


> Steve said:
> The assertion that the fundamental nature of reality is outside of language is asserted using language. Doesn't this statement then
> contradict itself? I mean, is it true? Does this statement really tell us something about the fundamental nature of reality? If it is true it is false. It would seem to Matt and I better just not to say such things. This is not a denial or a rejection of the reality of anything. It is a preference not to speak in certain terms.
>
> dmb says:
>
> Yes, I already addressed the paradoxical nature of talking about the nonverbal and conceptualizing the nonconceptual. (Sigh. Why does everybody make me repeat myself?)

Steve:
I understand that you are comfortable with the paradox, but can you
imagine that someone else could be less comfortable with paradox and
choose not to say paradoxical things when it can be avoided? Do you
think paradoxes are unavoidable? Perhaps they are sometimes. But what
if someone has a way of doing the anti-Platonism without saying things
that contradict themselves? What if that person is not as comfortable
with paradox as you are? Wouldn't it make sense for that person to
choose a different way of doing anti-Platonism if he can do so without
paradox?

I don't want you to repeat yourself. If you fell like you are being
asked to repeat yourself it may be because you have missed the actual
question that was asked. You haven't addressed  "the preference not to
speak in certain terms." You keep conflating this preference with an
attack on radical empiricism. Matt is not attacking radical
empiricism. There is just your attack on Matt's not doing radical
empiricism.

Are you intersted in how anti-Platonism can be done without radical
empiricism?  If so, Matt would have a lot to teach you. If not, then
why get on Matt's case?


> Steve said:
> We don't like this "fundamental nature talk," it's too metaphysics-y for us and makes us fell all icky and Platonist. But if you can get some anti-Platonist mileage out of such talk, we're all for you doing it.
>
> dmb says:
> That's another case of taking the anti-Platonic claims of radical empiricism as if they were Platonism. You're inadvertently rejecting the rejection of Platonism in the name of rejecting Platonism.

Steve:
I'm not rejecting all "fundamental nature" talk. I'm just choosing not
to do it because of fear that it could be taken in the wrong way as I
tried to explain. I know that it is meant to be anti-Platonism and I'm
fine with you saying "the fundamental nature of reality is outside of
language," because I know you mean it as anti-Platonism. It just not a
phrase that I would use in certain circumstances. I might instead
choose to say other things to do anti-Platonism--things that may avoid
the paradox that you say you are comfortable with--or choose to say
nothing at all.


DMB:
These are just conceptual errors, not differences of personal
preference or tastes or interests. It's just about the difference
between what radical empiricism means and what you think it means. I
see this error over and over and I keep trying to show you but you and
Matt just keep making it anyway.


Steve:
Here again you are insisting that there must be some sort of error in
not talking about radical empiricism because you only see one way to
do anti-Platonism. Whether or not you are interested in other ways,
you should still be open to the possibility that there may be other
ways.

Consider also that acording to Pirsig, James's himself saw his radical
empiricism as independent of his pragmatism, so if James's pragmatism
is anti-Platonist, then anti-Platonism can be done without radical
empiricism.

Best,
Steve