[MD] Hoy stoves and those who sit on them

[MarshaV]

Ham,   

On Mar 21, 2010, at 1:28 PM, Ham Priday wrote:

> Happy Spring to you, Marsha --
> 
> 
>> Maybe I should stick to 'unpatterned experience',  experience
>> without overlaying memory/concepts/patterns.
>> 
>> How is experience different than value-sensibility?
> 
> You seem to have a semantic problem with cognition which muddles your epistemology and makes your understanding of experience something that it is not.

I love this sentence.   I won't deny it.


> 
> I don't see why our common understanding of "experience" must be adjusted or redefined to satisfy a philosopher's thesis.  The dictionary defines experience as: "The conscious perception of an external, bodily, or psychic event."   It says nothing about "patterns", nor does it qualify experience as "direct" or "indirect".  In a more general definition, however, it does state that experience is "something personally encountered, undergone, or lived through,"  indicating that experience is a "process" that is proprietary to the individual, rather than an independent realm or level accessed or "attached to" by the observer.

The dictionary should be my final authority???  I don't think you mean that.  Patterns of preference, patterns of experience, patterns of value, I think RMP has chosen the most perfect word.  


> 
> Also, there is no difference between experience and "the experienced". John's suggestion that "experience may be telling you something" is romantically enticing but epistemically wrong.  We bring value into the world as being, and the objective reality we construct reflects our value preferences.  Through experience we each make our "being-in-the-world" a representation of our individual value-complement.

Huh?  -  You're not so bad at creating semantic problems yourself.  


> 
> For me, experience is an extension of value-sensibility whereby apprehension is oriented to the space/time dimensions of the intellectualized ("conventional"?) universe.  

You say that experience is an extension of value-sensibility, but you have not explained how you define value-sensibility.  What is it?   


> Thus, "immediate experience" -- e.g., pain, pleasure, fear, change, tacticity, sensory perception -- is converted (reified?) into discrete objects and events, sometimes called "universals". This is the work of intellection in conjunction with memory (your "overlaying concepts/patterns").  So that what "begins" as value sensibility ends up as what we call experiential or empirical knowledge.

Isn't what you're calling a universal, a pattern?   Please define value-sensiblity.   


> Knowledge conforms to the universal order of our relational existence because it is derived from the same fundamental Sensibility/Otherness that is primary to every conscious subject ("experiencer").  

Please define/describe a subject?  Is that a mind.  Is that a body?  Is it a mind and body?  What else?    Please, what exactly is a subject?  



> Only the individual preferences, qualitative feelings, psycho-emotional responses, and valuistic meanings are unique to the observing subject.

Let's start by establishing what is this 'subject'?


> Have I helped to clarify the issue, Marsha, or only further complicated your understanding?

Oh sure, just like the Linda Blair character in the move, 'The Exorcist'.  


Marsha

  
 
 
 
 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> 
>> Marsha
>> 
>>> The MoQ confusion stems from the fact that Pirsig is a "monist", not an absolutist.  And, although he did not name or posit an "absolute source", his equivalency paradigm "Experience = Quality = Reality" leaves the inference that one or more of these equivalents is "absolute", whereas in fact all three relate to the finite, existential world.
>>> 
>>> Essentially speaking,
>>> Ham
> 
>>> 
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 9:49 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> > Hello John,
>>>>> >
>>>>> > How would you break this down to address: the experiencer,
>>>>> > the experience and the experienced?
>>>>> > because undoubtedly they are descriptions of the same thing,
>>>>> > the event, the experience, no?
>>>>> 
>>>>> They are not the same in the conventional use of English.
>>>>> _I am seeing a tree. _'I' is the seer.  The experience is seeing.
>>>>> The tree is the seen.  Experience has become a trinity.
>>>>> What I have been saying is that only the seeing is a fact in
>>>>> that moment.  The seer, 'I' , and the seen, 'tree' are surmised
>>>>> from the experience of seeing.  They are built from patterns, no?
>>>> 
>>>> I agree the tree, the I, and this act of seeing are built from patterns,
>>>> yes.
>>>> 
>>>> But I cannot 'see' how handing the crown of significance to any
>>>> one part of the trinity of experience is better in any way.
>>>> All three legs of the tripod depend upon the others to avoid toppling.
>>>> 
>>>> "The seeing" is not a fact if it's a hallucination
>>>> 
>>>> The seer is not a fact if there is no seeing.
>>>> 
>>>> The seen is not a fact if either the seer or the seeing disappears
>>>> from view,
>>>> 
>>>> Therefore, they are the three, interdependent in order for
>>>> experience to occur.
>>>> 
>>>>> There are grammatical rules, dictionaries and social training
>>>>> for interpreting the words we use, no?
>>>>> 
>>>>> yes!  Which influences the conceptual frameworks of meaning
>>>>> we build.
>>>> 
>>>> I agree completely.
>>>> 
>>>>> > but to address the experience of the hot stove, it depends.
>>>>> > It can be good, or it can be bad.  When a child learns to listen
>>>>> > carefully to its mother's warnings, that is an overall good.
>>>>> > If the child is so badly injured that she dies, it's an overall bad.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Judgements based on individual static pattern histories and dynamic
>>>>> context.  I've always wondered if RMP would say there is a difference
>>>>> between the value/experience and the judgements made subsequent
>>>>> to the experience. I would think there is a big difference, no?
>>>> 
>>>> But as Ham points out, without the judgement there can be no valuation of
>>>> the event.  However he takes then the judger as absolute whereas I see it as
>>>> none of the three legs of the tripod can be absolute - you need a subject,
>>>> an object and a valuation all at once or there is no experience.
>>>> 
>>>>> > Thus the value or Quality of the event is not in the immediate,
>>>>> > experience, but in the overall context - an interpretation between > the
>>>>> > subject and object AND some third overarching principle of valuation.
>>>>> > Interpretation is triadic in nature and thus more inherently stable > > than
>>>>> > the diadic relationship of S/O.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > As you know,
>>>>> 
>>>>> I know Absolutely nothing, how about you?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Marsha
>>>> 
>>>> I thought there were no absolutes. :-)
>>>> 
>>>> John
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