[MD] DMB and Rorty

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,


> Steve said to dmb:
> That helps me understand what you are saying. When you say "the question of truth" you are referring to the question, "what is true?" Making this substitution in your previous post then, you mean to say, "The correspondence theory is just one particular answer to the question ["what is true?"]  but because that particular answer has failed, he concludes that we should abandon the questions too. Because the various attempts to get the subject to correspond with objective reality, he refuses to do epistemology at all. He refuses to have a truth theory at all."
> But that doesn't quite work in that sentence, does it? Correspondence theory was never an answer to the question, "what is true?" Since you say you are not taking on the question "what do all true sentences have in common?" then we simply can agree that lots and lots of things are true. We can list true sentences all day long. I think, however, that in doing so we wouldn't be getting to the issues that theories of truth are supposed to inform us about. Would we?
>
> dmb says:
>
> Huh? How can you deny that the correspondence theory of truth does not answer the question of truth? That theory says our ideas are true when they correspond to objective reality. That is its answer to the question of truth.

Steve:
That's not quite what I meant. I mean that the correspondence theory
of truth was not pursued, created, or reflected upon as an answer to
YOUR question of truth (what is true?). It was always an answer to
different Philosophically deep questions of truth such as...

What does truth consist in?
What is the nature of truth?
How are assertions made true?
What do all true sentences have in common?
What is the definition of "true"?

It is because there are so many ways to ask a "question of truth" that
I wanted you to be specific about what you mean by "THEE question of
truth." I don't think that there is any such specific question that
qualifies as the one question of truth the philosophers have been
interested in.

Your particular question "what is true?"is just one "question of
truth." But I don't see correspondence theory as an answer to that
question.

When some asks, "what is true?" The form of the question seems to me
to rule out the answer  "our ideas are true when they correspond to
objective reality." I read the question, "what is true?" as being
answered by statements of the simple form "X is true," and I can't
figure out how to put correspondence theory into that form. Maybe you
can help here.


DMB:
I see that all-or-nothingism at work again in your next objection;
where you say that since I'm not looking for the essence of all true
sentences, we can simply agree on lots and lots of true sentences. I
mean, it seems rather drastic to jump from such truth essentialism to
no truth at all.


Steve:
First of all "lots and lots of true sentences" is quite the opposite
from "no truth at all," so you allegation of all-or-nothingism is
falling flat. Secondly, my response about "lots and lots of true
sentences" was intended only as answer to your question of truth "what
is true?" It was not intended as being the final word on all questions
about truth.


DMB:
I'm just saying that the pragmatic theory of truth does not aim for
any such things as objective truth or essential truth. Pragmatism
answers the question of truth in a way that simply does not claim any
such things and yet it is still a theory of truth. It is designed to
overcome those things without giving up on epistemology or truth
theories or philosophy or even metaphysics.

Steve:
But there is not just one "question of truth" as you know. Pragmatism
as a theory of truth is not a direct answer, for example, to the
question "what is the nature of truth?" But pragmatism IS a suggestion
to stop asking this question about truth and start asking different
questions about truth. A theory of truth is not an answer to "THEE
question of truth" so much as a suggestion for the kind of questions
we should be asking. Why someone lie Rorty may want to claim to not
have a theory of truth is because he is not asking the sorts of
questions about truth that were traditionally meant by the various
forms of "the question of truth." But whether or not you want to call
what Rorty has to say with regard to truth (e.g. "to say that
something is, as far as we know, true, is to say that no other belief
is, as far as we know, a better habit of action.) a "theory" is no
real matter for me. I understand his rhetorical reasons for denying
having a theory of truth, but if you want to call what he has to say
"a theory of truth" then feel free.


DMB:
> Your final objection seems to express this all-or-nothingism too. You say that by NOT looking for the essence of truth or for objective truth, "we wouldn't be getting to the issues that theories of truth are supposed to inform us about". You seem to be saying that a truth theory doesn't count as a truth theory unless it defines truth in these essentialist or objectivist terms. But why are truth theories supposed to inform us about that? Those are the failed answers we're trying to overcome and so of course the pragmatist does not define truth in those terms. Rorty takes those failed answers as a definition of the question of truth.

And then says we should not have a theory of truth at all, that we
should stop doing epistemology. By this account, to simply ask what
counts as true would be fancy enough to be called epistemology because
epistemology MUST ask what is objectively true or essential true or
eternally true or True with capital "T". See what I mean? This
confuses the question with the answer, and the rejected answer at
that.


Steve:
I agree that there is a lot of confusion gere about the questions and
answers and which answers go with which questions. Here again I'm
reminded of why I wanted you to be specific about "the question of
truth."  You already agree with me and Rorty that certain "questions
of truth" ought to be dropped in favor of others.

Correspondence theory is not a failed answer so much as the answer to
a bad question that presupposes truth in essentialist and objectivist
terms. Consider James's statement that the true is “the name of
whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too,
for definite, assignable reasons.” This is not an answer to the
question that many people take to be "the question of truth" i.e.
"what is the nature of truth?" Instead it is an application of the
pragmatic method to reformulate the question and then answer the new
question. The new pragmaticized question is something like, "how is
the word 'true' used in practice?" James's statement gives a clear and
precise answer to that question but does not give an answer to the
question that correspondence theory was created to answer.




> Steve said:
> So I guess I am still pretty confused about what you mean by "the question of truth" that theories of truth are supposed to answer since the question "what is true?" doesn't seem to be a question that Rorty has abandoned as you have alleged and is not the sort of issue that we can have an interesting theory about.  Once you have dropped the quest for nailing down the nature of Truth and claims about what all true sentences have in common (which you have), then all you are left with with respect to the question "what is true?" is a never ending list of assertions that are true. Perhaps you meant something else by the question "what is true?" or have a different question to propose to substitute for "the question of truth."





> steve quoted Rorty:

> "If the pragmatist is advised that he must not confuse the advisability of asserting S with the truth of S, he will respond that the advice is question-begging. The question is precisely whether “the true” is more than what William James defined it as: “the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.” On James’s view, “true” resembles “good” or “rational” in being a normative notion, a compliment paid to sentences that seem to be paying their way and that fit in with other sentences which are doing so."
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> I think Rorty leaves out the most important part of the pragmatic theory of truth and thereby misrepresents James's view. He leaves out the empiricism, which is quite consistent with his refusal to do epistemology. (Obviously, any empiricism or theory of truth is an explicit epistemological theory.)


Steve:
The problem for your claim here is that Pirsig says that James himself
saw his radical empiricism as distinct from his pragmatism.




DMB:
>.. This element of the pragmatic theory of truth is what prevents it from being anti-realist. It is not a realism in the usual sense of that word, but it definitely retains a certain respect for experience as natural bullshit detector. That's where ideas are tested and made true. That's the sense in which they are good, or not. Without this important feature, then the claim that true ideas are ideas that are useful for certain purposes can be construed as meaning that truth is whatever pleases me. Without this test of experience, then it becomes too difficult to distinguish empirically verifiable truths from wishful thinking or from using ideas as the intellectual equivalent of comfort food or junk food. We need some kind of reality check, you know? We don't need God's eternal truth but we do need a way to sort out bad ideas, empty ideas, dangerous ideas even. Who's the arbiter of truth here? You and me and empirical reality. That seems pretty fair and workable and down to earth.


Steve:
I'm at a bit of a loss at the moment to defend Rorty against the
"linguistic idealist" charge because when I quote Rorty saying
something to the effect  that reality won't let us believe that
certain things are true, that's when you change tack and start
accusing Rorty of being a realist.

Note that you've just raised another "question of truth" i.e. "who is
the arbiter of truth?" You are correct that Rorty's quote of James on
truth does not answer that question, but of course it was not intended
as an answer to that question. I am sure that we agree that there is
no final arbiter. When you propose empirical reality as an arbiter of
truth, are you pretty much suggesting a version of correspondence
theory? I don't think James ever made this move you're suggesting
here, did he? He was content to say that true beliefs lead to
successful action without having to talk about how empirical reality
plays into things. How does your talk about empirical reality add
anything to saying that true beliefs lead to successful action? Does
it explain anything more than that about justification of beliefs?
What tools do you have for justifying beliefs to others that Rorty
could not use? Is Rorty somehow forced to accept others's wishful
thinking and "whatever pleases me" arguments as true because he
doesn't talk about radical empiricism?

Best,
Steve