[MD] A fly in the MOQ ointment

[MarshaV]

On Mar 30, 2010, at 1:27 PM, Steven Peterson wrote:

> Hi Marsha,
> 
> 
>> Dmb got you stumped?
> 
> 
> Steve:
> No. Why do you ask?
> 
> Steve previously:
>>> SOM answers to this question vary. Such answers include Locke's notion
>>> that there are two types of substances: mental substance (minds) and
>>> material substance (objects). Other answers include collapsing
>>> everything into material substance or everything into material
>>> substance.
> 
> 
> Marsha:
>> ZZzzzzzzz
> 
> Steve:
> If you have no interest in what SOM actually is, why would you want to
> say that he intellectual level is steeped in SOM?

I am not necessarily convinced there's only one definition of SOM and that
it is your interpretation.  



> Steve:
>>> Now, where in all this do you get the notion that the fourth level of
>>> that hierarchy is SOM itself? Where are the mental substance and
>>> material substance that make up SOM ontology in this description?
>>> Nowhere of course. Intellect itself does not require that we postulate
>>> such substances.
>> 
> Marsha:
>> Intellectual static patterns of value are reified concepts and the rules for
>> manipulating them, if not offer some examples.
> 
> Steve:
> Your explanation of intellectual patterns has nothing to do with SOM.

Maybe to you it doesn't.  Okay.  As I already said to you, I find no interest 
in convincing anyone of anything.  That would be oh so static...  I'm still
a relativist,  and I cannot understand why you wouldn't think I might approach 
the MoQ differently.  
  

> Steve:
>>> We can think without making any assertions about
>>> ontology whatsoever.
>> 
> 
> Marsha:
>> The subject is intellectual patterns of value, not intellect which, by the way,
>> is a reified concept.
> 
> Steve:
> Yes, of course subjects and objects are intellectual patterns. That
> doesn't make intellect 

I'm going to ignore your use of 'intellect' and restate that I am talking about
Intellectual static patterns of value.  



> Steve:
>>> Most people don't give any thought to
>>> metaphysics. They just follow static intellectual patterns of those
>>> who came before them, and  SOME of these patterns rely on the S/O
>>> ontological assumptions. But we can even use the words "subject" and
>>> "object" themselves without any ontological implication that these
>>> represent two types of fundamental substances that constitute all of
>>> reality. It is only when we make this presupposition that we are doing
>>> subject-object metaphysics.
> 
> Marsha:
>> SOM explanation through and through.
> 
> Steve:
> I think you should try to figure out what SOM is before you say that.

And I suppose you would like to be the one to determine when I get it right?
Nope, Steve, it's not going to work that way.  To me SOM is understanding reality 
as consisting of subjects and objects.


> Marsha:
>> When a physicist can state that the equation calculating spin "is not
>> just mathematics, but Real", RMP might want to rethink his statement
>> about mathematics not having objects.
> 
> 
> Steve:
> In the equation "2+2=4" where are the subjects and and where are the objects?

It's meaningless dribble if the numbers don't represent some objects.  




Marsha
 
 
 

 
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