[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,


> Friday morning, Steve said:
> ... to follow DMB in his Jamesian "true for you false for me" relativistic notion of truth where beliefs are made true by verifying them is not what anyone but Jamesians and post-modernists normally mean by "true."
>
>
> Later that same Friday, Steve said:
> Ah, here we go. Part of you still thinks we can have and also need a foundation to "rest on."
>
>
> dmb says:
> So, which is it? Am I a relativist or a foundationalist?


Steve:
You have a relativistic conception of truth that you are trying to
ground in radical empiricism as a foundation.



DMB:
> Neither, actually.
>
> Because truth is provisional, plural, historical, contextual and constructed, it cannot rightly be considered a form of foundationalism.

Steve:
Our beliefs are "provisional, plural, historical, contextual and
constructed" and most of them are probably even true as well.
Believing something for good reason isn't enough to make it true
unless you are willing to be a relativist with respect to truth. You
are correct that what you are saying about truth here "cannot rightly
be considered a form of foundationalism." Where you look to a
foundation is in your use of radical empiricism. That's the part that
I said is useful for metaphysics and for critiquing traditional
empiricism but doesn't give you the epistemological foundation you
want so badly.


DMB:
>BUT, because truth is empirically based and defined as that which functions within the ongoing process of experience, it cannot rightly be considered a form of relativism either.

Steve:
The thing is, Dave, not being able to say that slavery is wrong
whether anyone believes it or not is pretty much the paradigm for
relativism.


DMB:
> Also, I find it wildly incoherent to insist on the traditional meaning of the word "truth" because that is exactly what Rorty says we can not have. You insist on retaining a failed concept of truth and then insist we can only have "warranted assertability" or practices of social justification.

Steve:
What do you mean we can't have truths? Rorty says that most of our
beliefs must be true. And your use of warranted assertibility with the
scare quotes scares me. Do you not realize that that is Dewey's term
for what you are doing with truth rather than what I am doing with it?

And how is "'X' is true iff X" a failed concept of truth? Do you not
agree that the sentence "The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if
the cat is on the mat? If not, I don't think you know what "true"
means.


DMB:
> The other day you said that radical empiricism might give me something extra in terms of metaphysics but as a theory of truth, you said, it adds nothing. But, you see, the pragmatic theory of truth can only be understood properly when you understand underlying metaphysical shift...


Steve:
Yeah, good luck with that. Every time someone accuses you of being a
relativist and the pragmatic theory of truth as being relativistic,
you can just tell them that they don't understand radical empiricism
and that using the word true to mean "true" is a failed concept. Do
you think that will really prevent people from making that accusation
of you? Are you starting to get what is going on with people accusing
Rorty of being a relativist? Probably not, but at least you are
getting to know what the frustration is like.

Best,
Steve