[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

Ian Glendinning ian.glendinning at gmail.com
Tue May 4 06:59:50 PDT 2010


Hmmmm Steve ,,, not really ...

I wouldn't / didn't say "the same thing as" that would be a
categorical ontological statement about what truth "is".

Justified belief is more useful than truth ... so let's talk about it
(instead of "asserting" truth) but we've just shifted the problem to
the process(es) of justification ... of one idea, conclusion, decision
being "better" than another (vis the Pierce example)

Dave is no sissy, and doesn't need my defense, but I doubt that
rhetoric .... of what he "thinks / is trying to say / make" as
justified = "whatever we feel justified" .... was within a million
miles of what he was actually saying. (Jamesian) Radical empiricism is
more than the subjective feeling of experiencing justification, but
even without that the (Pirsigian) quality we experience is a
multi-patterned & many-layered thing.

You may have to explain the correspondence theory point to me ...

Ian



On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 3:20 PM, Steven Peterson
<peterson.steve at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Ian,
>



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