[MD] Ham's theory of Truth

[Ham Priday]

Dear Marsha --

> I understand the only way towards an Ultimate Truth is to
> discover the falseness of static patterns(experience): not this,
> not that.  There is no permanence to static patterns(experience)
> so in what sense could they ever be true.  Could it be that
> patterns that last longer are somehow more true?  But that
> would mean time is the measure of truth, and time is itself
> a static pattern of value.

I don't think we can "discover falseness" any more than we can discover 
truth, for the former is only the negation of the latter.  If we can't know 
what is true, how can we know what isn't?   In other words, if Truth is 
fallible, so is Falsity

But, as your post is the only response I've received so far (thank you), I 
shall try to think in "patterns" so that I can address your question.  Time 
is no "measure of truth", no matter how long a principle remains valid. 
Besides, in positing a truth, it should be possible to state that 'X' will 
be true until superseded by 'Y'.

The problem I have with your epistemology, Marsha, is that it rejects both 
Truth and the knowing subject.  That makes you something of a nihilist when 
it comes to fundamental principles.  Your "interactively patterned " Reality 
is a house of cards without foundation or purposeful design, except 
(perhaps) for what is purported to be Quality's "evolution toward 
betterness" which you will never live to see.

Truth for me equates to Reality, just as do Value, Sensibility, and 
Intelligence.  But because human experience is on the outer fringe of 
Reality, we can only know these essential components (patterns) 
incrementally, or relationally, and never in their absolute  state.  Yet, as 
free agents, we are aware of "provisional" truths in the same way that we're 
aware of "relative" values, and these are useful (pragmatic) principles in 
guiding our lives-- especially since it is man's nature to seek Truth and 
Value in existence.

We have a pretty good handle on Value, thanks to pilosophers like Socrates, 
Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Pirsig, but the indefinite nature of Truth 
continues to be a source of confusion in philosophical circles.  It was my 
hope that by realizing Truth as a cosmic principle of experiential reality, 
we might overcome some of the dialectical problems associated with it. 
Apparently I was wrong, judging by the lack of response to this suggestion.

I do appreciate your interest, though, Marsha.

Essentially yours,
Ham