[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Matt,

I like the distinction you made between 3 uses of truth. You called
the 3rd use the semantic notion of truth, but isn't this whole
analysis a semantic one?

Best,
Steve





On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 12:10 PM, Matt Kundert
<pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Steve said:
> I agree that it is indeed the same thing to assert that something is true and to assert that you are justified in believing that same something--as Pierce said, "we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so"--it is nevertheless good to recognize that at least some of the things that we are justified in believing are probably not actually true.
>
> Matt:
> Rorty, for these purposes, liked to distinguish--in good, commonsensical dictionary fashion--different uses of the word "true."  Because, on the one hand, justification is our only route to truth, so when you feel justified in believing something, you feel it is true.  That was the "endorsing use of truth" (occasionally called the "complimentary" use which got Rorty into a lot of trouble).  Because, if justification is our only route to truth, then it does seem an add-on to then say it is justified _and_ true.  Call the endorsing use "the use of truth from the first-person standpoint."
>
> Another use of true, which is what Steve wants to emphasize is different and needed--we shouldn't assimilate all uses of truth to the endorsing use (like in our theories of truth)--is the "cautionary use of truth."  This is the impetus of somebody, having heard you slide from justification to a complimentary extra endorsement of "and it's true, too" to say, "well, you might be justified, but it still might not be true."  Call the cautionary use "the use of truth from the third-person standpoint."
>
> Distinct from this again is the "disquotational use of truth," which is the semantic notion, the very boring explanation of the only kind of correspondence pragmatists think we are going to find between sentences and states of affairs: "'X' is true iff X."  (For example: The sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.)  Explains nothing much, but that's the point.  Call the disquotational use "the use of truth from the God-person standpoint."  If you find God's point of view useful, maybe you can get more out of correspondence than pragmatists can.