[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Matt,


Thanks for the explanaion.


Matt:
> "Semantics" below more means "the structure of language,"
> though "structure" is misleading.  Like, semantics as a field
> of inquiry, which would be into how language has to hang
> together (or does hang together) for it to function the way
> it does.  It would be the isolation of certain primitive
> ("irreducible") bits that sentences and what not need to
> function.  Things like subjects, objects, predicates, verbs,
> nouns, logical connectives.  The valence of true/false is
> one of these, I take it, and the semantic version shows how
> it functions.  The other uses of "true" _in English_ didn't have
> to evolve that way--there could have quite easily been
> different words to have evolved to pick up those things that
> still need to be said (as I suspect there are in other languages).


Steve:
I don't know if you know enough about semantics to answer, but where
would Pirsig's criticism of the bivalence of true/false (the aditional
"mu" state) fit in here? I would expect that mu could be considered to
be just as primitive in the sense that subjects, objects, predicates,
verbs, nouns, logical connectives, and the valence of true/false are.
Is the idea that every language has to have these pieces to function
as a language?

It seems widely agreed in this forum that language is a social pattern
(even though we MOQers can't seem to agree at all on different
particular uses of language as being social or intellectual). This
semantic analysis which says that subjects and objects are primitive
language bits has implications for the MOQ in that subjects and
objects in at least the semantic sense of the terms predate
intellectual patterns (which of course undermines Bo's SOL theory for
the 4th level).

Best,
Steve