[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,

>> > Anthony writes:
>> It’s worth noting that the MOQ follows a pragmatic
>> > notion of truth so truth is seen as relative in his system while
>> > Quality is seen as absolute.

DMB:
It is a form of empiricism, even when held separately from radical
empiricism, and so it can't rightly be called a relativism. I can see
how it could look that way, because, as James puts it, "to a certain
extent, everything here is plastic".

Steve:
You seem to have an unusual notion of what relativism with respect to
truth is. You say that "The pragmatic theory of truth has standards of
coherence, usefulness and agreement with experience," and that means
it is not a relativism, but relativism with respect to truth is not
the claim that no one holds any standards for what ought to be called
true. The fact that you have standards does not make you something
other than a relativist. Everyone has standards for what they will
call true. What it means to NOT be a relativist with respect to truth
is to believe that what standards one holds for deciding what ought to
be called true is a separate issue from what is actually true.

According to Rorty, so long as we allow the conversation to be about
"what actually is true" we will be called relativists. There is
nothing we can do about it other than try to shift the terms of
conversation to pragmatic ones. The problem is in the choice of
vocabulary. For a Pirsigian and for a Jamesian as well as for a
Rortian, "what actually is true" is not a coherent part of the
vocabulary, so the question of reativism with respect to truth just
doesn't come up. It is a question that can only be asked in the
Platonic vocabulary. As long as someone insists on that vocabulary as
I did with you over the last couple of weeks, they will continue to
call you a relativist no matter how much you protest because within
that vocabulary, you simply ARE a relativist.

Then you want to object that correspondence theory of truth is a
failed theory of truth so you shouldn't have to face such charges of
relativism ("it can't rightly be called" relativism, you say). Is it a
failed vocabulary? So the correspondence theory of truth is not "what
actually is true" while the pragmatic theory of truth is "what
actually is true"???? See why Rorty just shrugs and tries to change
the subject when relativism comes up? Because if a pragmatist allows
the conversation about relativism to take place on SOM grounds he will
always lose.

What is always wierd for me is that you want to accuse Rorty of
relativism while I don't think the issue can even be articulated on
pragmatic grounds. As I said at the beginning, you must have an
unusual definition of relativism with respect to truth if you think it
is something that a pragmatist ought to be concerned about (as
something philosophical and distinct from basic moral clarity). I'd
love to here you specify what your pragmatic definition of relativism
is.

Best,
Steve