[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,


> Steve said to dmb:
>
> You seem to have an unusual notion of what relativism with respect to truth is.


> dmb says:
> Yea, what's up with the Platonism? You're using realism and Platonism and SOM to push back against the pragmatic theory of truth. On this topic, you have the philosophical equivalent of multiple personality disorder. Your position is a complete mess of contradictions.


Steve:
I didn't make any objections to the pragmatic theory of truth in that post.


DMB:
> And besides that, I totally disagree that we can ask "what actually is true" ONLY from a Platonic perspective. That the whole point of saying that Rorty defines the question in terms of the failed answer. The pragmatist has an answer to what's actually true, but "actually", only means in actual experience, that truth is what we can successfully act upon. This has nothing to do with any Platonic claims about trans-experiential realities or their correspondence to the objective reality.

Steve:
But that's my point. When you talk about "what is actually true" you
don't mean the same thing as the Platonist does.

DMB:
And I have to say that I'm irritated by the fact that you keep
repeating this irrelevant nonsense despite the fact that I've objected
to it about ten times. I don't want to resort to insulting your
intelligence or your honesty, but what am I supposed to conclude from
this behavior?

Steve:
Can't you imagine that I am equally frustrated with you??? Look, you
think you understand what I am saying and that I am not understanding
what you are saying. I think I understand what you are saying and that
you don't understand what I am saying. Either one of complaining about
the other is irrelevent and our personal frustrations are just a given
and best kept to yourself. You just aren't ading anythying by saying
"Your thickness on this topic has been kind of unbelievable." Believe
me, I find you as thick as you find me. So F-ing what? Do you think
one of us can better convince the other by name-calling? (Just in
case, you are narcissist and an intellectual fraud!)


> Steve said:
> See why Rorty just shrugs and tries to change the subject when relativism comes up? Because if a pragmatist allows the conversation about relativism to take place on SOM grounds he will always lose.
>
> dmb says:
> My concerns about Rorty's relativism do not take place on SOM grounds and neither do my assertions concerning the pragmatic theory of truth. Again, your argument is irrelevant and only shows that you are oblivious to what I've actually been saying.

Steve:
I just asked you to give a clear concise definition of what relativism
with respect to truth could possibly be if James and Pirsig are not to
be counted as such as Ant says they are in his textbook that Pirsig
approved of. Can you please, please, please define relativism with
respect to truth, so I can know what you mean when you say (pace Ant)
that Pirsig can't rightly be called a relativist with respect to
truth?



> dmb says:
> You rejected my description of relativism on the grounds that Platonists don't define it that way. You say I have a very unusual idea of what relativism means. That is nonsense. If you go to the Wiki article, you'll find a section on Richard Rorty. You know perfectly well that his pragmatist critics have accused him of relativism many, many, many, many times. It is thee most common complaint about Rorty. Do all these critics have some weird idea of what relativism is and means? C,mon, Steve. That's not even remotely plausible.

Steve:
I have no idea what they or you could mean by relativism because you
have refused to define it.


DMB:
...
> Rorty thinks justification is relative to the different conversations we can have within a given sociological context. That's what his ethnocentrism is all about. Rorty denies that this ethnocentrism makes him a relativist.

Steve:
I've been saying all along that in terms of SOM, Rorty is a relativist
with respect to second order justification (but not truth as James and
Pirsig are or even first order justification.) Anyone who thinks "is
it objective or subjective?" is a good question will call James,
Pirsig, Rorty, you, and me a relativist.

Rorty denies being a relativist by denying that "is it objective or
subjective?? is a good question to ask. But unlike James and Pirsig,
he doesn't even need to make this denial until we not only ask about
whether truth is something that ought to vary from person to person
based on justification (relativism with respect to truth) or whether
justification practices ought to vary from person to person
(relativism with respect to justification) but only when we ask "is it
objective or subjective?" about the justification standards themselves
(second order justification).  Here Rorty trues to avoid the question
saying that it is a question that we would do well to drop in favor of
other questions like, "how can we make our standards for justification
better than what they are now?"


DMB:
But like I said, James and Pirisg escape this purely sociological
framework by the simple fact that the pragmatic theory of truth has
non-verbal standards and constraints. Agreement is not excluded from
the notion, but the test of truth is its ability to perform, to
operate successfully in empirical reality whether there is an audience
to persuade or not.


Steve:
But that isn't even the issue, DMB. The question is not what sort of
standards you have. James and Pirsig don't have any standards of
justification or ways for justifying beliefs that Rorty can't use. The
question is, where do those standards come from? Even if it makes
sense to you to assert that you have standards for justification that
are nonverbal (note that to beg back the verbal/nonverbal question all
I need to do is simply ask what those standards are and they are now
verbal), the question is still, are those standards for justification
themselves justified objectively or subjectively? This is the
second-order justification question for which Rorty has no answer (and
neither do James or Pirsig). To Rorty, that doesn't make him a
relativist because he thinks (along with James and Pirsig) it is a
question that we ought to stop asking.

I am still very interested to read a concise definition of relativism
from you where Rorty qualifies but James does not.

Best,
Steve