[MD] Relativism

[david buchanan]

dmb says:
 I doubt that Rorty denies that there is an objective reality. He just thinks we can't have access to it.

Steve replied:


I suppose it wouldn't even matter if I provided 10 Rorty quotes that contradict this claim. You'll just keep saying it.


dmb says:

Well, I keep saying it because I see evidence for it and I haven't seen any evidence to the contrary. If you think you have some, please dish it up. I also don't see much evidence that you have any respect for evidence. I have quoted Fish, Hildebrand, Rorty and others on this point but those pieces of evidence always seem to disappear from your replies. 


dmb said:
... So, if you understand what empirical restraints are and you understand what conversational restraints are then you should be able to understand how James and Pirsig differ from Rorty.


Steve replied:

I don't think you've added anything to conversational constraints on knowledge by talking about "the epistemic value of experience." It's not like Rorty can't justify a belief by saying talking about his experience. Experience is included in "conversational constraints." Its just that talk about experience when providing a rationale for a belief is still talk. It's not that Rorty "rejects the epistemic value of experience," it's just that he gets all that we can get from experience in justifying beliefs by talking about conversation.

dmb says:

You've only reiterated my point about Rorty's bias toward talk and conversation. Talking is a subset of experience, not the other way around. One of the main points of the MOQ is that you can NOT get all we want from experience by talking about it. Thinking that you can is what we mean by a discursive bias. And may I remind you for the tenth time that Rorty think we ought not be doing epistemology at all. He is convinced that empiricism is dead. Period. How could that possibly be consistent with your claim that he doesn't reject the epistemic value of experience? It can't, obviously.




Steve said:
If there really is something that Rorty is missing as far as epistemology, then you should be able to tell me the sort of argument that James and Pirsig could use to justify a belief that Rorty is unable to use. You never have offered such an argument, and I don't think you ever will because I don't think you can. Go ahead. Prove me wrong.


dmb says:

You're asking for an argument, which means words, which means you're still not getting the difference between  experience and language. The pragmatic theory of truth can apply to public sorts of knowledge like science and philosophy but it can also be applied on a more personal level that has almost nothing to do with whether or not your neighbors agree. These beliefs can be tested in experience and prove themselves good and true even if nobody ever talks about it. One of the things that pragmatism is supposed to do, as a method, is sort out the differences that really make a practical difference and merely verbal disputes, which are meaningless, pragmatically speaking. And on a related note, again, Pirsig and James puts quite a lot of emphasis on pre-conceptual experience and they both make a distinction at the center of there thought that simply doesn't appear in Rortyism. In that sense, you're missing half of the picture, the most innovative and remarkable half to boot.



dmb said:
He [Rorty] tells us that his position against slavery, fundamentalism and Nazism has no ground whatsoever. It would be a significant improvement for Rorty to be a shaky ground.


Steve:

Well that's just it. If you are looking for a foundation for claiming that slavery is bad and are unsatisfied with really good arguments that slavery is bad, then you might start talking about absolutism/relativism. But if you are then you aren't doing pragmatism.


dmb says:

Oh, now you've switched back. Sometimes you like to say that slavery was always bad no matter what anybody thought, the earth was round no matter what anybody thought and then sometimes you stuff like this. I guess you're arguing with your self? In any case, as I KEEP SAYING, absolutism and relativism are not the only choices and the pragmatic theory of truth is neither. You can have empirical standards without objectivity or foundationalism. Pirsig didn't trade empiricism in for dialogue. That's where Plato went wrong. He expands empiricism to the point that reality and experience are the same thing. 


Also, I'll remind you that the pragmatic theory of truth is not mentioned in ZAMM, nor is James. Quoting from ZAMM can work because he was already a radical empiricists but the most relevant evidence is going to come from Lila and the quotes from ZAMM can't rightly be used to unsay what he said later. 





 		 	   		  
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