[MD] knowledge

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Steve --


> My understanding of metaphysics is that it breaks down
> into ontology and cosmology (though I think Pirsig uses
> the term metaphysics very loosely to mean philosophy).
> I'm not "trying to understand these issues from within
> SOM" as ontology or cosmology, but I do think that
> epistemology always takes a dististinction between
> knower and known for granted. Epistemology does not
> need to be SOM in taking the subject-object ontological
> distinction as fundamental and given by reality, but I think
> it is always "SOE" (subject-object epistemology) in
> taking the subject-object distinction as a useful one for
> the purpose of talking about how we may be justified
> in believing what we believe. ...

You make some good points here, Steve, and your comments  demonstrate that 
most of the confusion is contextual rather than conceptual.  For example, if 
"metaphysics" is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality, it seeks 
an answer to the question: Are there principles applying to everything that 
is real, to all that is?   Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy asks it this 
way: "If we abstract from the particular nature of existing things that 
which distinguishes them from each other, what can we know about them merely 
in virtue of the fact that they exist?"

What Pirsig abstracts from things is "quality", and he posits it as the 
fundamental reality.  But quality exists only as a "realization", which 
presupposes a cognitive agent.  Thus, the reality Pirsig addresses is 
"existential", not fundamental, and the MoQ is not really a metaphysics but 
a euphemistic description of the relational world.

[Steve to DMB]:
> I don't know how else to talk about knowledge without
> talking about "we" and "it" as ...I think you always do when
> you talk about epistemology even with your "pure experience". ...
> I do understand the radical empiricist's point that the believer
> need not be thought of as having any ontological status
> outside or prior to experience, and I agree, but once we
> start talking about epistemological issues like "what is good
> to believe" we are always accepting the hypothesis of the
> existence of a believer at least for the sake of argument.

My point, exactly.  Epistemology (i.e., how we know) assumes a knower in a 
relational world.  It deals only with the relational aspects of existence, 
not metaphysical reality.  By the same token, while "cosmology" (theories 
about the origin and dynamics of the universe) and "ontology" (theories 
about the nature of "being") are valid branches of philosophical study, they 
are "fundamental" only to the extent that they relate to an ultimate source 
that transcends space/time, self/other existence.

[DMB]:
> As you might recall, James says that the first great pitfall
> from which radical empiricism will save us is a fake idea
> of the relation between knower and known. His doctrine
> of pure experience says knower and known, subject and
> object, are secondary concepts derived from experience
> and not the ontological ground of experience... (ZAMM 239)

I maintain that "radical empiricism" is a ruse that only pretends to dismiss 
S/O experience, while alluding to it all the time.  There is no distinction 
between empirical knowledge and the SOM (which Pirsig is alleged to have 
invented), nor is ultimate reality divided into levels of Quality that 
evolve toward "betterness".  Evolution is process in time, which should be 
our first clue that Quality doesn't define metaphysical reality.

Unfortunately, since semantic terms take precedence over concepts in 
philosophical discussions, you and I will be reprimanded for "failing to 
understand" the MoQ instead of complimented for helping to clarify the 
issues at hand.

Essentially yours,
Ham