[MD] loopty-loop

[Platt Holden]

Hi Marsha,

Like most academics, Hofstadter buys into SOM hook, line and sinker. Too
bad, really.

Platt

On Mon, May 31, 2010 at 6:50 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:

>
>
>
>   "What would make a human brain a candidate for housing a loop of
> self-representation?  Why would a fly brain or a mosquito brain not be just
> as valid a candidate?  Why, for that matter, not a bacterium, an ovum, a
> sperm, a virus, a tomato plant, a tomato, or a pencil?  The answer should be
> clear:  a human brain is a representational system that knows no bounds in
> terms of the extensibility or flexibility of its categories.  A mosquito
> brain, by contrast, is a tiny representational system that contains
> practically no categories at all, never mind being flexible and extensible.
>  Very small representational systems, such as those of bacteria, ova,
> sperms, plants, thermostats, and so forth, do not enjoy the luxury of
> self-representation.  And a tomato and a pencil are not representational
> systems at all, so for them, the story ends right there (sorry, little
> tomato! sorry, little pencil!).
>     "So a human brain is a strong candidate for having the potential of
> rich perceptual feedback, and thus rich self-reresentation.  But what kinds
> of perceptual cycles do we get involved in?  We begin life with the most
> elementary sorts of feedback about ourselves, which stimulate us to
> formulate categories for our most obvious body parts, and building on this
> basic pedestal, we soon develop a sense for our bodies as flexible physical
> objects.  In the meantime, as we receive rewards for various actions and
> punishments for others, we begin to develop a more abstract sense of "good"
> and "bad", as well as notions of guilt and pride, and our sense of ourselves
> as abstract entities that have the power to decide to make things happen
> (such as continuing to run up a steep hill even though our legs are begging
> us to just walk) begins to take root.
>    "It is crucial to our young lives that we hone our developing
> self-symbol as precisely as possible.  We want (and need) to find out where
> we belong in all sorts of social hierarchies and classes, and sometimes,
> even if we don't want to know thee things, we find out anyway.  For
> instance, we are all told, early on, that we are "cute"; in some of us,
> however, this message is reinforced far more strongly than in others.  In
> this manner, each of us comes to realize that we are "good-looking" or
> "gullible" or "cheeky" or "shy" or "spoiled" or "funny" or "lazy" or
> "original", or whatever.  Dozens of such labels and concepts accrete to our
> growing self-symbols.
>    "As we go through thousands of experiences large and small, our
> representation of these experiences likewise accrete to our self-symbols.
>  Of course a memory of a visit to the Grand Canyon, say, is attached not
> only to our self-symbol but to many other symbols in our brains, but our
> self-symbol is enriched and rendered more complex by this attachment."
>         (Hofstadter, Douglas,'I Am A Strange Loop', pp.182-183)
>
> ---
>
> A extremely interesting explanation of self-forming, yet ALL in this
> explanation are patterns and analogs including the concept of a "human
> brain" (sorry little marsha).
>
>
> Does the concept 'dna' as a pattern have any more substance for the
> biologist than for the police officer?
>
>
>
> ___
>
>