[MD] BeTteR-neSs (undefined or otherwise)

[Ham Priday]

On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 11:26 AM, Dan Glover daneglover at gmailmail.com wrote:

Hello everyone

[Ham to dmb, previously]:
> We all participate in a subject/object world that is the source
> of all our knowledge. The conscious experience of that world
> has its locus in the individual self. The MoQ that Pirsig
> "designed to replace it" would have us pretend that we are
> living an illusion, that there are no subjects and objects, no
> freedom to choose, no role for mankind other than to go with
> the flow to "betterness" that is automatic in the author's
> evolutionary Quality.

[Dan]:
> Since we've agreed to disagree, I would like to point out some
> possible flaws in your thinking here, Ham. This subject-object world
> isn't primary. It is not the source of our knowledge by any stretch of
> the imagination.

Can you provide a known fact or example of knowledge that is not based on 
empirical experience?

> We have been trained to believe that a subject observes objects
> and both are independent of one another, but it is just training that
> makes it so. Quantum theory has shown that it is impossible to
>  measure an object without disturbing it... observer and observed
> are linked... there is no independent observer.

Who "trained" you to recognize objects as external and independent of you?
Physicists who investigate quantum phenomena have concluded that observation 
(i.e., the observer) affects the relational parameters by which such 
phenomena are measured.  Since these parameters (mass, velocity, energy, 
gravity, etc.) are intellectual precepts to begin with, what this suggests 
is that experiential knowledge is limited to the micro/macro range of human 
perception, and quantum physics exceeds our reach.

> But RMP does not dismiss individual freedom, at least as far as I
> know. Maybe you could point out some relevant quotes.  He does
> however say that the individual is fictitious, that both science and
> Buddhism have come to the same conclusions, and that any philosophy
> based on individualism is fraught with problems, which I have
> explained in an earlier post.

You won't find it, Dan.  "Individual freedom" is notable by its absence in 
Pirsig's works.  It's troubling to me that a full-blown, allegedly 
humanistic philosophy would ignore free will, personal choice, individual 
intentionality, and a proper epistemology for cogizant awareness.  Simply 
defining the conscious self as an "interrelated pattern of Quality" doesn't 
fill the bill.  Someone here recently suggested that Freedom is more 
intrinsic to Dynamic Quality than to man, and this strikes me as missing the 
whole point of human existence.  Certainly a "philosophy based on 
individualism is fraught with problems"; but so is a philosophy based on 
Value.  By rejecting both individual subjectivity and empirical reality, the 
author creates more problems than his MoQ resolves, in my opinion.

[Ham, previously]:
> In ZMM Pirsig says ""When one person suffers from a delusion,
> it is called insanity. When many people suffer from a delusion it is
> called a Religion."
> In the Copleston Annotations, Pirsig notes: "The MOQ is atheistic".
> Is this not a rejection of religion? And what supports your conclusion
> that one can be religious and reject "faith and supernaturalism"?

[Dan]:
> Religion is a coming together. The MOQ is anti-theistic, not
> atheistic. Theism is the belief in a supernatural power, be it God,
> Allah, Jehovah... whatever. The MOQ is empirical.  It does not
> subscribe to supernatural solutions. Neither does the MOQ
> denouce religion, however.

The MOQ may be empirical in approach -- but radically so, as it does not 
acknowledge
the objective reality of traditional empiricism.  Again, you and dmb dismiss 
the fact that Pirsig referred to his own philosophy as "atheistic" and 
denounced religion in general.

How do you define "supernatural"?  If it means "transcending nature", then I 
submit that metaphysics itself is supernatural by default.  The author had 
no use for metaphysics because it was "nothing but definitions", and a 
definition would reduce his concept to a static pattern.  Perhaps he 
declined to posit DQ as the primary source because he wanted to avoid a 
"supernatural connotation" for this otherwise ineffable force.  Then again, 
perhaps we shall never know.

I'm sorry you disagree with my fundamentals, Dan.  But thank you for the 
kind response.

Best regards,
Ham