[MD] Betternes - 4 levels of!
plattholden at gmail.com
plattholden at gmail.com
Tue Nov 9 05:18:34 PST 2010
Hello Ham,
Rather than attempting to answer your post point by point I would like to offer
the following passages from several authors who have influenced my critique of
"critical thinking."
First, from physicist Paul Davies writing in his book, "The Mind of God:"
"All three arrangements are founded on the assumption of human rationality;
that it is legitimate to seek 'explanations' for things, and the we truly
understand something only when it is 'explained.' Yet it has to be admitted
that our concept of rational explanation probably derives from our observations
of the world and our evolutionary inheritance. Is it clear that this provides
adequate guidance when we are tangling with ultimate questions? Might it not be
the case that the reason for existence has no explanation in the usual sense?
This does not mean the universe is absurd or meaningless, only that an
understanding of its existence and properties lie outside the usual categories
of rational human thought. We have seen how application of the human reasoning
in its most refined and formalized sense--to mathematics--is nevertheless full
of paradox and uncertainty. Godel's theorem warns us that the axiomatic method
of making logical deductions from given assumptions cannot in general provide a
system which is both provable and consistent. There will always be truth that
lies beyond, that cannot reached from a finite collection of axioms. In the end
a rational explanation of the world in the sense of closed and complete system
of logical truths is almost certainly impossible. We are barred from ultimate
knowledge, from ultimate explanation, by the very rules of reasoning that
prompt us to seek an explanation in the first place. If we wish to progress
beyond, we have to embrace a different concept of 'understanding' from that of
rational explanation"
Second, from Robert Pirsig from his paper," Subject, Objects, Data and Values."
"I would guess that the Conceptually Unknown is an unacceptable category in
physics because it is intellectually meaningless and physics is only concerned
with what is intellectually meaningful. That also might be why Bohr never
mentioned it. However I think that this avoidance of The Conceptually Unknown
should be revised. It is like saying that the number zero is unacceptable to
mathematics because there's nothing there. Mathematics has done very well with
the number "zero" despite that fact. The Conceptually Unknown, it seems to me
is a workable intellectual category for the description of nature and it ought
to be worked more. As a starting axiom I would say, "Things which are
intellectually meaningless can nevertheless have value." I don't know of an
artist who would disagree with that. Certainly not Rene Magritte."
Finally, from Benjamin Franklin:
"So convenient a thing it is to be a rational creature, since it enables us to
find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."
I guess my friend that it all boils down to what we emphasize -- the words or
the music, prose or poetry, intellect or intuition, pragmatism or mysticism.
When it comes to metaphysics, my inclination is towards the latter although I
realize the inherent contradiction therein. What I rely on to rescues me is the
conviction, confirmed by artists and mystics, that true understanding is not
necessarily explicable. .
Warm regards,
Platt.
On 8 Nov 2010 at 16:17, Ham Priday wrote:
Greetings, Platt --
> Hi Mark, All:
>
> Dynamic Quality isn't concept free. Once you name something,
> it becomes a concept. But it's a concept like "ineffable" is a concept
> -- pointing to something that cannot be defined. And that leaves
> intellect impotent. Intellect can only deal with defined terms. Pirsig
> admitted as much. But, he said go ahead anyway: "Getting drunk
> and picking up bar-ladies and writing metaphysics is a part of life."
> (Lila, 5) So, yes. Even though we can't think about DQ, go ahead
> and think about it - another paradox illustrating critical thinking's
> feet of clay.
I realize that you respect Pirsig's philosophy and feel obliged to follow
his precepts to the letter. However, Pirsig called his thesis the
"Metaphysics of Quality", and a metaphysical exposition should properly
include both an epistemology (to explain how we know) and an ontology (to
explain what we experience). Without theoretical support for these
components, a philosophy is merely a euphemistic paradigm or, as some regard
the MoQ, an anological perspective of reality. One might as well say, as
Marsha often has, "Everything is analogy". I don't know about you, Platt,
but that's not my idea of a metaphysical concept.
Also, I have to disagree that "once you name something, it becomes a
concept." If I name the "quadratic equation" to you, does it become a
concept? Is "antidisestablishmentarianism" a concept? Is even the simple
noun "Quality" a concept?
In a previous post to Mark, I distinguished "concept" from "conception" in
this fashion:
> A "concept" must be defined in words in order to be conveyed to others.
> (That's why metaphysics is "nothing but definitions," as Prisig
> complained.)
> But a "conception" is one's conceptual understanding, whether it is set in
> words or equations, analogized, or merely described. This, I submit, is
> what
> we are after. The rest is typically philosophology, opinion, polemics, or
> anecdotal "what I read last night" commentary.
If we intend to expand our understanding of philosophy and metaphysics, it
seems to me we need to do it conceptually, rather than just throwing words
around as so much poetic metaphor. Even a conception that seems
indefinable can be communicated as a principle or functionally described.
I'm reminded once again of Cusa's First Principle: the 'not-other'. It's
only the hyphenated conjunction of two simple words, but it expresses his
conception that the primary source (however you choose to name it) is an
undifferentiated whole. Meister Eckhart's concept of "total IS-ness" and
the 'ex nihilo' principle also effectively convey related concepts.
More typically, a metaphysical conception requires a number of postulates,
the author's specially defined terms, and a logical rational to support the
overall concept as a cogent theory. I side with Mark on this issue.
Ridiculing the critical thinking that is necessary for metaphysical
exposition is a lame excuse for intellectual oversight, in my opinion.
Essentially speaking,
Ham
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
More information about the Moq_Discuss
mailing list