[MD] Rorty and Mysticism
Matt Kundert
pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com
Thu Nov 18 09:40:11 PST 2010
Hi Dave,
Dave said:
Okay. You're using the term "poet" in a much broader sense than
usual. (That's probably worth mentioning if you want to be
understood.)
Matt:
Apologies. To save on space and avoid pedantic repetition of things
commonly understood, I assumed a common understanding of
Rorty's basic terms. I don't mean to respond with the cattiness you
just showed, but you do still bring Rorty up a lot as punching bag,
don't you? Maybe I'm mistaken in that, but understanding a thinker
from "the inside," as it were, must be some kind of prerequisite
before beating up on "their thoughts" (the inside view being what
establishes the possessiveness of "their"). Even if he doesn't come
up a lot in your writing here, if he looms large in your imagination
as the thing you don't want to be, I'd advise a more sensitive
understanding of what he stands for (by which I mean, a better
understanding than such heavyweights as Hilary Putnam and
Bernard Williams showed when they punched the image of Rorty).
Dave said:
But that expansion of the term doesn't really address the point
because all those thinkers are working within language at the same.
In fact, the notion that mystical reality is outside language is a view
that all philosophical mystics have in common.
Matt:
Yes, you are right, it does avoid the point, but it does so as a matter
of rhetorical convenience. The residual difficulty with the rhetoric of
radical empiricism (which accompanies some, but not all,
mysticisms--the rhetoric has a much different function in
Romanticism) is this: if one has already rejected the goal of
transcendence (in its Platonic guise), then it is unclear to what
purpose the idea of "purity" plays in any remaining distinctions
between reality or experience, on the one side, and language, on the
other. Experience as something pure that language muddies is not
something I can make sense of in non-Platonically transcendent ways.
Experience as "immediate" whereas language is "mediating" is not
something I can think of many uses for for nonrepresentationalists
either. The only use I can think of for them is the use to which
Romanticists like Wordsworth and Emerson put them, which is
heightening the agon against what Dewey called the "crust of
conventionalized consciousness."
I think that is where the matter has rested between us for some
time. I don't understand why language is looked askance at,
considered impure. Rorty taught me to think of the moral concept
of "purity" as a remnant of what Heidegger called the
onto-theological tradition, and I take the impetus to escape from
that tradition to be the same impetus as people have in saying that
theism is peculiar to Western monotheism, opening non-Western
modes of spirituality like one finds in many American Indian
cultures and Buddhism as resources.
The last productive cycle of responses we had went in this same
direction (posted here:
http://pirsigaffliction.blogspot.com/2010/01/discussion-with-dave-buchanan.html).
At that time I said that the move that is unavailable to a pragmatist,
pushed into explaining why there is an invidious distinction between
experience and language, is to say that that is just the way things
are, the way reality composes itself. I think you agree on that point,
but I'm still unclear on what move you do make. You make on
occasion, in different kinds of conversation, the same move Pirsig
makes in Lila when pressed on this kind of question, that this way of
thinking is more beautiful, makes so much sense of the world, works
better. (That move is made in the conversation in the
aforementioned post.) But that move just signals that the
conversation is over, for what is left to the other conversant who
disagrees other than, "Hunh--I disagree about what is more beautiful,
makes more sense, works better"? What is needed to move on is a
delineation of specifically what it is that works better, which means
specifying a problem and the tool that needs to be used but can't be
by others who don't agree on that special issue.
As it is, I'm not sure I can even follow very far in such progressively
technical discussions. I'm not a professional philosopher. So
perhaps our differences can be put in the relative sense of beauty
we find from different objects. When you want to be stunned into
sublimity, you go outside to watch a sunset. When I want to be
stunned into sublimity, I go to my bookshelf and read Stevens' Opus
Posthumous. Spiritual texts are still texts, but I'm not sure why
we're grading levels of spiritualness, one more pure than another.
Matt
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