[MD] Philosophy and Abstraction

[MarshaV]

Matt,

Caution:  If you let dmb frame the issue "Let me put it this way", he just might try to screw you with it.   


Marsha 
 
 
 

On Nov 29, 2010, at 11:54 PM, david buchanan wrote:

> 
> Let me put it this way; The question is not whether philosophy deals in abstractions or not. Of course it does and it must. The question is whether or not it's a good idea to exclude certain kinds of experience from our reflections. Is it good to have a starting point that says only certain kinds of experiences are worthy of philosophical reflection and articulation? The radical empiricist says "no". He says all experience is worthy. He complains that a certain range of experience has been excluded for metaphysical reasons and he thinks it's time to correct that mistake. This particular radical empiricist thinks Rorty only repeats that mistake.
> 
>> From: dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
>> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>> Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 21:36:22 -0700
>> Subject: Re: [MD] Philosophy and Abstraction
>> 
>> 
>> Matt quoted his essay: 
>> "I think at the heart of the difference between philosophers attracted to the classical pragmatists but repelled by Rorty is the thought that radical empiricism returns us to the scene of life, a counter to abstract philosophical sterilities. I can empathize with the formulation, to the idea of pragmatism "returning us to the scene of life," a formula I've grown fond of. However, what I think we should rather say in most cases, is that philosophy is abstract by nature--that's what it is--and returning to the scene of life is something that people need to figure out how to do, not necessarily philosophies, or other abstract activities. For instance, why would we necessarily want theoretical physics to do so? Philosophy is Dewey's indirect experience--returning to life is knowing, as Wittgenstein put it, when to put philosophy down."
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> dmb says:
>> I understand what you mean and it does get at the heart of the difference. This is an example of where you gleefully embrace a position that makes me cringe. I also think you're mis-characterizing and misreading the situation. 
>> 
>> Roughly, if the scene of life is DQ and philosophical abstractions are static quality, then you would be saying that DQ is something people need to figure out, not philosophies. Isn't that fair?
>> 
>> I think it would only be natural for a MOQer to be alarmed by what you're saying. This is not just picking nits. I'm fairly certain that putting DQ into our philosophies - or rather some working concepts about DQ - is the main mission of the MOQ. 
>> We do want to maintain the distinction between the immediacy of life and reflective knowing and it's good to know when not to reflect. But you are taking a stance that very much opposes the MOQ's main thrust. For Pirsig, the great crime is that somewhere back in ancient Greece Quality was pushed under and made subservient to intellect. I think Rorty has his prints all over this stance, the Rortian lens at work again. From here it just looks like Plato slandering the Sophists all over again. And so I cringe.
>> 
>> 

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