[MD] The Moral Landscape

[plattholden at gmail.com]

On 15 Oct 2010 at 9:16, Steven Peterson wrote:

Hi Platt,

>> Steve:
>> It is part of Harris's thesis that some cultures are better and worse
>> than others where "better" and "worse" refer to the contributions of
>> sets of values to human flourishing.
>>
>
> Platt
> Glad to hear it. But you, I and Harris all seem to beg the question, "What
> constitutes human flourishing?" It seems the answer can only come after
> we have each made certain nonrational moral assumptions. That gets to
> the root of the problem don't you think?.


Steve:
Why do you think that it is nonrational to make assumptions? Part of
reasoning is making assumptions and also holding such assumptions up
to rational criticism. Some assumptions we now make about human
flourishing may turn out to be wrong. We will know only when such
assumptions conflict with other things we learn about human
flourishing.

Consider the parallel to human health.  Not having a precise
definition of what human health is does not prevent us from pursuing
it and understanding it scientifically.

Hi Steve,
Yes, part of reasoning is making assumptions, but the reasoning comes after the 
assumptions. We make seemingly obvious assumptions about human health such as, 
"physical suffering is bad." Yet on closer "rational" examination we know of 
many people who suffered physical hardship and overcame it to contribute to 
human flourishing.  Beethoven, FDR and Helen Keller come immediately to mind.

When I think of nonrational assumptions that are subsequently held up to 
rational criticism I think of creative ideas that come out of the blue in a 
sudden flash of insight, well described by Pirsig in Lila:

"When inorganic patterns of reality create life the Metaphysics of Quality 
postulates that they've done so because it's "better" and that this definition 
of "betterness"-this beginning response to Dynamic Quality-is an elementary 
unit of ethics upon which all right and wrong can be based.

"When this understanding first broke through in Phaedrus's mind, that ethics 
and science had suddenly been integrated into a single system, he became so 
manic he couldn't think of anything else for days. The only time he had been 
more manic about an abstract- idea was when he had first hit upon the idea of 
undefined Quality itself. The consequences of that first mania had been 
disastrous, and so now, this time, he told himself just to calm down and dig 
in. It was, for him, a great Dynamic breakthrough, but if he wanted to hang on 
to it he had better do some static latching as quickly and thoroughly as 
possible. (Lila, 12)

The "static latching" meant applying reason to the idea (initial premise) that 
suddenly "broke through" in a nonrational manner.   
 
>> Steve:
>> Harris has dones that. By just about any measure you can think of, it
>> is the less religious counties in the US and less religious countries
>> that are thriving.
>>
>
> Platt
> Well, that's the root of the problem. What are the measures that put
> one county or country over another on the flourishing scale? Pirsig says
> by its contribution to the evolution of life. Not only is that a moral
> assumption but mighty hard to measure.

Steve:
Some measures that are frequently considered are life expectancy,
literacy rates, poverty rates, unemployment, % of children who are
underweight, GDP per capita, number of residents seeking asylum in
other countries, infant mortality, etc.

Platt
Yes, a fine list of criteria. But, it illustrates my point about begging the 
question. Why are such criteria chosen? Don't they all assume moral judgments?
If you agree that they do, then the real question becomes, "What is the basis 
of those moral judgments? General agreement among civilized people? Natural 
law? Instinct? I don't see how one can give a rational explanation of why it's 
better, say, for one group to live longer than another. 


>> Steve:
>> There you would be very wrong. His book is aimed primarily at liberal
>> intellectuals who are convinced that values talk is noncognitive
>> babble.
>>
>
> Platt
> Thanks for the correction, although it doesn't specifically address Pirsig's
> critique of intellectuals. Still I wonder: does Harris define a initial
> premise
> for a moral code? Pirsig posits advancement of evolution. Ayn Rand posits
> individual freedom. I posit expansion of consciousness. What does Harris
> posit?
> And how do we escape from invoking a nonrational moral judgment in
> establishing any initial premise?


Steve:
Harris's premise is that human well-being is a matter of conscious
experience which depends on facts about the world and facts about
ourselves--facts that we can learn about through scientific inquiry. I
don't see how this could be viewed as a nonrational premise. That
morality is a matter of increasing the well-being of sentient
creatures capable of experiencing happiness and suffering is simply a
definition of moral concern. There is nothing nonrational about making
definitions, and it is no arbitrary choice to define conscious
experience as the source of values since anything that is never
experienced could be of no concern. What other source of values--one
that is completely independent of conscious experience--could there
be?

He is content to leave well-being itself as a currently loosely
defined and continually redefined term such as physical health that we
we will better understand be better able to define with precision as
we study it. What is important is that we begin thinking of morality
as something that has to do with well-being and as something that we
can be right or wrong about. There may be multiple peaks on the moral
landscape, but there is an objective difference between moving toward
a peak or moving toward a valley.

Platt
I think you have made my point. "Well being" reminds me of "human rights" that 
Pirsig blasted in Lila:

"What passed for morality within this crowd was a kind of vague, amorphous soup 
of sentiments known as "human rights." You were also supposed to be 
"reasonable." What these terms really meant was never spelled out in any way 
that Phaedrus had ever heard. You were just supposed to cheer for them." (Lila, 
24)

I can cheer for "well-being" along with Harris and everybody else. But, when it 
comes to specifying a basis on which we can agree as to what a moral standard 
like "well-being" will actually lead to in practice, I'm afraid we will 
continue to go around in circles. Let's never forget that every dictator in 
history appealed to the "well-being" of the nation to justify his actions. Both 
communism and capitalism appeal to well-being for support, yet the outcomes 
have been radically different. 

Pirsig's defines "well-being" as that which improves response to Dynamic 
Quality, a rational conclusion from his initial assumption that the world is a 
moral order. From what you've told me about Harris, his metaphysics is still 
good old SOM. But maybe he can tell us on what rationally-determined moral 
basis he defines "well-being." 

Best,
Platt