[MD] An attempt to reconcile the Metaphysics of Quality with the Cartesian dichotomy and ordinary epistemology

[Alexander Jarnroth]

In reply to Mark (118)

Actually I mostly don't translate English into Swedish and thus I can
sometimes have an understanding of a word in one language without being able
to translate it directly to the other. 
The concept of direction is interesting, as you are generally modeling
directions by vector (either geometrically or algebraically, by matrices for
example). The interesting thing with mathematics is that it actually
includes a lot of what is generally considered subjective, and thus, in the
Cartesian dichotomy, you must place it at the boundary. But considering the
Cartesian dichotomy just a mental concept, it becomes just a way to think
which is sometimes useful, which, in the boundary of the dichotomy itself,
makes it subjective also. One thing I was thinking about this morning,
concerning mathematics as a means to describe, or model, its Boolean
algebra, which is an abstract algebra. Formal logic, set theory and networks
of computer circuits are equivalent patterns of reason modeled by Boolean
algebra (and geometrically by Venn diagrams). Every Booleans algebra is
binary, so there are only two values, 1 and 0. There are two included
operations (another dualism) and their respective inverses (a third
dualism). In reasoning the two operators are equivalent to concepts of
parallelism and sequence. However, ordinary arithmetic doesn't follow these
rules, and neither do the most patterns of the central nervous system.
Thus it ought to be obvious that neither the world nor the conscious
experience of the mind, could be completely described by formal logic / set
theory only.

One way of considering morals in a rough way is saying that everything that
work/function, is right. But then we're back to what I wrote earlier: "to be
rational is to strive toward function, but there is no rational way deciding
which function towards which to strive".
What I found interesting with MoQ was, as I wrote then, that by using it you
actually could find that in a rational way. Thus MoQ is also somehow
rational, as you wrote and that was the reason I thought it should be
possible to create a map between the two. Pirsig actually try to explain
ordinary Epistemology in statements of MoQ, so what I tried to do, was also
trying to explain MoQ in statements of ordinary epistemology. Thus in terms
of ordinary epistemology dynamic quality becomes an impressive map of
external reality upon the perceiving subject, as an example. Of course, on
top of this I place Conceptual Systems Theory, which states that I could use
any concept I like to describe, analyze and synthesize experience. The two
are then just to different concepts none really better than the other as
long as they somehow "corresponds" to what actually is perceived (and thus
makes both inductions and deductions possible). Concerning MoQ and
direction, then again, the only thing I can see that it intrinsically does,
is establishing an order of priority, or supremacy concerning moral
judgments. I think Pirsig kind of described this method I practice in the
first book, while writing about the motorcycle maintenance. But this is, as
far as I can see, the only direction it intrinsically has. And if you try to
imagine the "dynamic cosmos" as an infinite-dimensional space, in which you
could place your vector, one would be interested in just which dimensions
the vector points and in which it doesn't. A sign telling you to follow the
road, as an example, doesn't consider the third dimension of "up and down"
at all, but just the two-dimensional plane of an ordinary roadmap.

Well, I don't know whether if this makes any sense to you or not. However,
my train of thought just stops here.

/A

-----Original Message-----
From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
[mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of 118
Sent: den 21 oktober 2010 23:25
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Subject: Re: [MD] An attempt to reconcile the Metaphysics of Quality with
the Cartesian dichotomy and ordinary epistemology

Hi A,

Ordinary reply works for me.

Don't worry, especially if you challenge someone's premise you will get more
replies than you need.  There are some who have more authority due to their
length of stay here, and I am certainly not one of them.  Nonetheless, we
are all experts in our opinions.

 You provide a mechanistic explanation of freedom, which I would like to
extend into the realm of free will (you actually do this with your example
of society).  This would bring in the concept of morality.  One proposition
is that we live in a moral universe.  As humans, we view that in our own
way.  Such anthropocentric interpretation is a model through which we can
provide insight into a possible direction (or pulsing, or circle), of our
awareness.  So to use your analogy, I would ask whether such free will
provides an indication towards direction?  I would also ask whether there
can be too much free will which would create a meltdown of any progress.
 The dark ages may have had more free will than its religious boundaries (or
book ends).  There is talk in this forum of encapsulating free will into a
binding structure which is then used as a measure for morality or value.  If
the scope of MOQ is used in such a way (as is much of metaphysics), then
certain boundaries need to be defined.

To me cybernetics implies homeostasis, and certainly all of reality can be
considered as a system (please do not ask me to define reality, you can go
with your definition).  One can bring in Taoist principles to create a
metaphysical structure on this basis.  I prefer the notion of an arrow which
implies direction (perhaps more of a Buddhist or Christian outlook).
 Whether the destination already exists or is being formed under some kind
of rules is not important.  It is the describing of the direction itself,
which I am contemplating.  One such direction takes a rational approach,
another is a completely subjective mystical one.  Often insight can be
gained through the mystical (or subconscious if you wish) and is then
translated in as accurate way as possible.  This existence could also be
considered a mystical experience that we agree on so let's not get into what
I mean exactly.  It is more of an objective/subjective differentiation.

Taking stock of what we have, and where we are going can be done through a
number of labeled philosophical premises.  Certainly a spaceship is under
some kind of cybernetic control, but it is still going somewhere.  I was
wondering whether you have considered this directional aspect.  If the
guiding principle is morality (cybernetics), what is the direction?  What
defines morality of higher quality?

Obviously I have a lot more questions than answers.  But like you say, by
formulating the questions, I have to think about the answers.  It is said
that two brains think better than one.  The digital use of language (which
is quasi analogue if one uses enough words) is an impediment, and there is
often much discussion around semantics.  In your case, this would also
include translation.

Best,
Mark

On Thu, Oct 21, 2010 at 1:21 PM, Alexander Jarnroth <
alexander.jarnroth at comhem.se> wrote:

> In response to *Mark from California* (118)
>
> Let's hope I can make this mail-function work. I'll just try an 
> ordinary reply.
>
> ***
>
> I thought that you had discussed most of this - but I thought going 
> through everything, without actually knowing where to search for what, 
> would be too great a work to be done at this moment. So I thought, why 
> not just present my own thoughts and see what replies I might get? So
that's what I did.
> I have been at some forums before, and at most of them I have more 
> often than not met with very weak opposition. Most people just don't 
> know how to respond to the ideas I propose. This place seems to be 
> different, which is just what I hoped. I like opposition, that's what 
> forces one to think more than once and it makes you find what could be 
> wrong with your own trains of though which otherwise can take quite a
while.
>
> ***
>
> Considering the degree of freedom (negentropi, information, 
> improbability) of a system, I said it could be invested either in 
> metabolism (that is function or ability to perform work) or structure
(that is static pattern).
> Energy with too high degree of freedom, being invested in metabolism 
> would produce som sort of "meltdown" and destroy the system. But with 
> too low a degree it would make the system stop function the way it 
> did. Energy with high degree invested in structure, could make a 
> system to "mechanistic" so that it would be unable to repair itself, 
> much like a computer which not too seldom just breaks down by its own 
> accord, or perhaps a bureaucracy making a society unable to make 
> decisions. With too low a degree invested in structure, however, the 
> system would after a while stop functioning as a whole and become 
> decomposed an scattered (that is, the abstract system would cease to 
> work and then the concrete system is object only to the physical 
> forces - or the "physical moral"). So much for ordinary systems.
> Considering
> control, I can't help thinking about cybernetics, and the it is often 
> the abstract system which asserts the control function, much like the 
> state is controlling society (but of course, the society can in some 
> respects control itself dynamically only be means of social convention 
> - but then being to less organized such huge bodies of people as 
> exists today couldn't possibly exist - thus the systems of today are 
> dependent upon more static social institutions such as the state - but 
> these institutions free the individual in other respects too) - as a 
> controlling or regulatory function. That a high degree of freedom is 
> invested in structure, you could say, just means it could be 
> decomposed in many different ways. A system with no degree of freedom 
> couldn't possibly be decomposed at all because it would be devoid of 
> structure.
> I'm actually not sure whether this really answered your question. If 
> it didn't I beg you clarify.
>
> /A
> (Alexander Jarnroth)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
> [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of 118
> Sent: den 21 oktober 2010 21:24
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Subject: Re: [MD] An attempt to reconcile the Metaphysics of Quality 
> with the Cartesian dichotomy and ordinary epistemology
>
> Hi Alexander from Sweden,
>
> Let me say that your English is very readable.  Thank you for the 
> refreshing post and for your description of Quality through the 
> analogies you presented.  I could respond paragraph by paragraph, 
> which I sure you will get from others, and many of the subjects you 
> propose are dealt with in other posts.  This doesn't suggest you need 
> to scan all the history, but it means that you are not alone.  You 
> will also find that your attempt at reconciliation is far from done if 
> you continue to participate.
>
> You dealt with the subjective-objective divide in interesting ways, 
> and the elusive mind is a fascinating topic.  Some will expand the 
> mind to include everything, that is no distinction between subject and 
> object.  Others will shrink the mind to nothing and deny its existence 
> (the Buddhist concept of emptiness).
>
> We have discussed thermodynamic theory as it relates to MoQ.  Systems 
> theory is one that I have alluded to in terms of its use in MOQ.  We 
> have also discussed maps within maps.  All are good for developing 
> MOQ.
>
> So, I will only ask for clarification of one small topic which is 
> presented in your following statement:
> [Alexander]
> "Living systems, then, interact with their surroundings in such a way 
> as to optimize their degree of freedom both in term of "flowing 
> energy" and their own patterns of structure"
> [Mark again]
> This sense of optimization provides a sense of morality.  And yes, 
> survival of the fittest is indeed a tautology, but it is hard to find 
> any concept that is not ultimately self referential since our 
> intellectual level is artificial and ultimately does not have any 
> strict (or true) foundation, but rests on itself.
>
> So back to the clarification: How is the degree of freedom conceived?  
> I am well familiar with metabolism and the biology, so that is not 
> what I am asking.  There is a lot written on how structure adapts to 
> meet the surrounding, which would indicate that such freedom is under 
> a high degree of control.  So freedom within boundaries is perhaps 
> what you are speaking to.  If we are operating within a moral system, 
> are there degrees of freedom within that can be used to provide shape 
> to it?  I am not asking for a summation of the parts as you put it, 
> but by understanding the parts there can be inference of the whole, 
> however sketchy or wrong it may be.  Such inference is then proven or 
> disproved, as theories come and go.
>
> Cheers,
> Mark from California.
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 21, 2010 at 10:05 AM, Alexander Jarnroth < 
> alexander.jarnroth at comhem.se> wrote:
>
> > First I want to beg pardon if I my English in some ways isn't perfect.
> > I'm not really used to be writing in English.
> >
> > ***
> >
> > When I read Pirsig's first book, in the end, I was quite disturbed.
> > Though I approved of what was said, I don't like people just trying 
> > to prove that every interpretation of reality is a superposition. 
> > Today, to most people, that's obvious, but perhaps it wasn't when 
> > the book was written.
> > "Nothing new under the sun", I thought, "it is fun to see that 
> > somebody else has been thinking about the same things as I have, but 
> > you can't just tell people that their ordinary understanding is 
> > wrong unless you could offer them something better. You must be able 
> > to go one living, you know".
> > Then of course, I hadn't yet read Lila, and what an improvement from 
> > the first book!
> > If I did understand Pirsig right, he first divides primary 
> > experience into two categories, dynamic and static. Second, he 
> > divides static into four
> > parts:
> > - Physical (nonliving)
> > - Biological (living)
> > - Social
> > - Intellectual
> > This isn't the interesting thing, but the interesting thing is that 
> > he terms all these levels of moral. I had, before reading, stated 
> > this as a
> > principle: "To strive toward function is rational, but there is no 
> > rational way deciding what function towards which to strive". This 
> > principle was actually based upon mathematical theory of games. In 
> > that theory, you have a set of players, which through a set of 
> > rounds, plays a game, for which they choose a strategy according to 
> > which they choose actions, in order to in the end of the game get 
> > that order of results, which maximize their minimum utility 
> > according to some utility function. Choosing that strategy which 
> > achieve this goal, is said to be rational. What the theory actually 
> > says, then, is that rationality is dependent upon your utility 
> > function, which could be chosen arbitrarily.
> > Now, what about the MoQ? What Pirsig said in Lila was actually: 
> > there is in fact a way to know which utility function to choose.
> > This solved for me a great dilemma of a kind. But that's not all of 
> > it. Had it been, I could as well have taken Kant's categorical 
> > imperative as my moral advisor.
> > When, in the book, Pirsig at first mentioned the division of primary 
> > experience into dynamical and static quality, I came to think about 
> > another book, which I had read about a year before. That's Ludwig 
> > von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory (1968). In the book the 
> > author first says that everything which is called a system is a 
> > whole, which function can't be deduced from the sum of its parts. 
> > Systems can then be either closed or open. A closed system isn't 
> > interacting with its surroundings and will in the end wind down to 
> > thermodynamic equilibrium
> at
> highest possible entropy.
> > An open system, however, is exchanging matter, energy/information or 
> > both with its surroundings and can thus sometimes decrease its entropy.
> > Next he introduces the concept of dynamics and says that every open 
> > system is dynamic, but it can, according to its structure, be more 
> > or less dynamic.
> > And thus he introduces a scale from what he calls high entropy 
> > dynamic function, and low entropy mechanic function of a system.
> > Reading about Pirsig's MoQ, the analogy with von Bertalanffys GST 
> > struck me immediately.
> > You could then say, that somehow there ought to be an analogy 
> > between the ability to perceive dynamic quality and dynamic function 
> > and an analogy between the ability to perceive static patterns of 
> > quality and mechanic function.
> > Now, Systems theory terms itself, according to its own conceptual 
> > systems theory, a synthesist theory rather than reductionist theory.
> > That is, GST is a creative way trying to describe reality by models 
> > and concepts of wholes, rather than trying to describe everything 
> > there is by reducing it to the sum of some set of parts.
> > GST doesn't consider the set of parts of a system to be mere 
> > elements, but terms them components and also says that a system 
> > isn't just a concrete system, but also an abstract system, which 
> > consists of the set of all relations between the parts (say that the 
> > word concrete here denotes that which could be explained by 
> > classical physics and the
> such).
> > For example, the nervous system of a human being is a concrete 
> > system, but the mind is an abstract system, or the hardware of a 
> > computer is a concrete system but the software is an abstract system.
> > Here could also be considered a concept introduced by Arthur 
> > Koestler in The Ghost in the Machine (1967). He puts experience into 
> > a scale ranging from impressive to expressive.
> > Here the first distinction is made between sensory perception 
> > concerning external states (objects of perception) and motoric / 
> > emotive perceptions concerning internal states (the subject of 
> > perception). Purely impressive perception then, concerns values for 
> > sensory data and purely expressive perception concerns values for 
> > action. Of course, MoQ doesn't make this distinction concerning 
> > dynamic quality, but it does concerning static quality (that is 
> > intellectual patterns of value and non-intellectual patterns of value).
> > This, I thought, was analogous to the mathematical concept of mapping.
> > A mapping is a specified way to transform a pattern from one context 
> > to another, so as to somehow represent the original pattern on the 
> > map thus created. In that way some ordered form of correspondence is 
> > established. To make this interesting, however, you must also choose 
> > some property of a pattern you term as invariant (that is static) 
> > and then let other patterns vary freely (that is being dynamic) and 
> > then term all patterns having, according to some scale, equal 
> > invariants as being equal patterns (the concept is usually applied 
> > within geometry and topology, the former having more invariants than 
> > the latter). What is of interest when mapping then, is which 
> > invariants being preserved, that is, which invariants are equal in the
two or more maps.
> >  While being impressive, the mind somehow maps the world onto itself 
> > and while being expressive the mind maps itself onto the world.
> > According to Koestler, what is termed empirical science is at the 
> > equilibrium point between impressive and expressive. What you do, 
> > when measuring something, is interaction with it. You try to see, if 
> > I do this, what would this thing do then?
> > At this point there are a lot of other concepts which could be 
> > introduced, specifically mathematical information theory, 
> > probability theory and the concept of uncertainty.
> > Information theory is not concerned with meaning, but with the 
> > amount of "things" a given system at a given time and state, could 
> > induce into an observer. This amount is negatively proportional to 
> > the entropy of the system being measured. Now, information, or 
> > negentropy, is also equal to the degree of freedom and the amount of 
> > improbability in statistical mechanics.
> > When there is absolute certainty, the observed system is totally 
> > mechanic, or static with a high degree of freedom but with an amount 
> > of probability tending to zero. When there is absolute uncertainty, 
> > the observed system is totally dynamic, with a low degree of freedom 
> > and a probability tending to unity.
> > In the first case, you wouldn't need any information about the 
> > system to make it function or perform work. In the second case, you 
> > would need an infinite amount of information about the system to 
> > make it function or perform work.
> > Now, in reality, these extremes of the concept never occur, but it 
> > gives a lot of extra dimensions to the scale ranging from dynamic to 
> > static/mechanistic.
> >
> > Living systems, then, interact with their surroundings in such a way 
> > as to optimize their degree of freedom both in term of "flowing 
> > energy" and their own patterns of structure.
> > The first thing is called metabolism and can be left at that. The 
> > second, however, is the same as the mapping mentioned above.
> > Consider a primitive cell and its DNA. The pattern of the DNA forms 
> > an abstract system making the concrete system of the cell work 
> > according to some functions of the abstract system. Now, in this 
> > respect, the DNA molecule is mapping its own pattern onto the world.
> > But how does the DNA map the world onto itself? By evolution and 
> > "natural selection"!
> > Now first, what is natural selection? "The survival of the fittest"
> > Now, what is fitness? That's being adapted to the surroundings. But 
> > what does that mean? Well, it means knowing a lot of things about 
> > the
> surroundings.
> > In
> > usual neodarwinism, you say that natural selection means: the 
> > genetic pattern being most adapted is the pattern managing to 
> > reproduce itself on a larger scale than other patterns, and thus 
> > increasing its share of the population total relative to those other
patterns.
> > But this is, in fact, a tautology. Logically reduced, it becomes 
> > "those becoming most are becoming more than those becoming less".
> > But if you conceptualize evolution as gathering information about 
> > the present state of the surroundings and thus improving your own 
> > interactions with them, then you have a more fruitful concept. And 
> > what
> does that mean?
> > Well, the DNA is mapping patterns of the world onto itself.
> > This is the same thing as said about what the mind does, above.
> > Considering physical patterns, you could say that any fractal 
> > pattern is about the same thing. Considering social systems, the 
> > same could be said about how the actions of a single individual 
> > influence other individuals and how the actions of other individuals 
> > influence a single individual.
> > Now, we actually have analogues to all four different kinds of 
> > static quality in Pirsig's MoQ.
> > A concept in itself is an intellectual pattern, or a pattern of the 
> > mind being superimposed upon primary perception. The Cartesian 
> > dichotomy between mind and matter, then, reduces to being the 
> > difference between what's inside the mind and what's being outside, 
> > but then mind, being the abstract system of the concrete nervous 
> > system, can't be anything conceptually different from any other 
> > abstract system.
> > Thus, I hope, is found a map of sorts between statements made within 
> > Pirsig's MoQ and the Cartesian dichotomy / ordinary epistemology.
> >
> > I want here to mention another concept which I read about in an 
> > essay called Teleology and Biology by Richard T. O'Grady and Daniel R.
> > Brooks (included in an anthology called Entropy, Information and 
> > evolution; new perspectives on physical and biological evolution 
> > (MIT 1989)).
> > The authors propose a distinction between what they term:
> > - Teleomaty (causal relationships),
> > - Teleonomy (ordinary functions) and;
> > - Teleology (goal-directed)
> > Now the first could be the static patterns of physical moral, the 
> > second of biological moral and the third of intellectual. Social 
> > moral being mixed teleonomy and teleology.
> > Teleomatic description of a falling cat would just say that the cat 
> > falls because the gravitational force is working upon it. In a 
> > teleonomic description you must also consider that the cat wasn't 
> > falling a few moments ago, and that it actually has jumped off from 
> > a chair. Considering the falling cat in a teleological way, you 
> > perhaps also observed a mouse, and observed the cat observing the 
> > mouse and then saw the cat jumping off the chair when the mouse was 
> > being just in catching distance from it.
> > It's not exactly the same as Pirsig's static morals, but it offers 
> > another way of reconciliation.
> >
> > Similarly the self could be considered according to MoQ and GST.
> > There is a physical self which accelerate towards the ground while
> falling.
> > There is also a biological self being concerned primarily with 
> > metabolism and reproduction. Upon that is then the social self, 
> > which consists of the relation between the biological self and other 
> > similar such biological selves (this social self is, as far as I can 
> > see, what could survive as a ghost when someone's dead), that is a 
> > component of the abstract social system. Then you have the last 
> > static self, which is the intellectual self, consisting of this 
> > constant mapping between
> itself and its surroundings.
> > According to MoQ, though, there ought to be a dynamic self too - 
> > consisting of the changes occurring in the static patterns. I would 
> > say that this somehow lies at the interface between the static 
> > patterns and the surroundings (through the concrete sensomotoric 
> > system of the nervous system and sensory organs). Considering just 
> > intellectual self and dynamic self, it reduces to the function of 
> > the mapping between the mind and the world. Thus it could be called 
> > the transcendental self, as it is exceeding anything that lies 
> > within the static self. This interface completes the map mentioned 
> > above and the lack of explanation concerning dynamic quality when 
> > introducing Koestler's concept. That is, dynamic quality becomes, 
> > transformed into the Cartesian conception, the interface between mind
and matter.
> >
> > All this said, I consider this attempt at reconciliation done. Just 
> > some final words left to be written.
> > I would say that, knowing what it is you don't know, is the first 
> > step of turning dynamic quality into static quality. Knowing what it 
> > is you don't know is uncertainty. Probably, however, most things you 
> > don't know, you don't know you don't know - and those, still 
> > dynamic, could be
> anything.
> > Thus there surely is an infinite amount of arguments which I might 
> > have missed, some strengthening this attempt, but some surely making 
> > it seem worthless.
> > Every time I find a new concept, while reading about it, I try to 
> > make myself believe the author is God telling me the absolute truth. 
> > When being done, the intellectual reevaluation process starts. This 
> > is the result of my own reevaluation process after reading Lila. I 
> > don't know if it's anyhow correct or to what extent it might be or 
> > whether if the reader would discern it or not. Perhaps all this has 
> > already been said somewhere prior, or perhaps the reader finds it too
static.
> > My only way of find out is telling everybody interested what I think 
> > and hope for an answer, and thus improving myself dynamically. Surly 
> > you must have thought about things which I haven't thought about.
> > In the end, I must agree with Socrates and say that I don't really 
> > know anything.
> > I hope this has been of interest to the reader and I thank him or 
> > her for taking part and hope that the same person also will somehow
respond.
> >
> > Alexander Jarnroth
> > Stockholm, Sweden
> > 10.10.2010
> >
> >
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