[MD] The Dynamics of Value

[Alexander Jarnroth]

In response to Ham Priday's offshoot.

***

This makes me think of one thing that struck me the other day (and I must
admit that the concept of MoQ is still quite new to me). I had also, prior
to reading Pirsig's books, tried to somehow overcome the Cartesian
dichotomy. However, I had tried to do that from the outside of the Cartesian
Subject, trying to turn the subject into an object. What Pirsig does, I
think, is the opposite: turning all the Cartesian objects into subjects,
starting from the inside of the Cartesian subject (that is, beginning with
primary experience, rather than with abstractions from that experience).
I find that approach useful on its own accord. You just disregard some
aspects of experience, at first at least, then state some axioms, and then
start deducing. And I would consider the method rational, as it seems to
work fine.

I have, also, formulated another kind of redefinition of MoQ in Cartesian
terms, from what I presented in my former attempt. Now, mostly, concerning
static patterns.
If you don't consider the laws of physics, most often, every attempt to
perform an act (or action) in the physical universe would be futile. Every
act being in accordance with the laws of physics being "right" in the static
physical moral. Biologic self-preservation is then necessary for an organic
organism to stay intact. Thus, in the moral of biology, such acts that
preserve the organism is to be considered "right". An old individual
organism, for example, would exhaust all its dynamic potential, and thus it
is moral to die of age, (and of course reproduce). It actually seems to be
the case that the cells in man's body are programmed to kill themselves if
not some external force does. That's why no single individual could live
forever, that would be too static, and biologically immoral. So, in the name
of self-preservation constant recreation is necessary among biological
static patterns (thus giving them their dynamic component).
The social system is also primarily concerned with self-preservation and in
the social moral an act threatening the system would be immoral, while acts
preserving it, or dynamically improving it, are to be considered "right". In
that regard, it cares as much about individual human-beings as the
biological body cares about individual cells. And as soon as the abstract
social system is established, it creates its supremacy by necessity. It is,
in fact, enlarging the amount and density of the population it controls,
thus making the survival of the individuals dependent upon itself. Without
the system today, for example, all the people living in urban areas would
die from starvation within a year.
But now, even though the social system dominates the physical and biological
processes within its realm, it can't dominate the mind of the individuals
included. Even though being able to control human actions by threat and
force, it can't control what's going on inside individual minds. Of course,
trying to do this, is what booth Huxley's "Brave new world" and Orwell's
"1984" are about. In reality though, I think it would be impossible by the
means used in these novels.
So thus the order of supremacy among different categories of static patterns
is explained in still another way.  Now, dynamic quality, as mentioned among
biological patterns, would be the ability of constant improvability and
reform.

Considering intellectual patterns, I came to think about another "value",
which isn't explained in ordinary epistemology. That's the concept of
Ockham's Razor. Why should an more simple explanation somehow be better than
a more complicated? Bertrand Russell admits, in "The problems of
Philosophy", that no explanation exists. Considered from the point of MoQ
however, it does. One could say that the amount of applicability and thus
inherent dynamic potential, should be larger within a more simple, and thus
general explanation, as compared to that of a more specific and complicated,
because the latter could always be considered a special case of the former.

Now, going back to values, numbers are also considered "values" and values
is also dependent upon a scale (Pirsig seems to like sophists, and the
sophists claimed the Homo Mensura - measure and scale being interdependent).
So then, in MoQ, primary experience being the ultimate or absolute scale,
that is Homo Mensura and then finds no need to really define that scale.
Considering rationality, in the way I defined it in my first attempt, to be
to act in a functional way, you could say that MoQ is just a rational method
by which to determine and analyze purposes as measured by primary
experience. In that primary experience there is both a will to preserve the
self, that is static patterns, and a will to improve and transcend the self,
that being dynamic patterns.

Again, I don't know if this really contributes to anything. But I hope it
does. I need also both think and actually "evaluate" the theses some more
before I really know what I "believe".

/A
(Alexander Jarnroth)